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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Crip Time in Fin-de-siècle Spain: Disability, Degeneration, and Eugenics
by
Erika Rodriguez
Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Akiko Tsuchiya, Chair
A period of intense nation-building, the late nineteenth century was marked by the search for
medical and legal solutions to the increasing number of bodies that did not align with culturally
constructed expectations of productivity and reproduction in Spanish modernity. Authors of this
time used representations of disability to engage in urgent political questions about population
control and the rights of individuals in the face of increasing medical intervention. In carrying
out this analysis, I raise the question of how representations of disability created a space to
reconfigure the social values that determined what lives matter. Focusing on canonical realist
authors Emilia Pardo Bazán and Benito Pérez Galdós, as well as the modernist Sofía Casanova, I
locate literary production within larger cultural debates by analyzing fiction alongside legal and
scientific constructions of disability. Nineteenth-century scholarship from fields as varied as
criminal anthropology, gynecology, and economics shaped expectations for health around ideas
of national progress. The inability to satisfy work schedules and heteronormative life milestones,
such as marrying and starting a family, became indicators of disability that presented a threat to
social progress. Discussions on racial evolution and imperial decadence raised the stakes of these
debates by tying the health of the nation and to the progression of humanity as a whole. My
analysis of literary texts published between 1886 and 1904 teases out the discursive
iv

convergences and contradictions that constructed disability in relation to time by drawing on the
disability studies concept of crip time — the lifestyle or schedules of a person with a disability
that is culturally imagined as being at odds with progress. By centering on representations of crip
time, this project evidences fin-de-siècle authors’ preoccupation with the devaluation of disabled
subjects and the continuously narrowing definitions of health and ability, as well as their
investment in exploring relationships and practices of care as ways to value life beyond
normative frameworks of productivity and reproduction.

v

Introduction

In a 1906 speech on national improvement, the internationally renowned pediatrician,
Andrés Martínez Vargas affirmed a distinction between the lamentable high infant mortality
rates that implied a depleted national workforce and the “mortalidad tolerable, por debilidad
congénita, vicios paternos, y mala herencias, por enfermedades contagiosas” (tolerable mortality,
due to congenital debility, parental vice, and bad inheritance, by contagious illness).1 This speech
is, in many ways, paradigmatic of the various discourses at play in determining whose lives were
socially valued. Beyond his own expertise as a pediatrician, Martínez Vargas employs statistical
evidence of birth and death rates; draws on political science to calculate the monetary value of a
healthy life; and evokes anxieties surrounding the social role of women by referring to ignorant
mothers as the executioners of children who die of preventable illness.
Perhaps most striking in the confluence of these discourses is how health and ability,
designated as the determinants of the value of life, are conceptualized in relation to time. A
prognosis of debility, unhealthy reproduction, and non-productivity deems a death tolerable
within the project of national progress that, in the nineteenth century, was defined by politicians
in terms of economic growth and military strength. Alison Kafer’s disability studies concept of
crip time, which explores the relation between disabled bodies and constructions of temporality,
enables us to tease out the contradictions and consequences in the political mobilization of
medical discourses across a variety of cultural texts in fin-de-siècle Spain. This examination of
crip time during a period of economic, racial, and national redefinition, reverberates with the
questions, what lives matter and how they are made to matter?

1

All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
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The term discapacidad (disability) was not used in the nineteenth century, nor was there
an exact equivalent. Commonly used terms in medical, legal, and popular texts identified people
by their specific impairments, such as inválido (invalid), ciego (blind), manco (one-armed),
idiota (idiot), demente (mad), and later, more broadly as anormales (abnormal). What does it
mean, then, to speak about “disability” or crip time in the context of nineteenth-century Spanish
literature? Over the past three decades, the field of disability studies has demonstrated that
disability is a social construct and examined institutions and discourses that shaped ideas about
disability, beginning with texts such as Lennard Davis’s Enforcing Normalcy (1995) and
Rosemarie Garland Thompson’s Extraordinary Bodies (1997). More recently, works by Robert
McRuer, Christopher Bell, and Nirmala Erevelles on queerness, race, and economic oppression
have increasingly demanded that disability be recognized as political. As these scholars
demonstrate, the questions of who is likely to become disabled or to receive better treatment are
inseparable from issues of power and social control. Following the understanding of disability as
a social construct shaped by questions of power, “disability” in my analysis refers broadly to
stigmatized embodied difference that was considered an aberrant deviation from historically and
culturally specific norms. Disability as embodied difference includes visible and invisible
physical differences, as well as what we would now consider behavioral and cognitive
disabilities. The latter can be considered “embodied” in that nineteenth-century medical
professionals located subjects’ mental and “moral” differences in the body by conceptualizing
them as being biologically inherited and legible through bodily characteristics.2

2

See Nicolás Fernández-Medina’s Life Embodied (224-231), Laura Otis’s Organic Memory (30-31), Daniel Pick’s
Faces of Degeneration (50-52), and Ilegales de la naturaleza by Campos et al. (32-43).
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Within this context, crip time allows us to interrogate a particular politics of disability:
the expectation that a prosperous future necessitated health and able-bodiedness, which was
naturalized by legal, economic, and medical nineteenth-century discourses. What was at stake in
the politicization of embodied difference in the nineteenth-century Spanish context? And how
did this view of futurity shape understandings of disability in the cultural imaginary? This project
seeks to answer these questions by analyzing fiction alongside legal and scientific constructions
of disability. Following realist/naturalist literary trends, much finisecular literature engaged in
depth with scientific and legal theories, without reproducing them acritically. Literary fiction—
with its conflicting multiplicity of voices and shifts in focalization—invites an analysis that
delves into the uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding disability in the cultural imaginary.
Recent scholarship in Iberian studies has begun to address the co-construction of disability,
gender, and imperialism in Spanish history through studies of literary and cinematic texts.3
However, no specialists have yet carried out a book-length study that addresses the construction
of disability in nineteenth-century Spain, the period in which the medical understanding of
disability as requiring cure or elimination was crystallizing in European thought.
Through an analysis of disability in relation to time in Spanish modernity, “Crip Time in
Fin-de-siècle Spain” scrutinizes the connective tissue between nineteenth-century theories of
degeneration and the growing impulse toward eugenics that would arise in the early twentieth
century. Theories of degeneration in particular were crucial to conceptualizing the disabilities of
individual subjects as consequential to the future of the nation and of humanity. Eugenics grew
3

I refer specifically to Disability Studies and Spanish Culture (2013) and Cognitive Disability Aesthetics (2018) by
Benjamin Fraser; Disabled Bodies in Early Modern Spanish Literature by Encarnación Juárez-Almendros; “‘¡Pobre
pierna que sólo sirve para andar!’ Female (Dis)Empowerments and the Street in Literary and Filmic Tristana”
(2015) by Sara Muñoz-Muriana; the Hispanic Issues Online volume entitled “Freakish Encounters: Constructions of
the Freak in Hispanic Cultures” (2018) edited by Sara Muñoz-Muriana and Analola Santana; and "Becoming
Useless: Masculinity, Able-Bodiedness, and Empire in Nineteenth-Century Spain” (2019) by Julia Chang.
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out of the belief that medical intervention to prevent or correct perceived abnormalities was
urgent, idealizing a future free of disability or disease. Fictional literature at the turn of the
century illustrates a cultural ambivalence toward the narrowing definition of health that
developed through these frameworks, as well as toward increased medical intervention in matters
of social control. Along with this ambivalence, the works I examine reveal an awareness among
nineteenth-century Spanish authors that disability is political and relational. That is to say, that
disability is defined in part through relationships that can devalue a disabled subject with the
objective of minimizing or eliminating disability from the future, as well as through relationships
that affirm the agency of disabled subjects. By paying attention to the role of crip time in
literature, we can see how nineteenth-century Spanish authors questioned aspects of degeneration
and eugenics theories and began, at times, to imagine the attitudes and relationships surrounding
disability that could lead to a future in which disabled subjects would not be cast aside.
This project translates “crip time” and other disability studies concepts into the latenineteenth century Spanish context by drawing on the disciplines of political economy, science,
medicine, anthropology, and criminology of the time. This analysis engages with the work of
Spanish thinkers, as well as with discourses that originated elsewhere in Europe and were
influential in Spanish debates. For example, Bénédict Morel’s theory of degeneration; Thomas
Malthus’s work on population control; Samuel Smiles’ writings on the importance of thrift and
individualism; and Cesare Lombroso’s work on criminal anthropology were all subject to
translation and cultural exchange throughout Europe, and influenced Spanish thinkers. Beyond
the translation and circulation of texts, ideas were exchanged in real-time at international
conferences, which became increasingly popular in the latter half of the nineteenth-century and
beginning of the twentieth. As a result, scientific and economic discourses across Europe shaped
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expectations for health, often grounding the importance of medical intervention around ideas of
national progress. Spanish doctors, scholars, and politicians interpreted these discourses under
the context of anxieties surrounding the notion of national progress.4 Although Andrew Ginger
and Elena Delgado have compellingly contested the “backwardness” of Spain during this time,
noting that Spanish concerns erupted in concert with the social strains felt through much of
Europe, the particular anxieties among the Spanish ruling classes surrounding expectations of
progress impacted the ways in which international discourses were translated into the Spanish
context. As my analysis will show, the construction of crip time—of the social understanding of
who constitutes a hindrance to progress—was shaped by these historical factors.
Crip Time and Curative Time in Fin-de-siècle Spain
Among people with disabilities and chronic illnesses, crip time winkingly refers to the
experience of being late for any reason related to being disabled — for instance, because the
side-effects of a medication include lethargy or because the entrance for people with mobility
impairments was under construction. Disability theorists have put the term to a more expansive
use.5 Kafer in particular has laid out the way in which crip time can refer to the construction of
disability in relation to time (through diagnoses and prognoses, for example) and to a disabled
person’s experience of time (for example, PTSD flashbacks or planning for a future flare up)

4

Among these, such prominent figures as Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Ángel Pulido, Rafael Cervera y Barat,
Felipe Monlau, Juan Giné y Partagás, Ángel Fernández Caro, and Ángel Ganivet. Joshua Goode notes that this
perspective was wide-spread, as Krausists “pursued anthropology and sociology as methods of uncovering the laws
that demonstrated physical health to be a precursor of social health and healthy living conditions of individuals as
prerequisites for moral societies” (34). Goode argues that political support for criminology intensified after the
assassination of Cánovas del Castillo.
5

Alison Kafer’s Feminist, Queer, Crip constitutes the first sustained theoretical development of crip time, but she
notes that Irv Zola and Carol Gil were the first disability studies scholar to consider crip time an essential and
political component of disability culture. Following Kafer’s work, disability studies scholars Ellen Samuels, Sami
Schalk, Eunjung Kim, and Elizabeth Freeman have written on conceptualizations of time and disability.
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(25-28). In both of its manifestations, crip time, according to Kafer, probes the social
expectations for the rhythms and schedules of everyday life, as well as for the sequence of roles
that subjects may enact at different points in their lives. To live in crip time means to live outside
normative timelines, which may be defined in part through work schedules, as well as the
heteronormative life markers of marrying and having children. Kafer’s work is predominantly
rooted in 20th and 21st century U.S. culture studies, however the approach she offers, inspecting
the consequences of the specific ways in which disability is conceptualized in temporal terms, is
clearly applicable beyond the contemporary Anglophone context. The construction of crip time
in the nineteenth-century European context is particularly worth examining given the rise of
medical authority, as well as by the reform and increase in the number of institutions of control.
Arguably the most significant factor in the construction of disability in relation to time in
nineteenth-century Europe was the rise of intersecting discourses of progress and degeneration.
Daniel Pick has shown that research on degeneration “maps out various conceptions of atavism,
regression, relapse, transgression, and decline within a European context so often identified as
the quintessential age of evolution, progress, optimism, reform, or improvement” (2). In the
second-half of the nineteenth century, degeneration—the concept that certain groups of people or
that humanity as a whole was in decline—referred to the scientific belief that non-white races
had degenerated from the white ideal, as well as to pathologies inside European nations. This
broad understanding of degeneration brought together a range of stigmatized bodies and
behaviors, including (but not limited to) alcoholism, syphilis, epilepsy, criminality, madness,
idiocy, rickets, or any congenital deformity. As it shifted from a philosophical theory to a crux of
scientific investigation and social criticism, degeneration was established as a biological force
that constituted an internal danger to the future of European nations (Pick 20-21). Spain was no
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exception. As Ricardo Campos demonstrates, Spanish medical professionals’ claims that they
were able to decipher physical characteristics as symptoms of degeneration cast them as
harbingers of progress (98). Beyond interpreting subjects’ physical characteristics, doctors began
mapping genealogical trees as a way of confirming that a subject was the result of a process of
degeneration and that their offspring would likewise be degenerates (99). In this way, medical
discourses effectively located the disease or disability of an individual within a trajectory that
exceeded their lifespan, signaling past deficiencies, as well as the threat of their continuation into
the future.
A basic premise in disability studies is that the medical model, which is what we see in
theories of degeneration, takes disability to be a problem that necessarily reduces quality of life
and must be solved exclusively through interventions in the disabled body.6 Conversely, the
social model, which was first established in the 1980s, identified disability as a culturally and
historically specific phenomenon (Barnes 3-5). The more recent political/relational model, first
elaborated by Kafer, acknowledges the ways in which pain and discomfort can constrain daily
life, while emphasizing that disabilities are experienced in relationships with others and that
disability cannot be divorced from discussions of politics (4-10).7 Building on these
understandings of disability as implicated in relations of power, Alison Kafer sees the medical
model’s insistence on a cure as giving rise to “curative time,” a temporal framework in which

6

The criticism of the medical model is not aimed to critique disabled people who may choose to undergo treatment
or pursue a cure. Rather, the objective is to signal that, historically, the medical construction of disability as a
problem to be solved has minimized disabled people’s agency. For further information on this distinction, see Kafer,
p. 27.
7

The social model is based on a distinction between “impairment” as a physical or mental limitation and
“disability” as a social barrier. The relational/political model argues that both impairment and disability are social.
This can be seen as comparable to the gender studies distinction between sex and gender, and the later
acknowledgment that sex is also gendered.
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cure or the elimination of disability is assumed, and nothing other than medical intervention can
be imagined as acceptable (27). Although the medical model of disability may have existed
before the nineteenth-century, the increase of medical professionals and the proliferation of
medical literature likely granted curative time greater authority in the cultural imaginary. In
Spain, the number of medical professionals doubled in the second half of the nineteenth century,
reaching 10,000 registered doctors in Spain by 1895 (Jacobson and Moreno Luzón 106). With
the rise of the medical profession and the urgency and scope implicit in theories of degeneration,
curative time became a social imperative: it became the responsibility of the medical
professional to cure society itself (Campos et al. x).
The application of curative time to address social pathologies in the nineteenth century is
inextricable from the construction of race at the time. According to Pick, the uses of theories of
degeneration to characterize non-European groups as primitive and to pathologize threats within
European nations resulted in stigmatizing social ills as anachronistic (11-13). There are two parts
to this dynamic: first, the anthropological view of non-European cultures as belonging to the
past, which upheld the hierarchy of civilized and uncivilized nations (Pick 38); and, secondly,
the categorization of people within European nations as being either civilized or degenerate, and
therefore less European (Pick 39). The use of degeneration theories to enforce social norms is
evidenced by the fact that the racialization of domestic subjects was introduced by
criminologists. Lombroso’s explanation of arrested development or atavism as a predominant
factor in the pathology of crime was one of the most widely influential of these theories, as well
as one of the most significant for the use of degeneration in discourses of social control across
Europe (Pick 109).

8

As cultural historian Joshua Goode and medical historians Campos et al. have
demonstrated, anthropological constructions of race were turned inward to diagnose criminality
in the late-nineteenth century. Goode argues that Spanish anthropologists’ efforts to position
Spaniards as a superior European race while negotiating Spain’s historical ties to Africa led
anthropological discourses to define the Spanish race as a fusion. Drawing from these
anthropological findings, Spanish criminal anthropologists subsequently identified Spanish
criminal trends as due to their unique racial fusion (Goode 143; 174). Goode shows that the two
landmark criminological publications of the time, El delincuente español (The Spanish
Delinquent) by Rafael Salillas and La mala vida en Madrid (The Low Life in Madrid) by
Constancio Bernaldo de Quiros, attributed Spanish criminality to the unhygienic conditions of
the lower classes and to Spaniards’ African and Romani descendancy (165-172). Salillas’s
suggestion that environmental conditions shaped racial characteristics during fetal development
(ix-xii), exemplifies how criminality, public hygiene, and gynecology intersected in curative
time, specifically in the racialized intervention to eliminate embodied difference. Campos et al.
have noted that, while not all degenerate subjects were considered criminals, theories of
degeneration nevertheless designated physical abnormalities as signs of moral degeneration (47).
This medical framework marked people with disabilities as subjects of observation and
potentially as “ilegales de la naturaleza” (outlaws of nature; Escuder 43).8 To put it another way,
people with disabilities that medical professionals could interpret as signs of degeneration were
envisioned as bodies that belonged to the past and constituted a threat by their very existence in
the present.

8

Ilegales de la naturaleza by Campos et al. takes this quote as the title of their work. Their groundbreaking analysis
also offers a wealth of materials on nineteenth-century medical professionals, including Escuder, which I otherwise
might not have encountered.

9

Alongside criminology, concerns about healthy reproduction and the ability for
production gave rise to public and private hygiene as a manifestation of curative time. As Jo
Labanyi argues, women and members of the working classes posed a particular problem to the
construction of a homogenous national society in Restoration Spain, and the construction of
hygiene as a “social medicine” offered at least a partial solution to this crisis (Labanyi 66).
Hygiene texts and manuals attempted to turn workers and women into groups of responsible
individuals who were invested in the future physical and moral health of their nation (Labanyi
66-71).9 Ricardo Campos and Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña have demonstrated that public hygiene
sought to regulate the lower classes by offering proposals to reform worker’s laboring and living
conditions and by pathologizing vagrancy, gambling, and alcoholism as social ills with the hopes
of curtailing degeneration and preventing social unrest (Rodríguez Ocaña 26; Campos 1093).
Conversely, private hygiene reified middle-class women’s responsibilities in safeguarding the
health of their household, and in particular of their children, the future citizens of the nation
(Labanyi 67).10 As Labanyi, Ocaño, and Campos have shown, hygiene functioned as a
normalizing discourse. In relation to concepts of crip and curative time, hygienic texts promoted
the inclusion of preventative behaviors as part of the normative narrative of time, in which adults
marry, work, reproduce, and take the required preventative measures to continue their function of
being socially useful and economically productive.

9

Labanyi lists the following as the most well-known hygienic publications of the time: Pedro Monlau’s Higiene del
matrimonio (Hygiene of Marriage; 1853), Elementos de la higiene pública (Elements of Public Hygiene; 1846),
Elementos de la higiene privada (Elements of Private Hygiene; 1871); Juan Giné y Partagás’s Curso elemental de la
higiene privada y pública (An Elemental Course on Private and Public Hygiene; 1871); Benito Alcina’s Tratado de
higiene privada y pública (Treatise on Private and Public Hygiene; 1882); and Francisco Javier Santero’s Elementos
de higiene privada y pública (Elements of Private and Public Hygiene; 71).
10

Labanyi notes that the gendered function of private hygiene was codified in the 1857 Moyano Law, which
specifically prescribed hygiene as an obligatory subject for girls’ education (67).
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The understanding of medicine as the solution to curing and preventing social problems
ranging from the spread of epidemics to the eruption of revolution made medical discourses
influential in juridical and legislative processes, which ultimately laid the groundwork for
Spanish eugenic proposals in the early twentieth century. We can think of eugenics as curative
time on an intergenerational scale: preventing the reproduction of degenerate subjects, was seen
as a pre-emptive cure for generations to follow. The term “eugenics,” coined by Francis Galton
in 1883, would not circulate in Spain until the first decade of the twentieth-century (González
Soriano 112), but the curative impetus to direct the future of the nation through medical
intervention in reproduction already existed in the medical and political discourses of the
1880s.11 As Raquel Álvarez Peláez and Mary Nash have established, the terms of the eugenic
debate in the Spanish context focused on increasing the number of healthy marriages and
reducing unions that would produce degenerate offspring (Álvarez Peláez 103; Nash 199). Early
eugenic efforts, according to Campos et al., centered primarily on educating the working and
middle classes about what constituted a healthy union and encouraging doctors to offer marriage
counseling (187-193). However, several hygienists, including Malo de Poveda and Álvarez
González, insisted that a medical certificate should be required for subjects who intended to
contract marriage in order to ensure that degeneration would not continue into the next
generation (Campos et al. 178-186). While no such law was passed Spain, the extensive
discussions that surrounded it in the medical community point to an ethical struggle amongst

11

This is exemplified by Alfonso XII’s speech at the 1882 inaugural ceremony of the Sociedad Española de
Higiene, in which he explained the national importance of each subject’s hygienic behaviors by proclaiming, “se
trata de mejorar la sociedad, procurando en lo posible acrecentar la superioridad de nuestra raza, con lo que
podríamos contar con soldados y trabajadores más útiles e inteligentes” (the objective is the improvement of society,
doing everything possible to increase the superiority of our race, so that we might count on more useful and
intelligent soldiers and workers; Rodríguez Ocaña, La constitución 30).
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medical professionals to determine under what conditions the agency of individual subjects could
be sacrificed in favor of the potential health of a future society.12
Disability in Nineteenth-Century Spanish Literature
While disability studies is relatively new to the field of peninsular literature, my work on
disability and crip time is rooted in conversation with nineteenth-century Iberian studies
scholarship on deviance and social control. Jo Labanyi’s interdisciplinary study, Gender and
Modernization in the Spanish Realist Novel, was fundamental to my understanding of the role of
literary fiction in the construction of the nation and the rise of liberal political theory. This work
also enabled me to consider representations of disabled bodies as sites in which anxieties about
the process of modernization proliferate. Akiko Tsuchiya’s Marginal Subjects has been
foundational to my framework for its methodological approach in examining the construction of
marginal subjects in fiction, as well as for its conceptualization of marginal subjectivities as
opening spaces in the cultural imaginary to challenge established norms. Teresa Fuentes Peris’s
work on deviancy, waste, and filth in relation to degeneration was crucial to my understanding of
the co-constructions of disability and class in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Alongside the interdisciplinary cultural studies on gender and deviance, Global Hispanophone
scholars Alda Blanco, Susan Martin-Márquez, and Lisa Surwillo, among others,13 have expanded
the scope of the discipline to include a social history of imperial and racial thought in fin-desiècle Spain. The cultural debates over Spanish colonialism during this period enrich my own

12

The conflict surrounding this question would be central to the issues of family planning and birth control that
would arise in the Spanish eugenic conferences of the 1920s and 30s. For more information see “Maternidad,
feminidad, sexualidad: Algunos aspectos de las Primeras jornadas eugénicas españolas” by Marie-Aline
Barrachina.
13

Other prominent scholars working in transatlantic and transpacific studies include Joyce Tolliver, Mary Coffey,
and Aurelie Vialette.
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discussion of the racialized construction of disability and the use of degeneration to construct
what Ann Laura Stoler refers to as the “biologized ‘internal enemy’” located within the nation.
Given the rise of interdisciplinary cultural studies in Spanish literary criticism over the
past 25 years, the introduction of disability studies, however recent, has been well-received in the
field of Iberian literary studies in the U.S. academy. Recent books by Iberian studies scholars
Encarnación Juárez-Almendros and Benjamin Fraser have respectively offered important
contributions to disability studies in the early modern period and the twentieth- and twenty-first
centuries in Spain, and nineteenth-century specialist Julia Chang has published articles on
disability in the Spanish fin-de-siècle. My own project, particularly chapter 1, dialogues with
Chang’s work on disability, empire, and gender. The use of “crip time” in my theoretical
framework, however, offers new approaches to the burgeoning field of Iberian disability studies,
as well as to disability studies more broadly, as crip time has not been applied in literary
criticism in any field, including Anglophone studies. “Crip Time in Fin-de-siècle Spain” probes
the entangled ethical debates over corporeality and the social control of bodies in Spain and
demonstrates how authors of this time used representations of disability to engage in urgent
political questions about population control and the rights of individuals in the face of increasing
medical intervention.
In the texts I analyze, published between 1886 and 1904, Spanish authors respond to the
specific cultural debates of the Spanish Restoration (1874-1931), as well as to international
literary trends of the time. Spanish realists of the 1880s saw literature as a way of scrutinizing
difficult social problems and uncovering their causes through engagement with scientific
discourses. By the 1890s Russian spiritualism influenced the work of prominent Spanish realists
such as Emilia Pardo Bazán, Benito Pérez Galdós, and Leopoldo Alas. As Elizabeth Smith
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Rouselle has explains, the spiritualist manner in Spanish realism denotes “a desire for a reality
that is very different from the current reality of the protagonist” and which is envisioned through
the character’s interior life (120). Following Labanyi’s argument that Spanish realist literature
exhibits an awareness of reality as constituted by representation, Spanish realism’s investment in
the representation of scientific discourses offers fruitful ground to consider the construction of
disability. Similarly, the increased emphasis on character’s interior lives and ethical views during
the late stage of realism offers an opportunity to examine constructions of disability as relational
and to imagine a different reality, without sacrificing the use of scientific discourses that have a
prominent role in literary naturalism.
This analysis focuses on works by canonical realist authors Emilia Pardo Bazán and
Benito Pérez Galdós published during their spiritualist manner, as well as the first novel by the
less canonical author Sofía Casanova, who is most often categorized as a modernist. Despite the
differences in their categorizations, Casanova was writing at the same time as Pardo Bazán and
Galdós, and her immensely popular early fiction responded to the same scientific considerations
and literary movements as that of her realist contemporaries. Kristy Hooper, the only scholar to
carry out a sustained analysis of Casanova’s literary works, has shown that Casanova can be read
“as a continuation of the socially aware, profoundly moral realist novels of Galdós and Pardo
Bazán” (20). El doctor Wolski, Casanova’s 1894 novel which has not received sufficient critical
attention, is a particularly interesting object of analysis for literary disability studies as it is
arguably the first fictional text in Spanish to depict eugenic proposals. Each of the texts I
examine draws from the trends of the late realist movement to engage medical discourses and
confront the ethics of medical intervention implicit in curative time. The trajectory of “Crip Time
in Fin-de-siècle Spain” begins with texts that examine the construction of curative time as
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enacting a slow violence against disabled subjects before progressing toward novels that
explicitly envision ways of valuing disabled subjects and including them in conceptualizations of
the future.
My first two chapters examine the body of the disabled or degenerate, impoverished child
as a site of intervention for the improvement of society’s future in novels and short stories by
Emilia Pardo Bazán. La piedra angular (The cornerstone, 1891), which has not received much
scholarly attention to date, was published at the height of the debates surrounding criminal
anthropology. By explicitly addressing medical and legal discussions surrounding the death
penalty (the “cornerstone” of civilization to which the title refers), La piedra angular explores
the role of medical professionals in determining who should live and who should die with the
objective of improving social health by eliminating degeneration. The two short stories, “La
esteril” (1892) and “Leliña” (1904), focus on wealthy female characters with sterility, and in
doing so illustrate how anxieties about degeneration and class were gendered. The analysis of
these two short stories also offers a new approach to Los pazos de Ulloa (1886), Pardo Bazán’s
canonical naturalist novel, in which problems of female fertility and class function similarly.
Locating Los pazos in relation to her other texts signals a pattern and an increased anxiety
surrounding the role of motherhood in preventing and intervening in degeneration. Through
Pardo Bazán’s attention to criminology, as well as gynecological constructions of gender
difference and motherhood, we can see how theories of degeneration inscribed disability onto the
construction of lower-class and criminal subjects.
Chapter 1, “Curative Time and Unwanted Lives in Pardo Bazán’s La piedra angular,”
centers on the relationship between Doctor Moragas and Telmo, a young adolescent who has not
yet become a criminal but exhibits tendencies toward degeneration, according to the doctor.
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Bazán’s novel questions the idea of the “born criminal” and examines the implications of the
death penalty. Both the death penalty and the possibility of permanent incarceration evoke the
question of how a subject comes to constitute a threat to society and what medical or punitive
practices should be enacted to keep society safe. Pardo Bazán presents and strategically critiques
a medical version of curative time, which proposes to psychologically treat degenerate subjects
by having them repent for their vices, and a legal version of curative time, which maintains that a
degenerate subject is a born criminal and will always be subject to recidivism. The novel reveals
Pardo Bazán’s conflicted views regarding the diagnosis of symptoms of degeneration in
childhood, as well as the ethics of the death penalty and permanent incarceration—even as the
conclusion happily eliminates each of the characters who fall into crip time. Drawing on
anthropology and criminology, this chapter illustrates the co-constructions of disability, race, and
class by examining how debates over permanent incarceration and capital punishment
constructed expectations for “degenerate” bodies.
Continuing the first chapter’s exploration of the racialization and medicalization of the
lower classes, Chapter 2, “Infertility as Disability and the Eugenics of Adoption in Works by
Pardo Bazán,” centers on how medical discourses coded wealthy women’s infertility as a
disability and set it against the reproduction of pathologized, impoverished mothers. In “La
estéril” (The Sterile Woman; 1892), “Leliña” (The Little Idiot; 1903) and Los Pazos de Ulloa
(1886) by Emilia Pardo Bazán, the inability of the wealthy infertile women to fulfill their
feminine roles enables them to want to care for a child or infantilized adult whom is otherwise
deemed socially undesirable. The would-be adoptive mothers’ motivations, however, challenge a
reading of their maternal impulses as purely compassionate. For each of the women protagonists,
the care of degenerate or diseased subjects does not come from affection, but rather from a desire
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to confirm their maternal capacities. Drawing on Kafer’s association between curative time and
eugenics, I show that by putting these two forms of crip time in competition, Pardo Bazán
depicts a eugenic fantasy of adoption. In other words, each of these works reflects a sociological
anxiety surrounding degenerate reproduction and high infant mortality rates in fin-de-siècle
Spain, and narrativizes a biopolitical fantasy in which the continuation of one class or race comes
at the expense of another.
Building on the analysis of medical and maternal interventions of curative time
established in the first two chapters, Chapters 3 and 4 turn to depictions of crip time and
practices of care in Benito Pérez Galdós’s Torquemada series (1889-1895) and Misericordia
(1897). Examples of illness, disability and caregiving abound in novels by Galdós—even in
more explicit ways, such as in Marianela (1878) or Tristana (1892). However, the Torquemada
series and Misericordia are notable in that they examine the motivations, methods, and allocation
of care to disabled subjects as shaped by the economic changes of the Restoration. Specifically,
scholars have referred to the four novels that comprise the Torquemada series as Galdós’s most
searing indictment of late-nineteenth century materialism (Scanlon 264; Earle 30). Misericordia
is the only one of his novels to center on characters belonging to the mendicant class and depict
the everyday practices necessary to survive and preserve one’s health in extreme economic
precarity (Schraibman 882; Garrido Ardila 23; Valdés 35). These two works emphasize the
complexity of charity, care, social control, and attempts to enact practices of resistance through
crip time.
Chapter 3, “Blindness, Madness, and Suicide: Crip Time in Galdós’s Torquemada
novels” focuses on the figure of Rafael Águila, a blind, impoverished aristocrat who eventually
commits suicide. Drawing on Kafer’s understanding of crip time as both how disability is
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understood in temporal terms and how disabled subjects experience their orientation in time, this
chapter examines Rafael’s negotiation of his subjectivity at a time in which the value of human
life was increasingly defined by the ability to build individual and national wealth. Rafael
attempts to affirm his relevance (and insist that his family should care about his opinions on
social life) by offering prophecies about the family’s impending failures and the inevitable
decline of upper bourgeois class, both of which prove to be largely inaccurate. With the birth of
Valentín, his nephew and the family’s heir, Rafael finds himself increasingly neglected. His
sisters’ devotion to the child lead Rafael to realize that the child symbolizes the family’s future,
while he—with his disability and dated social values—can only represent the past. Rafael’s
trajectory reflects how valuing human life in terms of capital can shape the quality of care and
how that, in turn, shapes crip time.
Chapter 4, “Normative Time and Transgressive Caregiving in Galdós’s Misericordia
(1897)” examines how caregiving functions as a tactic of resistance against medical and national
discourses of progress that devalue the lives of ill, disabled, and marginal subjects. Through an
analysis of the relationship between normative time and practices of care, this chapter explores
the two opposing models of care that Galdós depicts in Misericordia: custodial care, aimed at
controlling social deviance and upholding normative time; and caregiving, which takes into
account the needs of the care recipient and rejects utilitarian ideologies that value human life
based on their economic practices. Unlike the caregivers of the previous chapters, Misericordia’s
mendicant protagonist, Benina, does not focus her attention on children, but rather on her
platonic, adult friends, extending her practices of care across non-familial bonds. Drawing from
theories on interdependence in disability studies and feminist political economy analyses of care,
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this chapter shows how Misericordia champions a model of caregiving that enables kinship
across race and class.
Building on the distinction between caregiving and social control, chapter 5 turns to an
early depiction of eugenic practices in Casanova’s El doctor Wolski (1894). The protagonist,
Enrique Wolski is a well-meaning young doctor whose ambitions reflect the practices that
hygienists and early eugenicist began to propose in medical literature and international
conferences at the end of the nineteenth-century. Casanova critiques Enrique’s eugenics project
through the character trajectories of Mara, his fiancée at the beginning of the novel, who breaks
off their engagement when she develops tuberculosis. In the end, Enrique’s eugenics projects
fail, and the novel concludes with a surprisingly idyllic scene of Mara in Lithuania, still living
with tuberculosis and working as a schoolteacher and caregiver. Although her position appears to
reify the idea that women’s primary contribution to society is through maternal care, it also
envisions a project for social improvement that stands in stark contrast from Enrique’s eugenics.
In the final chapter of the novel, Casanova affirms the possibility of creating a community in
which disabled people can contribute to the future.
These chapters elucidate the relationship between disability and time in fin-de-siècle
Spanish literature to reveal that representations of disabled subjects functioned as a nexus for
debates regarding the value of life under the cultural exigencies of progress. The consolidation of
the medical profession intersected with Spain’s waning empire and anxieties about economic
development, leading to the construction of disability as a problem to be cured or eliminated in
the hopes of cultivating a healthier and more productive national population. The novels
examined here, however, regard the impetus toward this vision of progress with ambivalence.
Fictional depictions of disabled subjects with attention to their experiences of crip time
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emphasized the constructed nature of disability and its slippages, drawing attention to the
narrowing definitions of health and ability. Delving into the fraught topics of of charity and care,
Spanish novelists explore potential tactics with which to challenge the curative impulse of the
national imaginary. Ultimately, valuing the lives of subjects cast into crip time compels a reimagining of social values and progress.
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Chapter 1
Curative Time and Unwanted Lives in Pardo Bazán’s La piedra angular (1891)

The title of Emilia Pardo Bazán’s La piedra angular (1891) refers to the debates
surrounding capital punishment in fin-de-siècle Spain and to the argument that the death penalty
was the cornerstone of civil society, but the novel also addresses the elimination of social
deviance more broadly. At one point in Pardo Bazán’s novel, the protagonist, Doctor Pelayo
Moragas, finds himself in an ethical bind: Although he views himself as a kind doctor, who
unerringly upholds the standard of his profession and sympathizes easily with his patients, he
suddenly vacillates between providing medical care for an adolescent boy who has sustained lifethreatening injuries or purposefully letting him die. The young patient is Telmo, the son of the
executioner, Rojo, whom Doctor Moragas believes to be a degenerate subject, and it is
Moragas’s disgust toward the family (and toward degeneration) that tempts him to leave Telmo
without treatment. This scene is emblematic of the larger concerns that the novel raises about
degeneration. How should social deviance be eliminated? What lives should be saved, which
bodies should be allowed to die, and how should that be decided?
Pardo Bazán’s thematic exploration of social degeneration through the debates over the
penal system reflects the medico-legal construction and use of marginal subjects. As historians
Ricardo Campos and Rafael Huertas have noted, Spanish criminal anthropologists at the turn of
the century employed theories of degeneration to frame unhealthy and non-normative individuals
as threats to society on the grounds that they could reproduce a degenerate national race.
Understandably, medicine became a discourse of political intervention that could apply its
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knowledge to individualized bodies, as well as to broader populations. In his lectures at the
Collège de France, Michel Foucault explains biopolitics as the regulation of population by
“making live and letting die” (247). He argues that the medical invention of certain races as
inferior and of certain individuals as abnormal enabled the emergence of biopolitics in the 19th
century as a way of determining what bodies must be eliminated to ensure social progress (241).
Although Alison Kafer’s concept of curative time does not refer explicitly to Foucault, her work
has clear connections to the idea of making live and letting die, as she investigates the normative
timelines and narratives of ideal futures that protect and value certain populations while
rendering others disposable, or otherwise condemning them to “a future of no future” (33).
Curative time, as Kafer defines it, is a temporal framing of disability, a cultural
expectation that a desirable future would be one devoid of disability and illness (27). In this
sense, curative time casts disabled and pathologized bodies as impediments toward a better
future and, in doing so, justifies efforts to eliminate stigmatized bodily difference, even when
these efforts have violent effects. Eunjung Kim has expanded on this aspect of curative time by
theorizing “curative violence,” the harm or destruction of a disabled subject through a curative
process (14). Kafer and Kim’s analyses are respectively based in 20th and 21st century U.S. and
Korean culture studies, but the idea of curative time and its violence is nevertheless useful in
thinking of biopolitical discourses in fin-de-siècle Spain, a historical period in which the failures
of the First Republic and the intensification of crime and poverty led criminal anthropologists,
psychologists, and other medical researchers to seek diagnoses and cures for the perceived
pathologies of the Spanish state, which were often framed in terms of racial degeneration. In this
way, the pathologization of criminals and members of the impoverished classes were constructed
in dialogue with colonial and racial boundaries. This chapter draws on literary disability studies
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to consider the co-construction of race and disability in relation to curative time, as well as the
way in which competing medical and legal views of curative time propose different forms of
curative violence.
Most medical professionals appear in Pardo Bazán’s novels as stereotypes designed to
reinforce the dangers of pathological subjects and the necessity for curative interventions—but
Doctor Moragas moves beyond the simplified type to become a more complex character
(Doménech Montagut 29-30). Moragas is introduced as a clinical physician in a coastal Galician
town who enjoys reading the latest French psychiatry journals in his spare time. In the course of
the novel Moragas applies his knowledge of psychiatric criminology to his patients, Rojo and
Telmo, and debates his views on criminology with Febrero, the defense attorney in a case that
has shaken the town. Febrero represents a woman who has allegedly murdered her husband with
the help of her lover. Moragas, taken by the woman's beauty as she was being transported to the
prison, sympathizes with the struggles of lower-class women and becomes convinced that she
should not be put to death for her crime. In an effort to prevent her death, he makes Rojo an
offer: If Rojo refuses to carry out the execution, Moragas will adopt Telmo and in doing so rid
him of the stigma of being the son of an executioner. Rojo accepts.
In the end, Moragas believes he has saved the lives of two criminals and morally
redeemed the executioner and his son, but Rojo’s suicide in the final scene calls the doctor’s
redemptionist project into question. Doctor Moragas's debate with Febrero over how criminality
or deviance should be eliminated and his medical evaluation of Rojo and Telmo allow the novel
to strategically challenge the ethical claims of both the doctor and the lawyer’s versions of
curative time. Through these discussions, Pardo Bazán approaches the medico-legal discourse of
progress much as Kim approaches the idea of cure, as a “transaction and negotiation that
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involves… the uncertainty of gains and the possibility of harms” (10). However, despite the
narrative’s critique of legal and medical efforts to erase the problems of degeneration at any cost,
La piedra angular concludes with the cure or elimination of several deviant characters and
upholds the idea that progress requires the preservation of normative lives over others.
As Pura Fernández has noted, Pardo Bazán’s novel responded to the “manía jurídicopolicíaca-criminalista” (juridical-detective-criminalist mania; Pardo Bazán, Al pie de la torre
Eiffel 57) that overtook Madrid in 1888. That year, a wealthy widow was found murdered in her
home, leaving her son and her servant, Higinia Balaguer, as the two suspects in the case
famously referred to as the Crime of Fuencarral Street. Scholars such as Carlos Petit and Adolfo
Carratalá have shown how coverage of the case spurred popular and scientific debates over
criminality and the penal system. Within the broader context, debates about penal reform had
been circulating in Spain following the rise of criminology, and specifically of Cesare
Lombroso’s theories, in the early 1880s (Campos and Huertas 310). Historians Pedro Oliver
Olmo and Óscar Bascuñán Añover have demonstrated that, while calls to abolish the death
penalty entirely were rare at the end of the nineteenth century, psychiatrists promoted a cultural
shift away from public executions and toward alternatives that appeared more humane and in line
with the idea of a civilized society (Oliver 284; Bascuñán 215-221). Pardo Bazán’s engagement
with these debates is evidenced by two short publications that precede La piedra angular. The
first is “Impresiones y sentimientos,” published in El Imparcial the day after Higinia Balaguer
was executed in 1890, in which Pardo Bazán critiqued the arbitrary application of the capital
punishment. The second is “Un tratadista de Derecho Penal” in which she favorably reviews
jurist César Silió Cortés’s La crisis del derecho penal—a text that lays out the theories of
prominent criminologists Lombroso, Ferri, and Garafalo, and which, as Fernández has
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demonstrated, Pardo Bazán employed as the theoretical basis for La piedra angular (Fernández
444).
Pardo Bazán’s knowledge of the debates surrounding degeneration and criminality within
different disciplines enable her to establish disciplinary differences between Moragas and
Febrero’s pathologizations of criminality with attention to their respective medical and legal
frameworks. The distinctions between the two characters demonstrate that curative time may be
constituted across an individual's lifespan (Moragas’s view) or that of several generations
(Febrero’s view). As medical historians have noted, clinical psychiatrists in fin-de-siècle Spain
framed degeneration in individualistic terms, while practitioners of legal medicine extended
curative interventions to the social body (Campos et al. 16, 55). These different perspectives,
which we see represented in Moragas and Febrero’s discussions, shaped the ethical core within
the debate over capital punishment in Spain. As criminologist Rafael Salillas describes these
debates, they were approached from a “correctionalist” school of thought and a “positivist”
school of thought. The former was against the death penalty because it held that it was possible
to reintegrate criminal subjects into society after having cured them, while the latter did not
believe in the possibility of curing degeneration and favored social segregation as a means of
preventing criminality (Salillas 259). Moragas (a clinical doctor with an interest in psychiatry)
pities criminals, whom he views as afflicted by an illness that must be cured rather than
punished. Conversely, Febrero, following the theories of criminal anthropologist Cesare
Lombroso, believes most criminals cannot be corrected or redeemed, but that their identification
and isolation would allow the redemption of the species as a whole.
Though Moragas and Febrero's curative temporalities differ, they illustrate the
connections between what Foucault refers to as disciplinary and regulatory technologies. The
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disciplinary technology of power, enacted by Moragas, centers on individualizing bodies and
making them docile and useful through institutional mechanisms; the regulatory technology of
power, modeled by Febrero’s argument, centers on controlling populations through state
mechanisms invested in the life and death statistics of specific groups (249). Febrero’s regulatory
version of curative time, rooted in the idea that everyone should contribute to the evolutionary
correction of the species leads him to contend that the death penalty can, on occasion, serve as a
“metodo curativo” for society (curative method; 186). Although Moragas is appalled by
Febrero’s argument, he seems unaware that his desire to leave Telmo without medical care was
rooted in the same logic that Febrero espouses—that if a subject cannot contribute to the
progress of the species, their life is not worth preserving. By emphasizing the ideological
differences between Febrero and Moragas, it would seem that the novel asks whether the doctor
or the lawyer’s understanding of deviance would prove to be a better solution to the social ills of
the lower class. However, the validity that the novel attributes to both perspectives indicates that
a resolution depends on an elimination of deviance that reconciles disciplinary and regulatory
versions of curative time.
Both conceptualizations of curative time begin with a diagnosis, which, significantly,
serves as the inciting action of La piedra angular. When a new patient enters the clinic and
Moragas struggles to identify him, the violence of the medical gaze is brought to bear on Rojo’s
physiognomy. More intent on discovering his patient’s identity than in diagnosing the biliary
discomfort and insomnia that has led Rojo to the clinic, the distinction between diagnosis and
identification collapses. Moragas examines Rojo’s “facciones oblicuas, pómulos abultados, la
marcada asimetría facial, signo frecuente de desequilibrio o perturbación en las facultades del
alma” (oblique features, bulging cheekbones, and marked facial asymmetry, a frequent sign of
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disequilibrium or perturbation in the faculties of the soul; 6). Under Moragas's gaze, the
description of Rojo’s countenance becomes a conjunction of anomalous signs that suggest the
possibility of deviance. The biological connection between external signs and internal
significance had been the focus of naturalist study as early as the mid-18th century in France, but
within the matrix of evolution and degeneration, Lombrosian criminal anthropology could claim
that phrenology and physiognomy revealed a subject’s ancestry.1 Even for those who doubted the
absolute nature of Lombroso’s claims, such as the Spanish lawyer Silió Cortés, the frequency
and patterns of physiognomic signs (including facial asymmetry and prominent cheekbones)
would allow a “diagnóstico probable” (probable diagnosis; “La crisis del derecho penal” 122,
125). In this context, Moragas's quick observations immediately place Rojo within an
undesirable lineage and anticipate a potential diagnosis of disturbance or disorder.
Following the description of Rojo’s physiognomy, the narrator extends Moragas's
medical interpretation to establish a dichotomy between normal and abnormal, defined
respectively by their connection to progress and degeneration. The narrator comments that if
Moragas were before a mirror and could compare himself to his patient, the marked contrast
would allow him to better understand his own sense of repulsion toward Rojo (6). Emphasizing
the contrast between the two men, the narrator describes Moragas's facial characteristics,
attitude, and posture in terms of a forward thrust and pathologizes Rojo as regressive: “Era la
actitud de Moragas de desenfado… se diría que siempre se disponía a avanzar, presentando el
pecho, adelantando la cabeza, tendiendo la nariz husmeadora y grande. El enfermo, al contrario,
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For physiognomy and phrenology in 18th and 19th century France, see Martin Staum’s Labeling People: French
Scholars on Society, Race, and Empire (1815-1848); for phrenology in 19th century Spain, see Impurity of Blood,
pp. 37-75; for Lombroso’s analyses of the phrenology and physiognomy of criminals, see the first two chapters of
Criminal Man.
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parecía como que, obedeciendo al instinto de ciertos insectos repugnantes, se hallaba
constantemente dispuesto a retroceder…” (Moragas’s attitude was one of self-confidence… one
would say that he was always prepared to advance, presenting his chest, raising his head, putting
forth his large nose ready to sniff things out. The sick man, on the contrary, seemed as though,
obeying the instinct of certain repugnant insects, was constantly willing to recede; 16-17).
Through the comparison the narrator designates Moragas as a standard of normality, and
subsequently identifies Rojo’s abnormality in terms of degeneration.
Beyond functioning as a dehumanizing metaphor, the comparison between Rojo and an
insect exemplifies the appeals to natural history on which certain theories of degeneration relied.
In contrast to Lombroso, who believed that each man replicated the stages of humanity
throughout his life until he reached civilized European adulthood, (Criminal Man 222),
anthropologist Giuseppe Sergi believed that each person replicated pre-human life, and,
consequently, an atavistic subject could display characteristics of inferior animals (qtd. Silió
Cortés 172). Following the narrator’s description of Rojo’s obedience to the instincts that drive
“insectos repugnantes,” Moragas becomes aware of “la repulsión que le infundía el cliente” (the
repulsion the client instilled in him; 17) and corrects himself: “el médico se regañó así propio,
tuvo un impulso de bondad” (the doctor chided himself and had an impulse of kindness; 17).
Although Rojo is associated with base instincts, it is Moragas's seemingly instinctive
disgust toward Rojo that drives the scene. The narrator’s justification of Moragas's disgust
toward Rojo, combined with the doctor’s self-censure, signals that his aversion is a crucial
source of moral tension. The instances in which Moragas is repulsed by Rojo and later by Telmo
are not merely instances of “impetuosity, ruthlessness and … bullying” (Henn 365) or strategic
attempts to gradually “detach” the reader from the doctor by characterizing him as occasionally

28

“cruel and self-indulgent” (Hemingway 103)—rather, these are moments that reveal the anxiety
underlying the power relationship between the able-bodied doctor and his patients and the
motivation for his enactment of curative time.
When Moragas discovers his patient’s identity at the end of the chapter, his excessively
emotional response becomes as much a surprise as the revelation of Rojo’s identity and renders
the doctor the new subject of study. Furious that he has tended to the executioner, Moragas
wraps Rojo’s coins in a handkerchief to avoid touching them and throws the payment out of the
window. “Impresiones y sentimientos” a journalistic piece published in El Imparcial the summer
of 1890, is key to understanding the depiction of Moragas's response to Rojo. In the article,
Pardo Bazán responds to Concepción Arenal’s question regarding why the magistrate is honored
and the executioner is reviled. Acknowledging her repulsion toward executioners, she adds “no
obstante, me vería en grave apuro para razonar mi sentimiento.” In this sense, La piedra angular
is an attempt to understand Moragas's emotional responses to Rojo and Telmo as much as it is an
attempt to portray the psychological life of the executioner and his pre-adolescent son. The first
chapter is therefore significant in that Pardo Bazán strategically depicts Moragas's medical and
emotional approaches to degeneration and frames his excessive emotional responses as
undermining his medical professionalism and scientific framework.
In the chapters that follow, the narrator (without Moragas’s focalization) characterizes
Telmo’s degeneration and relationship to history differently from that of his father: rather than
the bulky, oblique features that seemingly correspond with insectile instincts, the narrator refers
to Telmo’s protruding jaw, thick lips, and the slant of his forehead as African facial features. The
shape of Telmo’s cranium, “...de esas lisas por el occipucio, como si hubiesen recibido un corte,
un hachazo—cabezas de vanidosos, de ideólogos” (... of those that are flat along the occiput, as
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though they had received an axe-blow—the head of a vain man, an ideologue; 29) contrasts with
his expressive blue eyes, resulting in the narrator’s explanation that “en conjunto, la cabeza del
niño recordaba la de un negro… blanco, si es permitida la antítesis” (in conjunction, the head of
the boy reminded one of a Black man who was … White, if the antithesis is permitted; 29). As I
have mentioned, Lombroso’s view of degeneration holds the idea that each man passes through
the development of primitive races, and atavism is a case of arrested development. As historian
Joshua Goode notes, however, Spanish anthropologists, had argued that racial mixture in Spain
was a source of strength, and preferred to examine the aberrance of criminality as the result of
unhealthy racial fusions, particularly in the early 1890s (155-65). This does not mean that they
rejected Lombroso’s bio-historical logic altogether: Salillas, who was one of the most significant
proponents of investigations into insalubrious racial mixtures, argued that humans passed
through the stages of the species, reaching the stages of primate and savage races in extra-uterine
life, and becoming more human as they reached adulthood (Goode 163-4). The description of
Telmo’s physiognomy and phrenology clearly echoes these debates. Is Telmo a positive or
degenerate example of a racial fusion? Are his similarities to African races due to his young age,
a quality to be surpassed as he enters adulthood? Or has he already inherited his father’s
degeneration?
Within these questions, the racial “antithesis” activates contradictory timelines of
degeneration and curative temporality that constitute a moment of representational crisis. Despite
the narrator’s hesitation in describing Telmo as a “negro… blanco,” she magnifies the antithesis
by extending the reading of Telmo’s racialized features to his emotional life: “...la expresión
candorosa de cómico orgullo que se advierte en la fisonomía de los negros ya civilizados y
manumitidos, [completaba] la semejanza de Telmo con el tipo africano, y por su rostro también

30

pasaban las ráfagas de tristeza y receloso encogimiento que caracterizan a las razas oscuras,
cuando aún no borraron el estigma de la esclavitud” (the innocent expression of comical pride
that one sees in the physiognomy of Black people and freed slaves, [completed] Telmo’s
approximation to the African type, and over his countenance also came the gusts of sadness and
suspicious shrinking away that characterize the dark races when they have yet to erase the stigma
of slavery; 29). Telmo’s youth and openness suggests the possibility of a positive, social future,
different from that of his father, but the phrenological analysis and racialized characteristics
imply that such a possibility is untenable. Through the frame of degeneration, the excessive
interpretation of physical stigma leads to over-extended race and disability metaphors, prying
racial categories loose from their historical realities and threatening degeneration theorists’
claims to scientific truth. The comparison to freed slaves is meant to characterize Telmo with a
lack of self-awareness, a laughably unfounded sense of pride, and occasional sorrow or
guardedness rooted in memories of loss or oppression—but it is difficult to make sense of the
relationship between Telmo’s loss of his mother or the social rejection he has experienced due to
his father’s occupation and the intergenerational trauma of human trafficking and slavery.
The narrator’s application of physiognomic readings illustrates how an attempt to
construct the shared interior qualities of a racial group necessarily relies on specific material
histories that do not logically lend themselves to transference. In the narrator’s description,
Telmo’s youthful inexperience, signaled by “aquellos ojos [que] pedían comunicación; buscaban
a la gente, al mundo” (those eyes that asked for communication; looked for people and looked
for the world; 29), exists alongside both the pre-existing loss of his normalcy (as per the
description of his phrenology as comparable to a lobotomy by axe blow) and a long, racial
transatlantic history of African slavery. Moreover, his comparison to the African “type” that is
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both “already civilized” and unable to escape a negative scientific categorization or the pain of
their experience indicates that there are biological limits to any reform, improvement, or
civilizing project to which Telmo might be subjected. As a result, the antithesis of the “negro…
blanco,” is not just an antithesis of color or a racial ambiguity that is difficult to parse, but an
interpretive crisis that projects colonial experiences onto the physical “differences” of a young
Spanish boy. If phrenology and physiognomy are meant to reveal scientific truths, the
characterization of Telmo leads us to ask how these scientific interpretations can be accepted as
credible given that they lead to contradictory conclusions.
In the stone-throwing skirmish between Telmo and a group of adolescent boys, the
narrator presents Telmo as an unequivocally positive racial fusion, emblematic of heroic Spanish
qualities. Surrounded by his young attackers, Telmo becomes a “¡Genio eminentemente español
de las defensas heroicas de plazas y castillos, en que un puñado de hombres entretiene y domina
a un ejército numeroso! ¡Morella, Numancia, Zaragoza, Sagunto!” (Eminently Spanish genius of
the heroic defenses of plazas and castles in which a handful of men engaged and dominated a
mighty army! Morella, Numancia, Zaragoza, Sagunto!; 50). In the climactic moment of Telmo’s
valiant defeat, the narrator no longer observes him through a medical lens, but treats him
alternatingly as the hero or the focalizer of the narrative event, taking on—if not the boy’s
language—his military interest and the stakes Telmo perceives in the interaction. In this scene,
Telmo enacts the “valor suicida” (suicidal valor; 207) that José Álvarez Junco identifies as a
characteristic that nineteenth century Spanish historians insistently refer to as an essential
Spanish quality. Álvarez Junco notes that Sagunto and Numancia, battles from 219 and 134
BCE, were frequently invoked “en prueba de la existencia de un ‘carácter español’, persistente a
lo largo de milenios, marcado por un valor indomable y una invencibilidad derivada de su
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predisposición a morir en combate antes de rendirse” (as proof of the existence of a ‘Spanish
character’ that persisted through millennia, marked by an indomitable valor and invincibility
derived from its predisposition to die in combat rather than to submit; 210) even though this
representation required historians to ignore that the population of Sagunto was originally Greek
and that they did, in the end, surrender. In this scene, Telmo embodies the authentic Spanish
character, confirmed by its unchanging nature and constant historical presence, that nineteenth
century Spanish historians sought to construct.
Whereas the earlier description cast Telmo’s “African” features in direct opposition to the
redeeming quality of his blue eyes, in battle, Telmo’s racial configuration is not an antithesis, but
a distinctly Spanish racial hybridity that serves as a source of strength and adaptability.
Patriotically marrying spiritual audacity with physical adaptability, the narrator addresses the
reader, proclaiming: “Nunca vuestro espíritu impulsó a nadie con más fuerza que al bizarro
Telmo, cuando a brincos, a gatas, veloz como una lagartija se encaramaba por el interior del
ruinoso y destechado fortín...” (Never did your spirit drive anyone with greater force than the
gallant Telmo, when, leaping, crawling, quick as a lizard, he climbed the interior of the ruined
and roofless fort; 50). The narrator’s shift in perspective leads him to represent vanity and
(unsubstantiated) pride, the qualities earlier associated with the “abnormal” shape of his head and
with his “African” physiognomy, as historically, essentially Spanish. Without responding to the
questions of degeneration that the earlier description had raised, Telmo’s heroic feat temporarily
locates him outside of curative time—an eminently Spanish example of racial fusion and
adaptability, he does not require intervention.
The sudden normalization and admiration of the qualities that had recently been
identified in Telmo as anomalous is unsettling, in part because such a characterization demands
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an acknowledgment of the constructedness of normalcy and nationalism. Framing Telmo as an
embodiment of the Spanish “spirit” raises the question of what it means to be authentically
Spanish and subsequently uses this characterization to grant value to Telmo’s life and wellbeing. If Telmo’s stand is the siege of Numancia or the battle of Saguntum in miniature, the
students from Marineda’s Institute, by waging a full attack on the novel’s “negrito blanco” (little
Black White boy; 50), are therefore cast as less Spanish, even (temporarily) a threat to
Spanishness itself. As the conflict rages on, it is not just Telmo’s bravery in the face of certain
defeat that aligns with historical constructions of the idealized Spaniard, but also his sense of
honor, which Álvarez Junco describes as another value that nineteenth century historians exalted
as dominant in the Spanish character (212). After being wounded, Telmo adopts “una estrategia
de salvaje” (strategy of savages; 53) by making use of the surrounding space as a defense, but his
attack “revelaba la caballerosidad de Telmo, que acosado, sitiado por enemigos numerosos...
acataba la ley del código de honor: disparaba únicamente a las piernas” (revealed the gallantry of
Telmo, who, under attack, besieged by numerous enemies… held to the law of the code of
honor: he aimed only at their legs; 53). His antagonists do not extend the same courtesy. They
aim for his head, and Telmo soon collapses, unconscious and badly injured.
Although the severity of Telmo’s injuries might be an accidental result of a puerile game,
the students’ decision to stone him and to leave him represent a microcosm of medico-juridical
action, albeit slightly distorted by their childishness. By casting Telmo as the scapegoat, “se les
figuraba ser justicieros… Cuanto más se le apretase [el garrote], más se cumpliría la ley de la
justicia, que infama a su propio ejecutor hasta pasada la cuarta generación… No juraría yo que
estas filosofías las razonasen y dedujesen con rigor los alumnos del Insituto marinedino; pero
llevaban el germen de ellas en el corazón y en el cerebro…” (they imagined themselves as
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avengers of justice … the tighter the garrote closed on him, the more the law of justice was
served, the law that defamed the executioner himself, even past the fourth generation of his
lineage… I would not attest that the students of the Marinedan Insitute rationalized and deduced
these philosophies; but they carried the seeds of these ideas in their hearts and minds, 48-9). To
his young attackers, Telmo’s death is rationalized because they do not see him as a Spanish hero,
but as a social deviant by biological inheritance. Although their logic is not explicitly medical,
the students’ decision to leave him constitutes a crude form of curative time in that it justifies the
death of deviant subjects by relating their biology to a presumed future that does not align with
normative expectations of progress. The choice of the word “bárbaro” (barbaric; 60), with which
one of the students describes the decision to leave him, is not coincidental, but rather reinforces
Telmo’s characterization in the scene as a civilized and essentially Spanish subject, and it is his
representation as a Spanish hero that imbues the scene with tragedy. In the chapters that follow,
Moragas is presented the same ethical test that the students failed—whether Telmo should be
cared for or left to die.
Although La piedra angular posits Rojo and (by extension) Telmo’s atavistic qualities in
opposition to social progress, Moragas's “manía redentorista” (redemptionist mania; 131) is the
first explicit articulation of curative time in the novel as he promotes a need for intervention to
medically eliminate deviance. Moragas's desire to “cure” Rojo and Telmo, and integrate them
into society as “normal” subjects, motivates the rest of the remaining action, pinning the
resolution on the question of whether the doctor will succeed. However, no sooner does the
narrator introduce a version of curative time, than she strategically interrogates its logical and
ethical foundation. The problem of whether or not Moragas can “redeem” Rojo and Telmo is
overshadowed, first, by whether the idealism and compassion in which Moragas believes his
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manía to be founded are opposed to contemporary science, and, secondly, by whether it is
empathy or disgust that prompts Moragas's redemption project. Torn between his responsibility
to his patient and the belief that staying at Rojo’s house is degrading, Moragas is afflicted by
“aquella generosidad semiquijotesca y semifilantrópica que, diga lo que quiera en vulgo, no está
reñida con las tendencias positivas del científico” (that semi-quixotic and semi-philanthropic
generosity that—whatever the masses may think—is not in conflict with the positive tendencies
of the scientist; 127). Shortly thereafter, Moragas chides himself for considering treating Telmo
and Rojo’s “llaga moral” (moral wound; 132), noting that “... en la sociedad presente, no cabe
duda que esta bobería de sentir como propios los males ajenos … se parece mucho al oficio de
enderezar tuertos y desfacer agravios que ya ridiculizó Cervantes” (in present society, there is no
doubt that this idiocy of feeling foreign misfortunes as if they were one’s own… is very similar
to the business of straightening out one-eyed men and undoing grievances that Cervantes already
ridiculed; 132). While the first explanation of philanthropic and quixotic generosity implies that
Moragas's belief in redemption could align with scientific objectivity in perhaps unanticipated
ways, the second frames his redemption project as nonsensical and ineffectual.
The doctor’s apparent ignorance of his own reasons for subjecting Telmo and Rojo to his
medical attentions constitutes a further critique of what motivates curative temporality.
Moragas's “manía redentorista” is not, as he believes, rooted in empathy and generosity, but in
his self-image as a caring, paternal doctor and his deep-seated disgust toward deviance and
difference. After debating whether to abandon Telmo or degrade himself by being in contact
with Rojo and his family, Moragas's mounting horror seems ridiculous to him, and it is finally
his view of himself as a loving paternal figure, “el mayor padrazo de Marineda, enamorado de la
niñez, derrochador de juguetes y confites” (the most indulgent father in Marineda, in love with
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childhood, distributor of toys and sweets; 131) that activates his manía redentorista. Although
this may constitute a representation of Moragas becoming aware of his instinctive response and
employing his capacity of free will to correct his behavior, even his decision to save Telmo
demonstrates that curative time is motivated by a hatred of deviance and a desire to frame the
medical profession in a positive and paternalistic light.
Despite his decision to stay, Moragas's negative reaction at the prospect of treating the
boy re-enacts both his earlier ambivalence toward Rojo and the brutality of the children who
abandoned Telmo when he was critically injured. Although the narrator appeared to justify the
doctor’s repulsion toward Rojo in the first chapter, at this point in the novel, both Telmo and
Rojo have served as focalizers, and it is more difficult to empathize with Moragas when he stares
at Rojo “como se mira a un sapo muy feo” (as one looks at a very ugly toad; 126) or maliciously
quips, “¿No cree que sea muy natural que la humanidad le apedree en la persona de su hijo?”
(Don’t you think it is very natural that humanity would stone you through your son?; 135). His
willingness to punish Telmo suggests that Moragas believes Telmo has inherited Rojo’s social
deviance or immorality, while his exaggerated disgust toward the idea of “detenerse en aquella
casa, cuidar al enfermo aquel” (stopping in that house, taking care of that patient; 127), reiterates
the juridical logic (or juridical instinct) of the students who leave him to die (49, 60).
Drawing on Foucault’s analysis of the role of the executioner in society in the 18th and
19th centuries, Anne Gilfoil has noted that the relationship between Moragas and Rojo signals
the transfer of power occurring in society from executioner to medical doctor (“The criminal
mind and the social body” 91). According to Foucault, the social stigma against executioners
eventually led punishment to become “the most hidden part of the penal process” (9) over the
course of the nineteenth century, at which point “a whole army of technicians took over from the
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executioner” (11).2 Moragas, in this sense, takes over from Rojo as the entity who enforces social
standards of behavior. This shift is consistent with the change Foucault describes from a state in
which power consists in killing or letting live to a modern bureaucratic state in which power
consists of making live and letting die (Foucault 247). Febrero and Moragas’s debate over capital
punishment, following the doctor’s decision to treat Telmo, further nuances this shift as the
doctor and the lawyer attempt to find common ground. Moragas is initially upset by his friend’s
assertion that the death penalty may benefit society if it serves to eliminate degenerate subjects.
Conversely, Febrero believes Moragas is being too sentimental by shying away from capital
punishment, which he compares to curative bloodletting. What both Febrero and Moragas finally
agree on is to eliminate social deviance with as little direct physical violence as possible:
“Cuando eliminemos… si vemos medio de evitar esa sangría, crea V. que la evitaremos,”
declares Febrero (When we eliminate… if we find a way to avoid bloodshed, be assured that we
will avoid it; 186), to which Moragas eagerly agrees, hoping to find a solution that would
eliminate the figure of the executioner as well.
Their compromise, as the rest of the plot reveals, is to substitute the public act of
execution by the slower, hidden death of permanent incarceration—in Foucauldian terms, to
substitute killing with letting die. I have described Febrero’s curative time as regulatory, because
he seeks to regulate populations, but it is when he agrees with Moragas that the elimination of
the criminal should avoid bloodshed as much as possible that Febrero and Moragas come to a

2

Historical research on the death penalty in Spain shows that this was not a linear process. Bascuñán shows, for
instance, that debates about capital punishment abolition in 1871 coincide with a decline in capital punishment at the
start of the first Republic, before increasing again. Nevertheless, the history of capital punishment in Spain generally
aligns with the shift Foucault identifies. Oliver demonstrates that executions reached their peak during the Sexenio
absolutista, the six-year period of political absolutism under the reign of Fernando VII (1814-1820). By the latenineteenth century executions were less often public, and by the year 1900 there is a significant decline in the
number of executions overall (Oliver 282). Oliver also find a correlation between the decreased number of
executioners and an increase of psychiatrists and medical professions involved in the legal process (284).
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decision that approximates Foucault’s notion of biopolitics as the power of regularization that
“consists in making live and letting die” (247). In view that Moragas’s focus is the normativity
of the individual subject and Febrero’s is the elimination of deviance from the population, their
compromise (permanent incarceration) constitutes a successful technology of a normalizing
society, “a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulations intersect”
(Foucault 253).3
Despite the logical and practical intersections of Moragas’s views with Febrero’s, the
narrator continues to problematize both the doctor’s and the lawyer’s perspectives. Maurice
Hemingway and Pura Fernández have noted that the narrator’s ironic treatment of Febrero and
Moragas makes it difficult to side with a specific ideological perspective, but, beyond verbal
irony, it is the implication of Febrero and Moragas’s versions of curative time for Rojo and
Telmo that challenge their ideologies. The lawyer’s curative arc extends across the development
of the species and envisions deviant types and “salvajes de ciertas razas” (savages of certain
races;180) cast outside of evolutionary time. Consequently, his curative method, enacted by
amputating certain subjects from society, returns us to the question of whether Telmo should live
or die. The fact that Febrero’s explanation of “los salvajes de ciertas razas” echoes the narrator’s
preoccupation with Telmo’s race only adds to the confusion. Are we to understand that the
narrator, like Febrero, believes that races are at different evolutionary steps, and that Telmo
represents an isolated case of primitivism cropped up in a civilized society?

3

The use of permanent incarceration as a replacement for capital punishment that Pardo Bazán represents reflects
the historical context of the time. Bascuñán notes that the 1870 Civil Code established the gradation of punishment,
which led sentences that would otherwise have resulted in the death penalty to be resolved through permanent
incarceration (213-214). By the early twentieth century, the majority of death penalty sentences were commuted to
permanent incarceration (Oliver 282).
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The views Pardo Bazán expressed on race in her other works do not necessarily shed
light on this ambiguity. In “Reflexiones científicas contra el darwinismo” (1877), she repudiates
human evolution, arguing that humanity and each of its races are essentially unchanging and
cannot progress or lose their character despite any advances or regressions (481), which would
appear to undermine Febrero’s claim that capital punishment can be salubrious for the race. Only
a decade later, in La revolución y la novela en Rusia, she proclaims “la superioridad absoluta de
la raza indoeuropea” (the absolute superiority of the indoeuropean race; 37). In contrast to the
contemporary anthropological championing of racial fusions that Telmo appears to illustrate
(Goode 155), she justifies the historical Spanish obsession with purity of blood (Pardo Bazán, La
revolución 40-1), which seemingly bolsters Febrero’s argument for the improvement of a
population through racial exclusion. As Lou Charnon-Deutsch has noted, Pardo Bazán’s views
on race are often contradictory, particularly regarding issues of perfectibility.
In La piedra angular, Pardo Bazán’s contradictory views on race and perfectibility are
borne out through the criticism of Febrero and Moragas’s applications of curative time on Rojo
and Telmo. While the novel is clearly critical of Moragas's hypocritical sentimentality, Febrero’s
desire for “mucha sangre fría” borders on the same absence of compassion with regards to statemandated executions that presumably underlies the popular hatred toward Rojo. The novel’s
criticism of Moragas's self-serving emotional performances and of Febrero’s pretense of
emotional distance is not evident in the narration of their theories, but rather arises from
incompatibilities between Moragas's and Febrero’s curative schemata and the information the
narrator has provided about Rojo and Telmo. Just as it is difficult to empathize with Moragas's
dehumanizing view of Rojo and Telmo after the narrator has treated them as focalizers, it is
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difficult to accept Febrero’s racial theories after the narrator has characterized Telmo
alternatingly as an atavistic subject and an eminently Spanish one.
After Moragas reasserts his position on redemption in his discussion with Febrero, he
returns to Rojo to carry out his curative approach, which the narrative critiques by highlighting
Moragas’s hypocrisy and lack of empathy. The goal of Moragas’s “cure” is to ensure that Rojo
never again carries out an execution, and the initial step is to extract a confession of the
conditions and choices leading to his occupation. The procedure, described in surgical terms,
includes obtaining Rojo’s admission that his decisions have condemned Telmo to a life of social
exclusion and that it would be preferable if Telmo died than if he recovered from his injuries
(198). The reader is precluded from sharing in Moragas's sense of success because the narrator
has made us aware of the key revelation in which Moragas takes so much pleasure: that Rojo’s
wife left him after he became an executioner and that he remains deeply hurt by her
abandonment. As the revelation does not impart new information to the audience, the focus is
consequently on the Moragas’s joy at Rojo’s discomfort during the process (Hemingway 101).
Just as before, Moragas's sympathy is nothing but a redirection of his abhorrence toward Rojo:
“Si al ver a Rojo humillado sentía cierta compasión, cuando Rojo se crecía y se revolvía contra la
sociedad, a seguir su impulso, le hubiese escupido y abofeteado” (If on seeing Rojo humiliated
he felt certain compassion, when Rojo grew and stirred against society, Moragas would have spat
on him and hit him, had he followed his impulse; 205). For Moragas, Rojo is deserving of
compassion only as long as he is on a path to redemption. Within curative time, as Kafer
explains, “the only appropriate disabled mind/body is one cured or moving toward a cure” (28);
likewise, within the curative temporalities activated by degeneration, the only viable degenerate
subject is one moving toward redemption and normalcy.
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Rojo’s personal history reveals the role of various institutions in his becoming an
executioner, including his role in the military, his occupation as a tax collector, and his service in
the police force during which he was ordered to register and brutalize Carlists after Amadeo of
Savoy was crowned—but through all of this, Moragas's attention continues to locate moral
deviance in Rojo as an “enfermo” (a sick man, 200). Moragas insists that Rojo “está enfermo …
de la conciencia, y ha contagiado usted a ese inocente [Telmo], que por culpa de usted se halla
fuera de la ley y camino del presidio” (is sick … of the conscience, and has contaminated this
innocent boy, who because of this finds himself outside of the law and on his way to prison; 200)
and that “un hijo de usted no tiene más camino que sucederle en el cargo” (a son of yours has no
other path than to succeed you in your position as an executioner; 235). The two futures Moragas
evokes are contradictory, as he imagines Telmo both in prison and working as an executioner,
but both possibilities call for intervention. Rojo’s heartbroken cry, “¡Eso no! ¡Primero le
ahogo… con manos… sin instrumentos!” (Not that! I would sooner choke him… with my own
hands!; 235) confirms that the value of Telmo’s life is dependent on the possibility that his
potential deviance can be eliminated.
Both Moragas and Rojo agree that Telmo’s premature death would be preferable to his
imprisonment or his position as an executioner, which demonstrates how curative time, in its
love of progress and hatred of impediment, creates a hierarchy of viable futures that must always
fall in step with normative views of progress. Curative time, as Kafer clarifies, signals the
elimination of impairment through a cure at the level of the individual, but also include a social
elimination of impairment, exemplified in a long history of eugenics, sterilization, segregation,
exclusion, and institutionalization (28). Framed in curative time, Telmo’s assimilation is the
most successful outcome, but the elimination of his potential deviance through his death remains
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preferable to a continuation of his projected life. The doctor offers to save Rojo’s son “y hacerlo
hombre como los demás” (and make him a man like all the others; 235) in exchange for an
unnamed favor, which will be Rojo’s refusal to execute the condemned woman.
In the last third of the novel, the question of whether Telmo deserves care or whether he
is better off dead resonates across the relative importance of the health and living conditions of
other children. The day after Moragas reaches an agreement with Rojo by offering to provide
Telmo a future without social stigma, Nené contracts a fever and the doctor forgets his
rehabilitative proposal entirely, devoting his every hour to the care of his pallid and delicate
daughter. A month later, a mechanical butterfly toy for Nené reminds him of Telmo. Although
the whimsical toy presumably serves as a token of the metamorphosis he had intended for the
executioner’s son, Moragas’s plan to transform Telmo suddenly strikes him as “semigrotesco”
(semi-grotesque; 241) and the narrator notes that “sintió Moragas, por egoísmo del cariño de su
hija, cierta hostilidad contra Telmo, tan robusto y vigoroso … ‘La salud de este bigardo la
quisiera yo para Nené’” (Because of the egoism in his affection toward his daughter, Moragas
felt certain hostility toward Telmo, who was so robust and vigorous… ‘I would like the health of
this idler for Nené;’ 241-2). Moragas's fatherly jealousy is understandable but nevertheless
contributes to the idea that certain subjects (the children of the middle-class) deserve better
health than others (members of the lower-class, the potential heirs of their father’s degeneration).
The constellation of children broadens when Moragas visits Febrero’s defendant, the
woman condemned to death for the murder of her husband. In a brief and surprising scene
following a hellish description of carceral conditions, the doctor encounters two children, around
the ages of eleven and nine, who are respectively described as “altivo, serio” (arrogant and
serious, 261) and “risueño … ostentando en la carita esa expresión picaresca, que acompañado
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de la inocencia tiene algo de celestial, y que marchita por el vicio encoge el corazón” (cheerful…
flaunting a picaresque expression that, accompanied by innocence is somewhat celestial, and
withered by vice shrinks the heart; 261). It is not until after Moragas learns that they have been
imprisoned for homicide and robbery that he looks more closely at the older boy, the “precoz
homicida” (precocious murderer; 261) and notices “que parecía el muchacho aquel un niño
filipino; su cara era terrosa, juanetuda, inexpresiva; sus ojos oblicuos, su boca pálida” (that the
young boy resembled a filipino child; his face was earthy, with swollen bumps, and inexpressive;
his eyes were oblique, his mouth pale; 261-2). As with Telmo, the visible markers that
approximate darker races signal an inherent proclivity toward crime in the young subject’s
character.4 However, when asked why he committed such a gruesome murder, the boy responds
that the man he killed had been beating his brother. The context suggests the homicide was a
crime of passion, not due to the atavism implied by his racialized description. The fact that
Moragas only notices the child’s features after learning that he had committed a violent crime
casts doubt on the doctor’s physiological interpretations, particularly considering that the boy’s
account of defending his brother situates the causality of the crime in the circumstances rather
than in the body of the criminal.
The representation of criminal children on the cusp of puberty draws attention to how
childhood innocence is formulated with regards to futurity. Although children in literature often
symbolize the future hope of a nation, in La piedra angular children with racialized
characteristics are excluded from this symbolic aspect of childhood. Moragas's racialized

4

In Criminal Man, Cesare Lombroso writes: “Those who have read this far should now be persuaded that criminals
resemble savages and the colored races… Members of both groups frequently have sutures of the central brow ridge,
precocious synostes or disarticulation of the frontal bones, upwardly arching temporal bones, sutural simplicity,
thick skulls, overdeveloped jaw and cheekbones, oblique eyes, dark skin, thick and curly hair, and jug ears” (91).
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interpretation of the older boy’s physiognomy and the guard’s emphasis on his age (he is twelve
though he appears to be eleven) force us to consider how blame, blamelessness, and childhood
are constructed through race, class, gender, and physical difference. While the narrator’s nonracialized description of the eight-year-old’s mischievous expression that withers with age from
angelic to threatening simultaneously associates childhood with irreproachability and tentatively
foretells a life of vice, Moragas's medical gaze binds the twelve-year-old in whom he identifies
Filipino features to a criminal future. Moragas's description of his face as “terrosa” associates the
filth of his surroundings with darker-skinned races, collapsing inherent qualities with
environmental conditions. The descriptions “juanetuda” and “ojos oblicuos” serve both as
criminological and Asiatic racial markers, just as Telmo’s prominent mouth and sloping head
signify African and criminal feature within the medico-legal framework of interpretation. Both
examples illustrate that children, particularly lower-class children, who have other racial markers
are narratively tied to a criminal or otherwise unvalued future, and the symbolic potency of
innocence is denied.
The narrative develops the prospect of Telmo’s potential criminal futures through
Moragas's observations of the woman Febrero represented and her accomplice, both of whom are
sentenced to the garrote. Moragas comments on the man’s “facha tan siniestra” (such sinister
look; 262) to which the narrator agrees, adding “efectivamente, su cara y su aspecto eran
característicos” (indeed, his face and appearance were distinctive; 262-3). The criminal’s “cara
mal proporcionada, más desarrollada del lado derecho” (badly proportioned face, more
developed on the right side; 263) recalls Rojo’s oblique features, while his “cabeza deprimida”
(sunken skull; 263), “pelambrera sombría” (dark mop of hair; 263), “prominente y bestial
mandíbula” (prominent and bestial jaw; 263) and “cuerpo vigoroso” (vigorous body; 263) mirror
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Telmo’s most salient characteristics—and it is through this physiognomic study that Febrero and
Moragas agree the criminal is “un másculo de las edades prehistóricas … oso de las cavernas” (a
male of the prehistoric age… a bear of the caverns; 264). The physical similarities between
Telmo and criminal, as well as Moragas's prediction that Telmo would end in jail, concretely
illustrate the boy’s future, as the medical gaze might anticipate it. The contrast between “Romeo
y Julieta,” the imprisoned man and the woman Moragas has gone to visit, is striking to the doctor
and the lawyer, both of whom firmly believe in the innocence of the woman, whose short stature,
thin frame, and poor constitution signal her vulnerability, victimhood, and innocence. Although
“Julieta’s” traits don’t align with those of other characters in the way her “Romeo’s” do, the
difference between them anticipates the contrast Moragas perceives between Nena and Telmo.
When Moragas, a few months later, unexpectedly sees Telmo and Nena playing together,
his horror and rage at their proximity are rooted in the future he anticipates for his daughter. As
before, Moragas’s anger consumes him, but whereas before he would have left Telmo to die,
now the same rage “le impulsaba a deshacer al muchacho, despertando en su alma instintos de
destrucción … salvajes…” (pushed him to tear the boy apart, awakening in his soul savage
instincts of destruction; 282-3). The intensification of Moragas's impulse to kill Telmo directly
(rather than through lack of medical care) is implicitly due to Telmos’s proximity to Nené,
whose vulnerability and innocence are inseparable from the future her father envisions. On
seeing “la cabeza ensortijada, graciosa, resuelta, de Telmo Rojo, tan próxima a la cabecita blonda
de Nené que casi se tocaban” (the curly, gracious, resolute head of Telmo Rojo, so close to
Nené’s little blond head that they almost touched; 282), the doctor is outraged by the
“Atrevimiento y descaro [que] necesitaba el hijo de Juan Rojo para fraternizar con la niña de
Moragas, angelito cándido, conservado entre algodones, capullo que un día había de ser la rosa
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blanca del jardín social, el misterioso sagrario que se llama una señorita casadera” (Boldness
and insolence required of Juan Rojo’s son to fraternize with Moragas’s daughter, candid angel,
conserved among cottons, bud that would one day be that white rose in the garden of society, the
mysterious sanctum that is referred to as an eligible young lady; 282). Nené’s very whiteness
calls into being the threat of corruption or adulteration, the possibility that contact with Telmo
could stain her. At the same time, her presumed future class status, depends on and demands the
conservation of her sexual and racial purity.
Having overcome his initial impulse to attack Telmo, Moragas resumes his curative
approach and demonstrates a preoccupation with Telmo’s future based on a reading of Telmo’s
physiognomy that differs substantially from the narrator’s earlier analysis. After Moragas
welcomes him into his house, the doctor identifies in Telmo “una impresión vivísima de
felicidad y gratitud, que lo transformaba” (a strong impression of happiness and gratitude that
transformed him; 284). Though the doctor notices the unwarranted arrogance and tragic suffering
that the narrator had earlier described, Moragas does not associate them with criminal or
racialized features. Using Moragas as a focalizer, the narrator hones in on Telmo’s desire to
improve himself, re-interpreting his suffering as an injustice and his arrogance as a desire to rise
above his unfortunate condition. The divergence from the narrator’s earlier description of Telmo
signals the subjective nature of physiognomic interpretations. Moragas’s reading of Telmo’s
character renews the doctor’s enthusiasm for his rehabilitation project, but the varying
interpretations of Telmo’s characteristics suggest that Moragas’s redemptive mania and his
desire for his patient’s gratitude are the determining factors in deciding whether Telmo is
redeemable—not Telmo’s physical characteristics.
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Overtaken, once more, by his desire to redeem Telmo, Moragas responds with
unanticipated enthusiasm when he learns of the boy’s dream of becoming a military officer:
“Aún no sabía Moragas si era posible, y ya le pareció ver al muchacho con sus estrellas, sus
galones, su teresiana y su espalda al cinto” (Moragas did not yet know if it was possible, and yet
he could already imagine the young man with his stars and his military cap and sash, with his
sword at his belt; 286-7). As Julia Chang demonstrates, in late nineteenth-century Spain, the
military curated the masculine ideal in racial and able-bodied terms, identifying soldiers and
officers as “useful” Spaniards and exemplary citizens (“Becoming Useless” 173-175). Given this
context, Telmo’s interest in military work serves to redeem him in Moragas’s eyes. Fueled by the
vision of Telmo’s military future, Moragas decides Telmo will attend the institute and live with
Moragas and Nené. The chapter closes on a familial scene in which Nené expresses her joy that
Telmo will join them for dinner, but then adds, “en tono reflexivo … No le amos uce … (No le
damos dulce… porque ése es para mí todo, y más que hubiera). No le amos roco (tampoco se me
antoja que el venga a comerse mi rosco). Le amos buebo frito (le damos un huevo frito)” (in a
reflexive tone… we won’t give him candy or sweet bread, because those are mine… we will give
him a fried egg; 289). Nené’s youthful selfishness is charming and comedic, but implicitly calls
attention to Telmo’s place in his new family. Despite his new prospective future, it is clear that
the value of Telmo’s life and comfort must remain positioned below Nené’s.
The final test of Moragas's curative efforts takes place the night before the execution,
when Moragas demands that Rojo refuse to carry out the sentence. In exchange, he offers to
provide Telmo an education and good social standing, dependent on reducing the relationship
between Telmo and Rojo so the boy can escape his father’s stigma. Through this exchange that
leaves Rojo heartbroken, Moragas believes that “Más poderoso que el jefe del Estado, acababa
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de indultar a dos seres humanos y de regenerar a otros dos” (More powerful than the head of
state, he had pardoned two human beings and regenerated another two; 319). Rojo’s suicide in
the epilogue, however, undermines Moragas self-assured claim to have saved four lives. As
Hemingway notes, the novel concludes by giving the moral high ground to Rojo rather than
Moragas (105), but even before Rojo’s suicide it is difficult to imagine Moragas's success. The
doctor’s belief that Rojo’s refusal to carry out the executions (accompanied by a letter explaining
his change of heart) would be enough to prevent them indefinitely and to redeem or regenerate
Rojo demonstrates Moragas's willful ignorance regarding Rojo’s position. As Rojo had indicated
in an earlier conversation, he would be tortured for not completing an execution, and, if he were
to renounce his position, he would once again be unemployed and without the possibility of other
employment (222, 225).
Moragas’s success with regard to the criminals is likewise limited: even if their execution
were put off indefinitely, the absence of a formal pardon means that they would remain
imprisoned in the conditions Moragas and Febrero had criticized as being unhygienic and
violent. Finally, Moragas's redemption of Telmo is complicated by the doctor’s ambivalence
toward his adopted son. While Moragas affectionately encourages him to leave Rojo’s home
without remorse by saying “Anda hijo mío” (Go on, my son; 319), it was not long ago that
seeing Telmo interact with his daughter provoked a murderous desire to “agarrar de un brazo al
chico y estrellarle contra un montón de piedras” (grab the boy by the arm and smash him against
a pile of rocks; 282). Moragas's multiple failures are hardly a surprise. In describing Moragas
previous redemptionist projects, the narrator mentions that “no era la primera vez… le había
costado por cierto tal propensión graves disgustos, comprobaciones penosas de negras
ingratitudes, enredos gratuitos, molestias sin cuento y desazones magnas” (it was not the first
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time … such a tendency had cost him grave disappointments, terrible experiences of dark
ingratitudes, excessive complications, endless annoyances and great discomforts; 131)—a vague
description that seems to imply Moragas's “perpetua ilusión del redentorismo” has rarely (if
ever) been successful.
The novel strategically criticizes Moragas's version of curative time as emotional,
egomaniacal, and shortsighted, and Febrero’s version as callous and disconnected from
individual experiences—and yet the novel upholds the values of curative time in its conclusion
by eliminating all social deviance. With Telmo cured and on a track to redemption, the criminals
imprisoned, and Rojo deceased, normalcy is reasserted, not just for Moragas, but for town of
Marineda. Gilfoil argues that in La piedra angular the multiple readings of external
characteristics “highlights the relative status of all interpretation” (89). Although Gilfoil’s
argument that the novel demonstrates the ways in which medical discourses are social constructs
is enlightening, the eradication of difference at its conclusion likewise reveals the underlying
assumptions that narrative resolution can only occur with the social elimination “abnormal”
bodies and minds.
The requirement of a specific narrative resolution (elimination) for certain types of
characters grates uncomfortably against Pardo Bazán’s earlier position against determinism in
literature. In the polemical essay “La cuestión palpitante” (1883), Pardo Bazán criticized Émile
Zola’s material determinism and advocated for a form of naturalism that, unlike Zola’s, would
affirm the free will of individual subjects. In their respective analyses on representations of
illness and disease both Asunción Doménech Montagut and Anne Gilfoil have commented that
Pardo Bazán moved away from her earlier naturalism toward a more “moral” or “spiritual”
perspective on bodily health (Doménech Montagut 30; Gilfoil, “Emilia Pardo Bazán and the
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Diagnosis of Cultural Diseases” 85). Given that Pardo Bazán associated determinism in literature
with an excessive scientific materialism and viewed free will as a god-given right (“La cuestión
palpitante” 12-4), one might expect the trajectory of her work to move more definitively toward
a championing of free will. However, as Fernández notes, the very materialistic determinism that
Pardo Bazán so emphatically rejected in La cuestión palpitante is carried out by the characters of
La piedra angular (449). The resolution of La piedra angular demonstrates that even when
material determinism is questioned, by framing moral redemption as social cure, the narrative
treatment of social deviance is already determined.
The narrative function of “cure” or the restoration of normalcy in La piedra angular
dialogues well with previous debates over Pardo Bazán’s racial determinism. In an analysis of
Una cristiana (1890) and La prueba (1890), the two novels that immediately precede La piedra
angular, Brian Dendle has argued that Pardo Bazán’s concept of racial heredity is deterministic,
and in fact, more so than Zola’s. Conversely, Lou Charnon-Deutsch posits that Pardo Bazán’s
portrayals of race in her fictional work are not always deterministic, but instead often uphold
“the power of education to overcome all racial dispositions” (147). Charnon-Deutsch’s argument
nuances Pardo Bazán’s position by paying special attention to instances in which the author
understood race as constructed and therefore subject to modification. However, it is precisely
Pardo Bazán’s willingness to represent difference and degeneration—triangulated through race,
ability, and class—as something to educate and modify that activates a narrative trajectory of
curative time in La piedra angular.
As disability studies scholars David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue, narratives often
rely on disabled bodies as rhetorical devices to “provide powerful counterpoints to their
respective cultures’ normalizing truths about the construction of deviance in particular, and the
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fixity of knowledge systems in general. Yet each of these characterizations [of physical
abnormality] also evidences that the artifice of disability binds disabled characters to a
programmatic (even deterministic) identity” (50). Not all theories of degeneration ascribe to
determinism,5 but the problem of degeneration demanded curative temporality, a view of the
future in which the only viable bodies and lives are prescribed as those that are normal or on
their way to being normal.
In La piedra angular, the limitation of science to respond ethically to social problems
(Gilfoil 92) is the moment of resistance to normalizing truths to which Mitchell and Snyder refer.
However, as per Mitchell and Snyder’s explanation of programmatic identities, the novel’s
denouement largely unravels the challenges presented to knowledge systems: Febrero and
Moragas’s regulatory and disciplinary versions of curative time come together in a successfully
normalizing society, exemplified by the education of Telmo and the permanent incarceration of
the two criminals. It is understandable why such a solution satisfies both Febrero and Moragas’s
perspectives, as it does not negate either of their versions of curative time. Permanent
incarceration localizes the delinquent subject in a disciplinary institution while serving as a
regulatory measure that prevents the subject’s potentially damaging effects on the population.
Telmo’s education has the same effect, with the difference that it prepares him to contribute to
the population through reproduction after having rendered him a normative subject.
Pardo Bazán’s explanation of her support for permanent incarceration as a replacement
for capital punishment because “me subleva la pena capital, por fea, por repugnante” (capital
punishment indignates me because of its ugliness, its repugnance; “Un tratadista de derecho

5

Campos et al. examine the role of free will and responsibility in medico-juridical views on degeneration in Spain.
According to their analysis, Luis Dolsa was among the strongest proponents that degenerate subjects are not
irresponsible for their actions because they do have free will and do not necessarily become criminals (47).
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penal” 94) is demonstrative of the way in which the violence and ugliness of curative time,
particularly in institutions, can be ignored by middle- and upper-class subjects, including
Febrero, Moragas, and the author herself. In her review of La crisis del derecho penal (1891) by
Cesar Silió Cortés, Pardo Bazán emphatically promotes perpetual imprisonment as a replacement
for the death penalty, referring to it as a “muerte civil y social” that does not rely on the garrote
(civil and social death, “Un tratadista de derecho penal” 93). Although Pardo Bazán frames
permanent incarceration as a non-violent solution, there is an undeniable violence in letting
people live and die completely cut off from society and in the poor carceral conditions she
described. There is violence in removing a boy from his family to render him a useful subject,
and there is violence in the indirect way in which doctors can convince their patients that society
would be better without him. In short, the pathologization of deviance and the need to cure
pathologies at any cost are violent. The problem that haunts the conclusion of La piedra angular
is not scientific limitations, but the sense that curative temporality creates a hierarchy of viable
lives to such a degree that suicide, imprisonment, and orphanhood constitute a successful social
resolution, provided they restore normalcy.
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Chapter 2
Infertility as Disability and the Eugenics of Adoption in the Works by Emilia Pardo Bazán

Female Fertility, Degeneration, and Eugenics
In Pardo Bazán’s La piedra angular we have seen how medico-legal discourses provided
frameworks to value subjects’ lives through projections of their anticipated productivity and
reproduction. While reproduction clearly structured expectations of adulthood for both men and
women, the onus of biological and social reproduction defined the social value of women. The
preparation for pregnancy and motherhood, the act of reproduction, and the end of a woman’s
reproductive life laid out a normative timeline, a set of biological milestones that delineated
“normal” female biological processes. According to contemporary gynecologists and hygienists
these series of events illustrated a perfect harmony between women’s moral character and their
physical needs as dictated by the law of nature.1 What, then, of sterile or infertile women?
Women who could not bear children, as represented in Pardo Bazán’s ‘La estéril’ (1892) and
‘Leliña’ (1903), can be imagined as falling into “crip time,” a timeline that does not align with
the anticipated functions of a “normal” female body. The depiction of sterility in these two
stories invite an analysis of reproductive limitation in Pardo Bazán’s earlier naturalist novel, Los
Pazos de Ulloa (1886), which does not explicitly feature sterility, but nevertheless demonstrates
how discourses of degeneration connected the reproductive practices of individuals to the
improvement or decline of the national race. Within this context, what was at stake in the
timeline of female biological processes was the larger arc of national progress. Consequently,
representations of women with limited reproductive capabilities connected to broader social
1

See works by Francisco de Paula Campá y Porta, Ángel Pulido, and Pedro Felipe Monlau.
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questions, such as whether the right kinds of women were reproducing. ‘La estéril,’ ‘Leliña,’ and
Los Pazos de Ulloa respond to these anxieties through the perspective of upper-class women
who dehumanize lower-class mothers. Ultimately, these narratives reveal the ties between the
construction of maternal desire and proto-eugenic cultural fantasies in the context of
degeneration.
The Spanish vision of eugenics in the early 20th century grew in line with the “Latin”
tradition of “soft” eugenics. “Soft” eugenics worked to increase the numbers of the desirable
population through “conscious motherhood” and puericulture, as opposed to the “hard” eugenics
of countries in Northern Europe, which aimed to decrease the numbers of the undesirable
population (Sinclair 14). Writing from an Anglo-American perspective, disabilities studies
scholar Alison Kafer argues that eugenic practices have been justified through concern with the
protection of future citizens and have cast disabled people as threats to futurity. While Kafer’s
analysis relies on examples of “hard” eugenic practices, “soft” eugenics also participated in what
Kafer refers to as “curative time”—the view of disability as a problem that requires intervention
at any cost. In this sense, “soft” eugenics denigrated lives of people with disabilities by making
disability a threat to the future and envisioning the future of disabled people as one not worth
living. Los Pazos de Ulloa, “La estéril,” and “Leliña” feature an impulse toward “soft” eugenics
through the maternal desires of women who are wealthy, able-bodied, and racially unmarked
(white). However, each of these narratives also anticipates negative futures for mothers and
children of the lower class who are pathologized, racialized, animalized, and objectified.
Through the futures imagined in relation to lower-class reproduction, each of these narratives
depicts a desire for a decrease in the numbers of the undesirable population.
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It is difficult to identify precisely when social views rooted in theories of degeneration
and regeneration become tied to eugenic proposals—particularly within the framework of “soft”
eugenics. Richard Cleminson marks Enrique Madrazo’s Cultivo de la especie humana (1904) as
the first explicit mention of eugenics by a Spaniard and traces the rise of publications on the
topic through the 1910s and 1920s (81-82). However, it is easy to consider many Spanish realist
narratives of the 1880s as participating in a “study of the agencies under social control that may
improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations,” which is how Francis Galton
defined eugenics when he coined the term in 1883 (321). As Jo Labanyi argues, the realist novel
participates in the fervor of surveillance and documentation evident in medical and legal fields of
study and contributes to the idea that the key to social improvement is to gather (and ultimately
to construct) knowledge about society and the bodies that comprise it (87).
In Pardo Bazán’s case, the topics of social improvement and representation of bodies are
of particular importance in light of the author’s role as the most eminent defender of Spanish
naturalism, as well as by her contributions toward women’s rights through the fin de siècle.
These issues are central in Los Pazos de Ulloa, which most scholars recognize as one of the most
representative texts of her naturalism, as well as “La estéril” and “Leliña,” which also participate
in a naturalist tendency by taking into account medical perspectives of female bodies and their
relation to society. In these narratives, the study of scientific “laws” in biology and inheritance
provide a space of cultural debate to consider the improvement of the race and nation through
changes to the environment and heredity. What makes them proto-eugenic, I argue, is the
relationship they depict between upper-class and lower-class mothers.
The representation of infertility in the upper classes and the poor health of the
impoverished classes in ‘La estéril’ and ‘Leliña’ lead to a convergence of degeneration, maternal
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desire, and charity that casts lower-class female bodies as both useful and threatening to the
upper classes. The wealthy protagonists’ inability to fulfill their feminine roles incites their
desire to care for ill or disabled subjects whom the narrative casts as socially undesirable. This
coincidence forms the crux of an incipient eugenic fantasy in each of the texts I analyze here. In
‘La estéril,’ Elena decides to adopt a sickly, orphaned child with rickets, while, in ‘Leliñá,’
Fanny decides to take in an infantilized woman with a cognitive disability in the hopes that this
act of generosity will convince God to grant her fertility. The motivations behind the
protagonists’ attempted “adoptions” challenge a reading of their maternal impulses as purely
compassionate. In both narratives, a “cure” is presented when the sterile, upper-class or
bourgeois woman’s desire for a child coincides with—and comes to depend on—the erasure of a
lower-class woman’s agency.
By presenting a “cure” in which there can only be one mother, only one reproducible
demographic (the pathologized and racialized lower class or the racially unmarked and sterile
upper class), ‘La estéril’ and ‘Leliña’ narrativize the logic that Michel Foucault posits as the
cornerstone of racism in the biopolitical regulation of populations: “if you want to live, the other
must die” (255). Los Pazos de Ulloa does not feature sterility to be cured or an adoption to cure
it. However, Nucha, the wealthy protagonist of the novel, experiences difficulty in childbirth
(which leads her husband to believe that she will be unable to conceive further) and goes on to
provide charity to members of the lower class in ways that coincide with the loss of lower-class
mothers’ agency. Each of these narratives affirm that the loss of reproductive power of the
privileged classes is something worth mourning, while the coincidental death (or social death) of
the lower classes can be a cause for celebration.
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As in more prominent narratives of the nineteenth century, such as La Regenta (18841885) and Fortunata y Jacinta (1886-1887), childlessness in ‘Leliña’ and ‘La esteril’ is a health
problem exclusive to bourgeois and upper-class women. The association of childlessness with
the upper classes in these fictional works reflects a medical anxiety of the time. In a widelycirculated publication, French physician Joseph Gérard refers to the discrepancy in birth rates
between the lower and upper classes, arguing that “los médicos sabemos…[que] solo
encontramos la esterilidad en las clases ricas” (Doctors know that sterility is only found in the
wealthy classes; 225). At a speech given at the Real Academia de Medicina in Barcelona, the
physician Juan Viura y Carreras noted that sterility was rarely a problem among the lower
classes, adding that the cultured classes tended to lose their “fuerza reproductiva” (reproductive
strength; 96-97). Despite the medical insistence on increasing population rates across all social
classes,2 the comparison of fertility rates by class leads physicians to posit a connection between
fertility and the negative characteristics of impoverished classes. Echoing the sentiments of other
medical professionals, Viura y Carreras claimed that “en las clases menesterosas… es más
abundante la fecundidad, como si el número de sus individuos se hallase en razón inversa al de
su valor económico” (In the impoverished classes, fecundity is abundant, as if the number of
individuals were in inverse proportion to their economic value; 96).3
Along with the study of birth rates, analyses on Spain’s exceedingly high infant mortality
rates were inseparable from the discussions of class and reproduction which placed the blame for
impoverished children's ill health on their mothers. Andrés Martínez Vargas estimated that

2

Juan Viura y Carreras called for his colleagues to engage in “la empresa de interesar la voluntad de todas las clases
sociales en el aumento de la población” (the business of investing the will of all social classes in the increase of the
population. 78)
3

In his 1876 Bosquejos médico-sociales para la mujer, Pulido comments that “las razas más fecundas son también
las más estúpidas y vice versa” (the most fertile races are the most stupid and vice versa; 339).
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ignorant and impoverished mothers were to blame for half of all cases of infant mortality. In his
argument, lower-class mothers were “verdugos de sus propios hijos” (executioners of their own
children; 23-24). Even if the children did not die, Martínez blamed impoverished mothers for
raising “esas criaturas pálidas, macilentas, con la cabeza grande y angulosa, el pecho angosto”
(those pale, weak creatures, with large, angled heads and narrow chests; 36) who were often
criminals and would, in any case, be unable to contribute to Spanish society. As other
pediatricians noted, the diminished health of lower class children was due to their families’ lack
of resources.4 Within the context of these debates, the trope of mixed-class adoption in fiction
speaks to anxieties about upper class female sterility, the neglect of lower class mothers, and the
potential death, disability, or criminal pathology of impoverished children.
Concerns about class, health, and reproduction resonated with anxieties about the
degeneration of the upper and lower classes. As Labanyi explains, the degeneration of the lower
classes was described as a form of arrested development, while the degeneration of the upper
classes was characterized by a “need to increase circulation to solve the problem of overaccumulation” (200). The association between upper class childlessness and stoppage or
stagnation reflects this understanding of degeneration, and the need to solve over-accumulation
through their generosity appears to reflect positively on the maternal ambitions of wealthy
women. As Lou Charnon-Deutsch notes, Emilia Pardo Bazán frequently organizes
representations of motherhood by class, depicting mothers with wealth and leisure time (that is,
the over-accumulation of resources) as good mothers, while poor mothers were unable—either
by social necessity or natural inclination—to fulfill an ideal maternal role (135-36). The childless

4

See “Arte de educar niños” (1899) by Luis Vega Rey-Falco and “Comparación entre el desarrollo físico de los
niños pobres y el de los bien acomodados” by José Martín Barrales.
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upper-class woman is cast as a tragic figure: she has so much to give and no one to give it to.
Conversely, a childless lower-class woman could hardly be represented as a tragedy because it
was already presumed that she would not be a good mother.
The narrators of ‘La estéril’ and ‘Leliña’ present the protagonists’ potential to be good
mothers by lamenting the tragedy of their sterility and framing it as a physiological source of
emotional distress. In “La estéril” we quickly learn that, despite leading an otherwise charmed
life, Elena (now past childbearing age) frequently loses sleep, sobbing in the middle of the night
over her “noble enfermedad” (noble illness; 81), “se moría de plétora amorosa, de la estancación
del amor en los centros desde donde debe irradiar, penetrando y vivificando todo el organismo”
(she was dying from an excess of love, of the stagnation of love in the centers from which it
should have irradiated, penetrating and enlivening the organism as a whole; 81). Fanny’s
emotional and behavioral response to her infertility in “Leliña” echoes Elena’s with precision:
“Fanny ansiaba hacer algo bueno; tenía el alma impregnada de una compasión morbosa,
originada por la íntima tristeza de su esterilidad… Fanny no contenía las lágrimas cuando
encontraba a una criatura” (Fanny was anxious to do something good; her soul was permeated by
a morbid compassion, originated in the intimate sadness of her sterility… Fanny could not hold
back tears when she came across a child; 4). Medical professionals of the time accounted for
male and female sterility as causes of childlessness among married couples,5 however, neither
the narratives analyzed here nor Fortunata y Jacinta, the most prominent novel featuring
infertility in fin-de-siècle Spain, suggests the possibility of male sterility or impotence. Instead,
5

In his 1904 speech, Alejandro Planellas y Llanos argued that women’s sterility far outnumbered men’s
“infecundidad,” which could refer to either sterility or impotence (54). However, prominent texts earlier, including
Higiene del matrimonio and Tratado de la impotencia y la esterilidad en el hombre y la mujer, devote an equitable
number of pages to male and female sterility, infertility, or impotence, and do not indicate that these issues are more
prevalent among women. In Higiene del matrimonio, Monlau indicated that impotence is more common among
men, while sterility is more common among women (231).
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both “La estéril” and “Leliña” emphasize the protagonists’ sterility by indicating that
childbearing would provide a release, an outlet for their maternal love. The “stagnation” of that
maternal love renders it pathological, as illustrated by Elena’s reliance on medicine for her
nerves and by Fanny’s “compasión morbosa” (morbid compassion).
Elena and Fanny’s pathological responses to their sterility aligns with contemporary
medical understandings of childlessness as a biological cause of emotional and behavioral
disorders in women. In his 1876 Bosquejos médico-sociales para la mujer, politician and
medical professional Ángel Pulido explained the effects of sterility on a woman’s character
stating, “Pues si la madre y el hijo son dos entidades tan estrechamente unidas [...] nada más
natural, á juicio del médico, que la esterilidad prolongada, influyendo moralmente y con
persistente acción sobre el carácter impresionable de la mujer, ocasione aquí la infelicidad, allí el
divorcio, en ésta la locura, en aquella otra el suicidio” (If the mother and the son are two entities
so tightly united [...] nothing is more natural, in the doctor’s judgement, than that prolonged
sterility would morally and persistently influence the impressionable character of a woman, and
would occasion her unhappiness—in one case divorce, in another insanity, and in yet another
suicide; 13). In Pulido’s explanation, the mutual dependence of mother and child exists even
within sterile women, so that a woman is always a mother—either a fulfilled mother with a child,
or an incomplete, childless mother. By this logic, it is the prolonged alienation from her maternal
function that negatively impacts sterile women, physically and psychologically. The physician
Pedro Felipe Monlau puts the same idea in more material terms, “La matriz es el órgano más
importante en la vida de la mujer; es uno de los polos de la organización femenina … En la
matriz retumban indefectiblemente todas las afecciones físicas y morales de la mujer, el útero
hace que la mujer sea lo que es” (The uterus is the most important organ in a woman’s life; it is
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one of the poles of feminine organization … in the uterus all the physical and moral conditions
of the woman unfailingly resound. The uterus makes the woman what she is; 152). In Monlau’s
thinking, childlessness would undoubtedly affect the organization of a woman’s emotional state.
By reacting as they do to their sterility, Elena and Fanny confirm the medical assumption
that women’s characters conform to their bodies, as well as their desire to adhere to social norms.
To be indifferent to their sterility, would further risk their being pathologized as the kind of
woman who, according to gynecologist Francisco de Campá y Porta, rebelled against the laws of
nature. Campá y Porta describes childless women as psychological monstrosities, drawing no
distinction between the gender deviance of women whose education negates their maternal
nature and women who are biologically unable to conceive:
La mujer en quien una educación torcida, o las influencias perniciosas basadas en un
positivismo fatal, han ahogado los arranques del corazón, o a quien ha negado el cielo las
dulzuras de la maternidad, se revela [sic] contra esta ley de la naturaleza, aguza sus
mismas pasiones con el aguijón del orgullo, abrigase el manto de la lujuria voluptuosa ya
que no puede sentir la lujuria orgánica, y angel [sic] caido [sic] entonces, representa […]
la verdadera esencia de una monstruosidad psicológica, bajo la efigie de una seductora
hipocresía. (Paula Campá y Porta 25)
The woman in whom a twisted education or the pernicious influences of a fatal
positivism have drowned the desires of the heart, or the woman to whom heaven has
denied the sweetness of maternity, rebels against [the] law of nature, sharpens her passion
with the thorn of pride, wraps herself in the mantle of voluptuous lust as she cannot
experience organic desire, and, having become a fallen angel, [...] she represents the true
essence of a monstrous psychology, under the effigy of a seductive hypocrisy.
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His description reveals the medical characterization of childless women as biologically
unnatural, psychologically deformed, and sinful. Through Elena and Fanny’s expression of their
emotional distress over their inability to change their biological condition, they avoid being cast
as monstrous fallen women. In other words, by enacting a feminine pathology that confirms one
law of nature (the harmony between women’s bodies and characters), the characters save
themselves from the more severe stigma of not wanting a child, which, as Campá y Porta
suggests, is the greatest transgression against the functions of women as dictated by the law of
nature.
Avoiding the hypocrisy, pride, and lust that gynecologists associated with childlessness,
Elena and Fanny, instead, fall in line with other Pardo Bazán characters who demonstrate the
desire and potential to be successful parents, even without biological reproduction. As CharnonDeutsch has demonstrated, non-biological maternal figures, such as Doña Milagros (Doña
Milagros), or even Julián (Los Pazos de Ulloa) and Gaspar (La sirena negra), are not uncommon
in Pardo Bazán’s fiction (126). Although Nucha (Los Pazos de Ulloa), who is the most idealized
maternal character in Pardo Bazán’s works, does give birth to a child, the complications of her
birth and postpartum ailments indicate that she “clearly has no avocation for bearing children,
only for mothering children born to others…” (Charnon Deutsch 126). Like Nucha, Elena and
Fanny’s capacity and willingness to care for others signal their potential to be mothers. Unlike
Nucha, however, their impulse toward motherhood and lamentation of their sterility as a medical
problem anticipates motherhood as a “cure.”
Given that Pardo Bazán demonstrated an acute awareness of the social constructions of
gender through her writing career, it may seem surprising that both the characters and narrators
in these short stories frame limitations of female fertility as medical problems (as Pulido and
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Monlau do), rather than a way to criticize social expectations of maternity, as Pardo Bazán does
in Los Pazos de Ulloa. As Jo Labanyi, Lou Charnon-Deutsch, and Robin Ragan have shown, Los
Pazos de Ulloa criticizes the medical construction of women’s health through the representation
of Nucha’s hysteria. Nucha’s post-partum hysteria is not caused by her lymphatic constitution or
the after-effects of her labor complications, as her doctor claims, but by social causes. After
giving birth, Nucha suffers through a prolonged lying-in period, the doctor and her husband
prevent her from breastfeeding, her husband resumes his affair with the servant, and he begins to
be physically abusive toward Nucha. While the narrative depicts Nucha as having a delicate
constitution and experiencing difficulty in childbirth and breastfeeding, her emotional distress—
which is characterized much like Elena and Fanny’s—is not indicative of her physical frailty or
of a connection between women’s behavior and their bodies, but of the alienation and abuse
caused by her husband and her doctor.
Why, then, do the protagonists of “La estéril” and “Leliña” exhibit such a different
relationship? As evidenced in her article entitled “La educación del hombre y la de la mujer”
(1892), Pardo Bazán strategically alternated between emphasizing or minimizing the role of
motherhood depending on her argument. In “La educación,” she argued against the idea that
women are more apt to fulfill their reproductive roles if they are uneducated by condemning “el
error de afirmar que el papel que a la mujer corresponde en las funciones reproductivas de la
especie determina y limita las restantes funciones de su actividad humana” (the error of affirming
that women’s role, as accorded to her by the reproductive functions of the species, determines
and limits the rest of the functions of her human activity; 75). A few pages later, she proclaimed
that the maternal instinct is “[el] más fuerte, más ciego, más animal de todos” (the strongest, the
blindest, the most animal of all instincts; 81) in response to the view that the objective of
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women’s education should be to prepare them for motherhood. Of course, these are not
contradictions, but they belie her rhetorical strategy of framing motherhood in different ways to
get at the issue of women’s agency. The same strategy characterizes her depiction of maternal
bodies is Los Pazos de Ulloa, “La estéril,” and “Leliña.” Her representation of Nucha speaks to
the argument that motherhood should not determine the rest of women’s functions, while the
gynecological discourses of maternal desire in “La estéril” and “Leliña” portray the maternal
instinct as a drive for female agency. By framing sterility as a medical problem, with a possible
cure, the stories create a space in which Elena and Fanny can make demands (however
normative) that will alter their physiology and psychology by providing a release for their
maternal desires.
However, because these texts participate in constructing the inability to conceive a child
as an upper-class problem, female agency is likewise classed. While Elena and Fanny’s sterility
and Nucha’s difficult labor is tied to concerns of female agency, the narratives represent the ease
with which lower-class women reproduce as rooted in their materiality and sexual instinct, which
in turn serves to animalize and objectify them. In La cuestión palpitante, Pardo Bazán criticized
Émile Zola for what she considered a negation of free will in his naturalist novels, and expressed
the need to explore “esta mezcla de nobles aspiraciones y bajos instintos” that constitute the
reality of human life (that mix of noble aspirations and base instincts; La cuestión palpitante 14).
But, while she argues that the study of characters should not be reduced to the physical, her
depiction of impoverished (and frequently nameless) mothers reduces them to their biological
function.6 Unlike the upper-class mothers who long to devote themselves to a child and attempt
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As Charnon-Deutsch has noted, a few notable exceptions from her negative portrayal of lower
class mothers, including the mother in La piedra angular (1891) (although she abandons her son)
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to minimize social deviance, the women of the lower classes in Los Pazos de Ulloa, “La estéril,”
and “Leliña” are incapable of such noble aspirations. This analysis does not attempt to reiterate
David Henn’s acute observations on Pardo Bazán’s “readiness to maul her proletarian
characters” (The Early Pardo Bazán 26), but rather draws attention to the assumptions
underlying Pardo Bazán’s pairing of lower-class women who are fertile and upper-class women
who struggle to reproduce.
Adoption as a Cure for Sterility and Social Deviance in “La estéril”
In “La estéril,” the possibility of a cure for Elena’s childlessness is inextricable from the
continuation or disruption of her aristocratic lineage. Although Elena appears unconcerned with
the disappearance of her lineage, the problem remains present in the narrative through the
comparison between Elena’s fertility and the fertility of the lower classes, as well as by the
options for parenting that her husband presents. On Christmas Eve, as Elena is lamenting the
loneliness that awaits her in old age, her husband returns home later than usual. He explains that
he had been abruptly summoned to a small, dirty apartment to witness the last rites of a dying
woman, who was survived by her children. At the mention of the newly-orphaned children,
Elena passionately confesses the decades of anguish she has endured in silence: “¡Gonzalo, yo
no callo más! … Yo he sido muy desgraciada… Y tú también… ¡Esta casa sin un niño, sin un
pequeñito que cuidar! … Debí morirme a los veinte años” (Gonzalo, I will no longer be silent!
… I have been so unfortunate… and so have you… This house without a child, without a baby to
look after!... I should have died when I was twenty; 83). The first half of the story has established
Elena’s mounting preoccupation with her sterility, but the fact that her declaration coincides with

and Amparo in La tribuna (1883) (although the political background makes it difficult to
imagine the birth in the final scene as a triumph).
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the conclusion of her husband’s story signals that Elena would not have broken her silence if it
were not for the stark contrast between her own life, spent “escondiendo su noble enfermedad”
(hiding her noble illness) while “rodeada de lujo” (surrounded by luxury) and her husband’s
description of the dead woman’s “cuchitril imposible…[en que] bulle allí una lechigada de
chicos” (impossible hovel… swarming with a litter of children; 82). Gonzalo attempts to console
Elena by suggesting that she occasionally look after his sister-in-law’s children, but Elena rejects
the suggestion outright, and asks her husband to bring her home the smallest, sickliest orphan.
In Elena’s view, her adoption of the little boy with rickets offers the possibility of a cure
for the physiological effects of her sterility, as well as for the orphaned child. Gonzalo, naturally,
finds the idea of adoption ridiculous, in the first place because it would represent an excess of
charity that falls out of line with the conventions of their class, and secondly because of the
child’s undesirability. Having described the boy as frighteningly ugly, he quips “¿Es para
enseñarlo en ferias?” (Do you mean to exhibit him at carnivals?; 84). The narrative’s earlier
focalization through Elena’s character emphasizes the insensitivity, even crassness, of his
response, but his reaction is not surprising. As Kafer notes, “discourses of reproduction,
generation, and inheritance are shot through with anxiety about disability” (29). The
heteronormative ideal future is one in which “a Child both resembles the parents and exceeds
them; ‘we’ all want ‘our’ children to be more healthy” (29). Gonzalo is appalled at his wife’s
deviation from this hope, at her willingness to desire an undesirable child. In fact, Elena is not
deviating from the ableist discourses surrounding reproduction. No sooner has she made her
request than the reason for her preference is made explicit: “tráeme de seguida a ese chiquillo
raquítico...Yo le sanaré. Yo haré de él un hombre fuerte, robusto…” (bring me that little boy
with rickets right away… I will cure him. I will make him a strong, robust man…; 84). Adopting
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any child would solve the primary problem of childlessness that the narrative has presented, but
adopting a sickly child and providing him a cure proves her maternal capacity, as well as her
commitment to the vision of futurity in which, in accordance with normative ideals, parents hope
for a healthier, stronger, more able-bodied existence for future children.
Though the plot turns on the mutual resolution that Elena and the child can provide for
each other, Maryellen Bieder argues that “La estéril” is not a story about motherhood or
adoption, but rather about Elena’s escape from the silence to which she was bound. In this sense,
it is primarily a story of feminine agency that “[subverts] socioeconomic conventions, even
though [her] goal is to enact the exemplary model of womanhood” (“Plotting Gender” 144).
Nevertheless, acknowledgment of Elena’s agency is intertwined with the politics of motherhood
and adoption. Elena’s proposal to adopt impacts her husband (who reserves the capacity to reject
the idea) and the orphan (whom we are to believe would be happier and healthier with Elena).
But what about the child’s mother? Elena is not interested in looking after the children of “una
mujer que vive, que tiene derecho sobre sus hijos, que me disputaría a cada hora la criatura” (a
woman who is alive, who has a right to her children, who would fight with me over the child at
every hour; 83), and so, a dead mother, who has no agency over her children, provides a
compatible solution. It is, of course, death itself, and not Elena’s agency, that concludes the
mother’s rights over her children. To say that Elena, “[giving] voice to her pain,” (Bieder 144)
causes the death of the poor woman would ignore the fact that, on the contrary, it is the woman’s
death that provides the opportunity for Elena to articulate her grief and make demands of her
husband. How, then, can we read the lines of coincidence and causality that tie Elena to the
nameless, impoverished mother?
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In the most straightforward reading, the cure Elena and the child can provide for each
other is dependent on a prior coincidence: the temporal intersection of the mother’s death with
Elena’s renewed desire to have a child. In her analysis of bourgeois bodies and empire, Stoler
extends Foucault’s claim that the technologies of sex were designed to affirm the bourgeois self
(rather than to oppress others) by arguing that “the cultivation of the European bourgeois self in
the colonies… required other bodies that would perform those nurturing services, provide the
leisure for such self-absorbed administerings and self-bolstering acts” (111). In this sense, as
other scholars writing at the intersections of intimacy and empire have argued, the liberal,
bourgeois subject could only come into existence by denying an existence of self-affirmation to
others. While Stoler’s work relates specifically to colonial projects, her analysis is applicable to
sexualities and racisms in the metropole, where the “other bodies” forced to provide services for
the self-affirmation of the upper-class were also racialized, pathologized, and denied their own
self-affirmation. In fin-de-siècle Spain, literary and medical texts frequently racialized the lower
classes, referring to them as “savages,” particularly with regards to the need (and difficulty) of
reform projects.7 In “La estéril”Elena’s cure and the continuation of her lineage depend on a
lower-class woman’s physical labor and the subsequent conclusion of the same woman’s rights
as a mother (specifically, through her death).
Although Elena does not desire the woman’s death or oppression, the coincidence by
which the narrative brings together one woman’s desire and the other’s death reflects the
relationship between life and death that Foucault describes as established through racism. As
Foucault explains, racism places the relationship of war within a biological framework that is not
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Jo Labanyi notes the “tendency of all the novels studied to call the urban and rural masses ‘savages’” (8) and later
relates this discourse to the work of Italian criminal anthropologist Cesare Lombroso, who argued that the lower
classes in Europe were more closely related to African races (Labanyi 79; Lombroso 91).
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explicitly violent: “the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the
abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer” (255). In ‘La
estéril,’ the death of the impoverished mother reflects the necessity of this denial of lower-class
self-affirmation in that it depicts the loss for one side (the “savage” lower class) as a gain for the
other side (the “civilized” upper class), and that it results in making life in general healthier for
Elena and for her future adopted child. Although Elena’s sterility embodies the absence of
circulation that Labanyi has identified as key in representations of upper-class degeneration, the
comforts of Elena’s home (as compared to the dead woman’s “cuchitril”) and her philanthropic
decision to adopt a child in need reaffirm the superiority of the declining aristocracy.
Elena’s philanthropy further illustrates the idea that the existence of upper-class selfaffirmation comes at the cost of the lower class. As Jo Labanyi argues, “the overall beneficiary
of [the] philanthropic recycling of human refuse is bourgeois society because, in making waste
useful, it incorporates social outcasts into the ‘supervised freedom’ of the ‘Estado tutelar’”
(‘tutelary state’; 200). Elena’s adoption promises not only to cure the boy of rickets, but also to
eliminate all trace of his biological stigma as a member of the lower classes—to rescue him from
his existence as one of the “gusanos...horribles, sucios” (horrible, filthy worms) as Gonzalo
describes the children of the lower class. By this logic, Elena not only gains an heir through the
adoption, she eliminates a “gusano” from the world by separating him from his family. Asserting
her desire for uncontested property (the child), Elena’s adoption entails a potential invasion of
privacy of other individual citizens (the child’s family).8 This issue is, of course, elided.
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For a more in-depth understanding of the representation of the people of the lower classes as “masses” to deny the
individuality of their members, see Labanyi’s Gender and Modernization.
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“La estéril” presents the timing of the mother’s death as purely fortuitous for Elena, for
the child, and for society at large. But beyond the coinciding of Elena’s maternal desire and the
mother’s death, we find a final temporal coincidence in “La estéril”—that it is Christmas. This is
how Elena makes her concluding argument for adoption. After Gonzalo rejects the idea of
adopting such an ugly child, Elena takes her husband to their ivory Christ above their bed and
exclaims “¿Te parece a ti, señor don Gonzalo, que ése que nace ahora mismo, nace solo para los
guapos y los derechos?” (Do you think, Mister Gonzalo, that the child who was born on this day
was born only for the handsome and upright?; 84). As Bieder argues, by aligning Elena’s
otherwise socially unconventional desires with the word of Christ, “her subversion is authorized
by a higher textual authority” (Bieder 144). The coincidence of Elena’s heightened desire for
children and the mother’s death are a Christmas miracle and, consequently, the relationship in
which the impoverished mother must die for Elena to reproduce (socially, if not biologically) is
divinely sanctioned within the text. This is not to suggest that contemporary readers would have
interpreted “La estéril” as a short text in which God authorizes the death of the “bad race” for the
continuation of a “healthier and purer” superior race—the story was, after all, published on
Christmas Day, during which optimistic readings reign. But it is precisely in unquestioned happy
endings (or the expectation of what would constitute a satisfactory resolution) that cultural
assumptions are shored up.
In “La estéril” we can see how the simultaneity of failures and successes, moments of
coincidence, and overlapping timelines fracture normative expectations around class and
reproduction and set them in competition with one another. According to medical constructions
of womanhood, it is assumed that Elena will have a child or desire to have a child, but her
normative and supposedly natural maternal desire to have a child (that she does not have to share
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with another mother) comes into conflict with conventional understanding of lineage and
inheritance, which frequently emphasizes legitimacy by blood relation. Normative expectations
of lineage and inheritance are then placed at odds with normative expectations for philanthropic
social reform. The adoption of an heir breaks with the tradition of biological legitimacy and to
adopt an heir of the lower classes subverts broader notions of aristocratic lineage. However,
through adoption the unhealthy and racialized child might be cured, not only of rickets, but of his
potential for social deviance. By authorizing Elena’s adoption, the concluding Christmas miracle
of adoption champions curative time above other normative expectations: The physiological
effects of Elena’s sterility will be cured, the child will be cured of his rickets and of his social
position, and, though the boy was not of a “good birth,” his subjection to Elena’s maternal efforts
will put him in a position to produce “good stock” in the future. In this way, curative timelines
seamlessly turn toward eugenics.
Degenerate Reproduction and Upper-class Sterility in “Leliña”
“Leliña,” published over a decade later, reiterates the maternal competition between an
infertile bourgeois woman and the fertility of the lower classes, with the difference that it
foregrounds the potential reproduction of disability. In a desperate attempt to cure Fanny’s
infertility, she and her husband Manolo have moved to the countryside, where they frequently
walk past a homeless “Leliña” (little idiot), and occasionally offer her charity. Fanny,
overwhelmed by her desire to nurture and to convince divine providence to grant her a child,
decides that she and Manolo will welcome Leliña into their home the following winter. Fanny,
however, does not get the chance to prove her maternal worth because she loses interest in
offering her charity when Leliña becomes pregnant. Fanny’s change of heart emphasizes that her
plan depended on Leliña’s infantilized and helpless state. In the final scene, Leliña comfortably
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breastfeeds her newborn child, and Fanny turns away, laughing and sobbing hysterically. Though
the protagonist and focalizer is Fanny, it is the eponymous “Leliña” who functions as an ongoing
spectacle around whom the narrative centers.
The opening paragraphs establish Leliña as a freakish spectacle and a liminal life form
that seems to be a piece of animate matter, rather than an animal or a human. The narrator first
describes her as a “mujer de ridículo aspecto” (woman of ridiculous appearance; 4), but her
gender is immediately erased as the narrator adds, “era un accidente del camino, cepo o piedra, el
hito que señala una demarcación o el crucero cubierto de líquenes y menudas parasitarias” (she
was an incident of the road, a hunting trap or stone, the landmark that signals a demarcation or
crossroads, covered in lichens and small parasites; 4). The comparisons mark her body is a site of
growth, but not of consciousness. The stationary quality offered by the comparison to a landmark
extends to Leliña’s relationship to time. On inquiring about the woman’s history, the narrative
notes “¿La historia? En realidad, no cabe tener menos historia que Leliña. Sin familia, como los
hongos, dormía en cobertizos y pajares … y comía…, si le daban ‘un bien de caridad’” (History?
Really, it's impossible to have less of a story than Leliña. Without family, like the mushrooms,
she slept in sheds and barns… and she ate…if she was given charity; 4). The description of
Leliña’s existence outside of history and family life delineates the domestic space as a primary
organizer of one’s history, and the articulation of that history as crucial to one’s humanity. Her
lack of schedule or family, the organizing schema of nineteenth century family, renders her
“como los hongos” (like the mushrooms; 4), a non-linear, non-individualized, non-human form
of life, whose processes are reduced to rest and passive consumption.
Compared to a landmark and a fungus, Leliña’s character triggers questions about what it
means to be human. In Extraordinary Bodies, disability studies scholar Rosemarie Garland
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Thomson argues that the freak show in nineteenth century U.S. culture performed the important
cultural work of exhibiting to the masses “what they imagined themselves not to be” and
encouraging audience members to enact and reify scientific classifications (17, 59). Viewers of
the bearded “ape woman,” for instance, were asked to determine whether she was human and
whether she was a woman (62). The narrative’s attention to the material markers of Leliña’s
bodily and cognitive differences craft a spectacle that, as with the “ape woman,” call forth
assumptions about race, gender, and humanity. Noting disinterest in money, for example, the
narrator notes, “a la manera que su abierta boca de imbécil dejaba fluir la saliva por los dos
cantos, de sus manazas gordas, color de ocre, se escapaban las monedas, yendo a rodar al polvo,
a perderse entre la espesa hierba trigal” (just as her idiotic open mouth let saliva flow in two
streams, her large, fat hands, the color of ochre, let coins escape, rolling into the dirt until they
were lost in the thick wheat grass; 4). The attention to her bodily dis-order (signified by leaking
saliva) is read beside the description of her racialized (ochre) and masculine hands.
The description of Leliña’s deviance, however, culminates in her apparent unawareness
or lack of interest in money. The coins escape, roll, lose themselves—essentially, they act with
more agency than Leliña. The text comments that even dogs and birds beg, but “para mendigar
se requiere conciencia de la necesidad, nociones de previsión, maña o arte en pedir… y Leliña ni
sospechaba de todo eso” (Begging requires awareness of necessity, a sense of foresight, the skill
or art of requesting something… and Leliña did not even begin to suspect that such things
existed; 4). Like the freak show signs asking “what is it?” Pardo Bazán’s short story encourages
the audience to construct a hierarchy in which Leliña is not only framed as a lower form of life,
but removed from humanity to such a degree that non-human animals and non-living things are
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considered more agential than she. Leliña is not in a freak show, but she is nevertheless
“enfreaked”—she is turned into an object of observation and exploitation.
Throughout the story, Fanny and Manolo’s observation of Leliña and their charity toward
her amounts to a kind of ownership. From the beginning, Manolo gently elbows his wife, saying
“Ya apareció tu Leliña… Fíjate” (There is your Leliña… Look; 4). The casual use of the
possessive, employed here to indicate a prior interest in Leliña, becomes more purposeful after
the husband and wife decide to take her in as an act of charity. When Manolo gestures for Fanny
to look at Leliña, the narrator notes, “La idiota no les hacía caso. Ellos, en cambio, la
contemplaban, se volvían para mirarla otra vez desde la revuelta. Les pertenecía; por aquel hilo
tirarían de la misericordia de Dios” (The idiot paid no attention to them. They, on the other hand,
contemplated her, they turned to look at her again from the bend in the road. She belonged to
them; from that thread they would draw out God’s compassion; 4). Manolo and Fanny’s
observations illustrate the points of connection between charity and enfreakment: both entail a
surveilling gaze, a subsequent evaluation of the other’s lack, and ultimately, both allow the
normative subject to reaffirm their empowered position.
While charity functions as a form of class self-affirmation for Manolo, it is all the more
so for Fanny, whose comparison with Leliña affirms her own feminine normativity and who
expects her charity toward Leliña to result in a cure for her sterility. As with Elena, Fanny’s
infertility removes her from the otherwise unquestioned classification of normative femininity
afforded to her by her status as a racially unmarked (white), leisure class, married, European
woman. In comparison to Leliña, however, Fanny’s normativity is relatively minimized. This is
evident in the title, which centers on the nameless “Leliña,” rather than drawing attention to
Fanny’s sterility, as the title of “La estéril” does with regard to Elena. In this sense, Leliña is a
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valuable counterpart through which Fanny can conceptually mitigate her own deviance from
normative femininity.
Beyond the comparison between the two women, Fanny uses Leliña to carry out a
maternal role through her charity. As in Elena’s case, Fanny’s sterility is pathologized as a lack
of flowing affection that stagnates dangerously in the childless woman’s body. Fanny “tenía el
alma impregnada de una compasión morbosa, originada por la íntima tristeza de su esterilidad”
(had her soul saturated with a morbid compassion that originated in the intimate sadness of her
sterility; 4), and Leliña’s apparent helplessness provides an outlet for Fanny’s compassion.
Unlike the plot of “La estéril,” however, Leliña herself cannot be cured, nor can she provide a
cure for Fanny’s sterility. This draws our attention to the differentiation between physical and
cognitive disabilities, particularly with regard to curative time and citizenship. The child Elena
adopts can be fed and educated to someday embody the idealized subject as an independent,
adult with property, capable of participating in civil society. Leliña, on the other hand, does not
show potential to progress along the same normative timeline. She is not independent, she
demonstrates a lack of interest in economic exchange, and she cannot (or does not)
communicate. Moreover, she is already an adult, and in that alone has lost the potentiality and
hope with which children are so often framed. The act of charity, though proven to be
insufficient for the problem of Fanny’s infertility, nevertheless becomes the conduit for a cure.
Fanny’s enfreakment of and charity toward Leliña reveal the bourgeoisie's need for other
bodies to affirm their position and values, but Fanny’s reliance on Leliña’s marginal body
becomes more literal when Fanny decides to provide Leliña shelter in the hopes that providence
will reward her with a child. She assures herself that “Apenas sopláse una ráfaga de cierzo,
recogería a la inocente, dándole sustento y abrigo, y la Providencia, en premio, cuajaría en carne
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y sangre su honesto amor conyugal…” (As soon as the cold northern wind began to blow, she
would collect the innocent women, giving her food and shelter, and Providence, in return, would
coagulate her honest conjugal love into flesh and blood; 4). It is not just that Fanny “ansiaba
hacer algo bueno” (was anxious to do something good; 4) to relieve the “morbosa compasion”
(morbid compassion; 4) incited by her sterility. It becomes clear that the goodness she wishes to
enact must be aimed toward the larger goal of restoring her normative timeline. While her
reference to a child as a reward marks the degree to which she envisions charity as a negotiation,
her decision to wait until winter to take in Leliña reveals that her self-perception as a charitable,
maternal figure depends on the vulnerability of the subject—that is, to take Leliña in would be an
act of charity, but to take Leliña in during the winter months provides a more fulfilling hero
narrative, and is therefore more likely to merit a child as a divine reward. Just as Elena depends
on the sickliness of the orphan and the end of his mother’s parental rights to prove the extent of
her maternal capacity, Fanny depends on Leliña’s vulnerability and presumed lack of agency.
The benevolent ownership that Fanny and Manolo envision over Leliña results in their
perturbation when they discover that she is pregnant. On hearing the news, “Fanny y Manolo se
quedaron fríos, paralizados, igual que si hubiesen sufrido inmensa decepción. La señora, después
de palidecer de sorpresa, sintió que la vergüenza de la idiota le encendía las mejillas a ella, que
había proyectado redimirla y salvarla” (Fanny and Manolo froze, paralyzed, as if they had
suffered an immense betrayal. The lady, after turning pale from the shock, felt as thought the
shame of the idiot ignited her cheeks, burning the face of she who had planned to redeem and
save her; 4). It is as though Leliña (as property) had been stolen from them. Astounded, they
discuss the impossibility of her pregnancy, mentioning that “¡Leliña ni aun tenía figura humana!”
(Leliña does not even have a human shape!; 4), attempting to estimate her age (between 30 and
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50 years), and noting with disgust the ugliness of her face, dark skin, and shapeless legs. They
discuss as well the question of paternity, concluding that “hacer burla de la inocente” (taking
advantage of the innocent woman; 4) is a sin and whoever the father was had earned his place in
hell. The rhetoric through which they process the knowledge of Leliña’s pregnancy calls into
question her humanity, her capacity for reproduction, her desirability, and finally, negates the
possibility of her sexual agency. Her pregnancy has added an additional variable to her
enfreakment, to the question of what Leliña is and of what she is capable of doing or
understanding.
The narrative provides no other information about the possibility of rape or of Leliña’s
sexual desires, but prior contradictions about Leliña’s cognition may complicate Fanny and
Manolo’s assumptions. At the beginning of the story, the narrator establishes that Leliña lacked
any awareness of how to beg, was unconscious of her own physical needs, and had no
understanding of the value of money. Given the historical context, her cognitive disability would
seem to disqualify her from society, not only because of her lack of productivity or familial ties,
but because her inability to understand that money has value renders her unable to engage in
economic exchanges at a time when “representation [was] the necessary condition of modern
life” (Labanyi 208). However, Leliña’s presumed inability to understand representation is
complicated by the pleasure she takes in gender performance. Although Fanny and Manolo’s
gifts of money and food are met with Leliña’s impassivity, their gifts of clothing provoke
excitement and self-admiration: “¡Cosa curiosa! Leliña, indiferente a la comida, gruñó de
satisfacción viéndose trajeada de nuevo. Una sonrisa iluminó su faz inexpresiva, al ponerse en
vez de sus andrajos, las prendas de esos matices vivos, chillones… Hembra al fin… fue el
comentario de Manolo” (A curious thing! Leliña, indifferent to food, grunted with satisfaction
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upon seeing herself dressed anew. A smile illuminated her inexpressive countenance as she
replaced her rags with garments that were brightly colored and made crumpling sounds… “A
female at last…” Manolo commented; 4). Leliña’s pleasure in the aesthetics, the sounds and
patterns, of feminine clothes suggest an awareness of gender performance and self-representation
that contradict the previous assessment regarding the limits of her cognition. There is no textual
information suggesting that Leliña’s agency in her presentation of femininity extends to sexual
desire and action, but Manolo and Fanny’s assumption that Leliña has no sexuality is based on
their broader negation of her personhood.
Leliña’s maternal behavior in the final scene brings the tension of her reproductive
agency and Fanny and Manolo’s ownership to a climax. Manolo and Fanny come across Leliña
in her usual place and stare at her as she breastfeeds her newborn, “Abierto el ya haraposo
pañolón de lana, recostada sobre el ribazo, colgantes los descalzos pies deformes, la idiota
amamantaba a su hijo, agrasajándole con la falda del zagalejo, sin cuidarse de la humedad que le
entumecía los muslos” (The already-ragged woolen shawl was open, and she was reclining
against the slope, her naked, deformed feet hanging freely as the idiot breastfed her son,
entertaining him with her petticoat, ignoring the humidity that numbed her thighs; 4). Though it
is impossible to know whether Leliña experienced sexual desire and enacted sexual agency, her
engagement with her child demonstrates her maternal capacity, a capacity for sociability and
care. The question of paternity had led Fanny and Manolo to react as though someone had stolen
her from them, but, through her maternity, Leliña steals herself from them—she uses her body to
create a child, thereby removing her body from the economy of vulnerability and charity through
which Fanny and Manolo intended to use her to bring about their own child.
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For Fanny, witnessing Leliña’s motherhood reverses the comparison in which her
normativity was affirmed through Leliña’s abnormalities. The function of a freak show to allow
audience members to identify “what they are not” backfires in this scene as Fanny does not
identify their differences based in Leliña’s disability and deformities, but rather in her ability to
bear children. Manolo stares at Leliña’s exposed body admiringly, exclaiming “¡Si hoy parece
una mujer como las demás!” (Today she seems a woman like all the rest!; 4) but Fanny is unable
to answer, “de pronto sacó el pañuelo y ahogo con él sollozos histéricos, entrecortados, que
acabaron en estremecedora risa … Ella con su niño… ¡Yo, nunca, nunca! -repetía, mordiendo el
pañuelo, desgarrándolo con los dientes, a carcajadas” (suddenly she drew out her handkershief
and drowned her hysterical sobs in it—choking sobs that ended in an alarming laugh… ‘She,
with her child… I never, never!’ she repeated, biting the handkerchief, ripping it up with her
teeth, and cackling; 4). Leliña’s reproduction transforms her (at least, relative to her previous
state) into a “normal” woman, a woman like the rest, as Manolo describes her. By comparison, it
is Fanny who is not like the rest. The extent of her “abnormality,” her pathologized sterility,
culminates in her hysterical sobs and laughter, to which her husband responds by calling to his
driver, “Den la vuelta… A casa, a escape… ¡Se ha puesto enferma la señora!” (Turn around…
we must go home, we must leave… The lady has fallen ill!; 4). Manolo’s commentary on
Leliña’s approximation to normalcy, immediately followed by his interpretation of Fanny’s
illness, further cements the indirectly proportional relationship of health between the lower and
upper classes implicit in the final comparison between Fanny and Leliña.

Affirmations of Upper-class Motherhood in Los Pazos de Ulloa
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The same formulation from “La estéril” and “Leliña”—the contrast between an upperclass woman’s reproductive shortcomings and a lower-class woman’s robust reproductive
health—is at play in Pardo Bazán’s earlier novel, Los Pazos de Ulloa (1885-6). The novel
centers on a priest’s efforts to exert a civilizing force on the Ulloa estate in rural Galicia, which
he does by attempting to convince Pedro Moscoso, the Marqués of Ulloa, to end his affair with
his servant and take a legitimate wife. Pedro marries his first cousin, Nucha, but when she gives
birth to a daughter and fails to provide him a male heir, he turns his attention back to his
mistress, Sabel, and their illegitimate son, Perucho. Although the story does not feature sterility
or adoption, it anticipates “La estéril” and “Leliña” by contrasting Nucha and Sabel’s health and
maternal capacities. Sabel is physically more adept at reproduction, but proves to be a neglectful
mother, while Nucha is a devoted mother, but almost dies in childbirth and is unable to bear
more children. The pairing of Nucha and Sabel aligns with the novel’s naturalist framework and
investigation of degeneration. Maurice Hemingway explains the novel’s naturalist framework as
constituted by the hypothesis that rural life animalizes people. As Mariano Baquero Goyanes has
argued, Los Pazos de Ulloa tests this hypothesis by dividing its characters into two groups: those
who are robust and associated with the rural land (such as Sabel) and those who are portrayed as
having a weaker constitution and are associated with civilizing projects (such as Nucha). Within
the novel’s central experiment (whether a civilizing effect might take root in rural Galicia and
what will happen to those who attempt it) Nucha and Sabel are put in opposition to one another.
Lou Charnon-Deutsch and Ángeles Sandino Carreño have commented on the novel’s
representation of Nucha at the expense of Sabel. Sandino argues that Pardo Bazán’s sympathy
toward Nucha and disdain toward Sabel contradict her feminist ideals to such a degree that the
novel is ultimately anti-feminist (328). Charnon-Deutsch critiques the novel’s vision of

81

motherhood, which is dependent on “sacrificing Sabel’s subjectivity to the other maternal figure
of the novel [Nucha]” (“Nineteenth-century Spanish Women Writers” 135). Reading Los pazos
de Ulloa in relation to “La estéril” and “Leliña” extends these interpretations by demonstrating
how the earlier novel anticipates the formulation that the health and propagation of the upper
class are in conflict with that of the lower class.
Nucha is brought into Ulloa not only as a civilizing force, but also as a cure for
degeneration. The priest expects that, as the legitimate wife, Nucha will replace Sabel and
provide both an heir and a sense of social order and propriety. The depictions of Sabel and her
son in the first chapters indicate the state of degeneration that awaits rural Galicia without
intervention.When the novel introduces Sabel’s four-year-old son, the narrator notes that he is at
first sight indistinguishable from the hunting dogs, and within the first chapter, his father and
grandfather encourage him to consume large quantities of alcohol. Conversely, Nucha embodies
the potential to provide a civilizing, domestic force that may counteract the environmental
effects. In this way, the degeneration of Ulloa, which is associated with Sabel and Perucho, is
contrasted with Nucha’s curative timeline. At the end of the novel, Nucha’s death is a source of
tragedy not only because it leaves her daughter essentially orphaned, but also because it leaves
Sabel as the sole mother figure in Ulloa and consequently marks the failure of moral and
maternal civilizing efforts to overcome the problems of degeneration.
Given that the production of a legitimate heir is central to the novel’s proposed cure for
degeneration, the relationship between the tenuous fertility of the upper-class mother and the
issue of lineage is made more explicit in Los Pazos de Ulloa than in “La estéril” and “Leliña.”
For Pedro, the continuation of lineage requires blood purity as well as sexual purity,9 which has

9

Julia Chang has recently argued that blood-based exclusion was not replaced by the administration of sexuality, but
continued to persist alongside it through the Restoration period. She cites La Regenta as a case study that reveals
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led him to choose endogamy and—among his first cousins—to choose Nucha, who is plain but
prudent. In contrast with his lover Sabel (who is associated with the circulation of the working
classes) and with his more attractive cousin Rita (who is associated with the circulation of
promiscuity), Nucha represents the perfect ángel del hogar. But, although Pedro selected Nucha
to ensure the legitimacy of his lineage, her labor complications put his hopes of having a
legitimate heir at risk.
Nucha’s labor is a critical point in the novel in that it draws together the problems of
lineage and the comparisons between Nucha and Sabel’s biology. Commenting on Nucha’s
physical weakness during childbirth, Máximo Juncal, the doctor, claims that “mil veces mejor
preparadas están las aldeanas para el gran combate de la gestación y el alumbramiento, que es al
fin la verdadera función femenina” (country women are a thousand times better prepared [than
city women] for the great combat of pregnancy and delivery, which is, in the end, the true
feminine function; 261). The narrator notes that, despite Máximo’s education and Pedro’s
ignorance of scientific matters, their views on women coincide, as the Marqués also believes that
“la mujer debe ser muy apta para la propagación de la especie. Lo contrario le parecía un
crimen” (women should be very capable of propagating the species. The contrary seemed to him
to be a crime; 262). The conversation leads Pedro to compare his wife to women who are more
capable of carrying out the propagation of the species. He regrets not marrying Rita, Nucha’s
healthy, robust sister, and remembers the ease with which Sabel gave birth to Perucho in the time
it took for the bread she had kneaded to finish baking. Finally, his concern over Nucha’s physical
capacity leads him to ask Máximo whether Nucha will be able to breastfeed, and Pedro sets out

“interstitial moments of transition in which the preoccupation with origin bled into sex” (301). Given the
simultaneity of feudal and modernizing values depicted in Los Pazos de Ulloa, it also functions as a moment of
transition in which ideologies of blood purity and sexual chastity intensify each other.
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to bring the daughter of one of his workers to serve as a wet nurse. All three women (Rita, Sabel,
and the wet nurse) provide an unflattering point of comparison for Nucha precisely at the
moment that she struggles to fulfill what is ironically deemed the most important feminine
function.
Although Nucha is able to give birth, Máximo’s description of her reproductive health is
comparable to the descriptions of sterility in “La estéril” and “Leliña.” According to Máximo,
the sedentary life of city women has the effects of “ingurgitarlas y criar linfa a expensas de la
sangre,” which leaves them poorly prepared to bear children (over-stuff them and create lymph
at the expense of blood; 261). The doctor cites the same improper production or flow of bodily
fluids in determining that Nucha should not breastfeed because “esa función augusta exige
complexión muy vigorosa y predominio del temperamento sanguíneo” (that august function
demands a vigorous complexion and the predominance of a sanguine temperament; 274). Like
Elena in “La estéril,” Nucha’s physical limitations in reproduction are characterized as an
“estancación” (stagnation; “La estéril” 2). As in the two short stories, Nucha’s delicate
reproductive health reflect the burgeoning view of the degeneration of the upper classes as a
problem of over-accumulation and a lack of circulation (Labanyi 200) that threaten normative
timelines of lineage by failing to provide a legitimate, male heir. Eager to have a male child,
Pedro asks Máximo immediately after the birth whether Nucha will be able to give him another
child. Máximo responds with some ambiguity, finally assuring the Marqués that nature can heal
women even after a difficult childbirth, but that the focus should be on his wife’s rest and
recovery. Despite the doctor’s optimism, Pedro interprets his response and Nucha’s condition as
indicative that she will not be able to provide him an heir (375). In short, hers is a body that is all
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too contained. In Nucha, the ideal of the Virgin Mother, to which the priest lovingly compares
her, is transformed through medical discourses into a sterile mother.
Following the birth, Pedro and Máximo’s decisions about Nucha’s health negate any
agency Nucha previously had over her own body. She is forced to rest against her will and rely
on a wet nurse, despite her insistence on nursing her own child. With the notable exception of
Jennifer Smith and María Asunción Gómez, scholars have largely ignored the representation of
the wet nurse in Los Pazos de Ulloa. Tracing medical and literary representations of the wet
nurse in nineteenth-century Spain, Smith has argued that the wet nurse subverted the division
between motherhood and sexuality prescribed to bourgeois mothers. She goes on to remark that
Pardo Bazán’s depiction of wet nurses differed from that of Galdós and contemporary medical
texts in that it critiqued the social construct of femininity, in part by showing sympathy toward
the wet nurse in Los Pazos de Ulloa. Gómez extends Smith’s argument by considering the
capacity for the wet nurse to disrupt social hierarchies, but takes issue with the idea that the
narrator of Los Pazos de Ulloa is sympathetic toward the wet nurse. Gómez goes on to reference
the “resentimiento mutuo” (mutual resentment; 54) between Nucha and the wet nurse, as well as
the absence of the latter’s voice in the narrative. While I agree with Gómez’s claims, I would add
that Nucha’s resentment toward the wet nurse is a reaction to her own oppression and an active
attempt to regain her agency. While scholars have remarked on Nucha’s lack of self-definition,10
her interactions with the wet nurse—and, later, with Sabel and Perucho—demonstrate an attempt
to intervene in the degeneration of Ulloa by reforming her new household. Like Elena and
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Pattison describes Nucha as having “almost no force of character” (52). Hemingway
characterizes Julian and Nucha as having “weak bodies and weak personalities” (28). In
“Between Genre and Gender” Bieder says, “Of Nucha the self-defined individual, one sees
nothing” (137)
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Fanny, she exerts her agency by affirming her social position as an upper-class mother, and, as in
the short stories, her affirmation depends on the negated agency of lower-class women.
The use of a wet nurse is an explicit example of the “other bodies” that must perform
services to provide the conditions for the affirmation the bourgeois self (Stoler 111), but it is
worth noting that Nucha’s reliance on the wet nurse occurs against her will. That is not to say
that Nucha is not invested in affirming herself as an upper-class subject. Popular medical writers,
including Pulido, condemned upper-class women’s reliance on wet nurses, arguing that a wet
nurse should only be used if the mother suffered from extreme weakness or a contagious illness
(Pulido 30-49; Aldaraca 86-87). Pulido notes that milk is “una de tantas modificaciones de
sangre… [hasta] podríamos decir que es la sangre misma” (one of several modifactions of
blood...we could say that it is blood itself; 39), and that as such, it is crucial to the final stages of
the infant’s physical formation. The wet nurse’s participation in the biological constitution of the
child would seem to make her, in a small way, the child’s second biological mother.11
Accordingly, medical injunctions warned against the wet nurse’s transmission of illness, but also
against transmission of racial and moral characteristics. Within this context, Nucha’s insistence
on breastfeeding is a declaration of her own health, as well as an attempt to control her
experience as a mother and the health of her child.
Los Pazos de Ulloa speaks to medical fears of transmission and hereditary contamination
through the characterization of the wet nurse who fulfills the negative associations of her
position as a woman who is lower-class, potentially promiscuous, and racially othered.12 She is
11

Pardo Bazán dramatizes the anxiety that ethnic characteristics could be transmitted through breastfeeding in her
1910 short story “La adopción,” in which a newborn European aristocrat must be nursed by an Indian woman and
becomes an Indian child. The story concludes, “Aquella criatura había dejado de pertenecer a la raza superior, a la
de los amos y vencedores.”
12

The fear of hereditary transmission through breast milk, based on the belief that milk was derived from blood,
dates back to fifteenth-century anxieties over Jewish or Moorish wet nurses who were believed to threaten the
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the daughter of one of Pedro’s workers, it is presumed that she has gotten pregnant out of
wedlock, and she is racialized through the doctor’s assessment that she is from a “valle situado
en los últimos confines de Galicia, lindando con Portugal” where the women are “guerreras
galaicas de que hablaban los geógrafos Latinos” (valley situated in the farthest confines of
Galicia, bordering Portugal [where women are] the gallic warriors of whom Latin geographers
spoke; 282). In contrast with Nucha, whose participation in the mission of civilizing Ulloa
associates her with progress, Máximo’s ethnographic assessment casts the wet nurse’s body as
foreign, belonging to a different historical time, and opposed to progress. The potential
transmission of these qualities is a threat to Nucha’s motherhood and to her ability to further
social progress.
While the doctor’s racialization renders the wet nurse a threat, Nucha’s explicit
objectification of her functions as a defensive response to cultural anxieties regarding the
potential biological influences of the wet nurse on the child. Máximo and the narrator ironically
describe the wet nurse as a “vaca humana” (human cow; 269), but Nucha reduces her further: “el
ama, decía ella, era un tonel lleno de leche que estaba allí para aplicarle la espita cuando fuese
necesario, y soltar el chorro: ni más ni menos” (the wet nurse, she said, is a barrel full of milk
that is there so we can apply the spigot when necessary and release the stream [of milk]: no
more, no less; 281). The narrator agrees with this objectification, adding, “la comparación del
tonel es exactisima: el ama tenía hechura, color e inteligencia del tonel” (the comparison was
absolutely exact: the wet nurse had the build, color, and intelligence of a barrel; 281). By
imagining her, not as a living being, but as a vessel of milk, Nucha evades the implications of the

limpieza de sangre (purity of blood) of Christian children (Ward 189). “Beginnings of a Scientific Theory of Race?
Spain, 1450-1600” by John Edwards and “Milking the Poor: Wet-nursing and the Sexual Economy of Early Modern
Spain” by Emilie Bergmann also demonstrate the deep historical roots that tie wet-nursing to concerns about blood
purity in Spain.

87

scientific claim—which the novel emphasizes—that milk is produced through blood. Although
the context differs from that of “La estéril,” Nucha shares in Elena’s need to be the sole mother,
the sole influence over a child’s upbringing. Whereas “La estéril,” presents a solution to Elena’s
problem through the coincidence of a lower-class mother’s death, in Los Pazos de Ulloa the
negation of the wet nurse’s personhood does not occur by coincidence but is rhetorically enacted
by Nucha’s objectification of her.
Despite (or because of) her disdain toward the wet nurse, Nucha makes an effort to
educate and civilize her—a project which she will later replicate with Sabel’s son. Sabel, whom
the narrator had also likened to a cow (143), enjoys comparing herself to the wet nurse because
“con semejante mostrenco Sabel se la echaba de principesa” (next to such a fat, dumb woman,
Sabel felt like a princess; 282) and participates in mocking her with other lower-class members
of the household. In contrast with Sabel’s mockery, Nucha’s small acts of charity and education
toward the wet nurse further characterize Nucha as a positive mother figure: “Costó un triunfo a
Nucha vestirla racionalmente [...] fue una penitencia enseñarle el nombre y uso de cada objeto,
aún de los más sencillos y corrientes; fue pensar en lo escusado convencerla de que la niña que
criaba era un ser delicado y frágil, que no se podía traer mal envuelto [...] y dejarse a la sombra
de un roble” (It took all of Nucha’s efforts to dress her in a reasonable way [...] it was a penance
to teach her the name and use of each object, even the most simple and common ones; it was
almost impossible to convince her that the little girl she nursed was a delicate and fragile being
that could not be left poorly wrapped under the shade of an oak tree; 283). There is some irony in
the characterization of the wet nurse as neglectful because Nucha fears she will leave her
daughter outside and uncovered, given that the wet nurse has been forced to abandon her own
two-month-old child in order to keep Nucha’s daughter alive—an issue which goes entirely
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unremarked. Nucha’s civilizing project has the effect of contrasting the wet nurse’s neglectful
parenting to Nucha’s constant mothering of both her child and the infantilized wet nurse.
Nucha’s affection toward Sabel’s son, Perucho, reiterates the depiction of lower-class
women as neglectful mothers and of Nucha’s civilizing influence as a necessity. Perucho’s
unwashed and unclothed state point to Sabel’s unsuitability for raising a child. Nucha, unaware
of Sabel’s relationship with Pedro, takes Perucho as her “protegido” (protected child; 244).
While her care for him does not constitute an adoption, her acts of mothering are similar to those
of Elena in “La estéril,” as Nucha “aspiraba a enderezar a aquel arbolito tierno, civilizando a la
vez la piel y el espíritu” (aspired to straighten that tender little tree, simultaneously civilizing
flesh and spirit; 244). Throughout the novel, Perucho is frequently animalized. His willingness to
suckle milk straight from the cow’s udder and the ease with which he steals eggs from the
chicken coop mark his moral distance from the expectations of civil life, while his enjoyment of
alcohol (at his father and grandfather’s behest) signals his trajectory toward a life of vice.
Nevertheless, the effects of Nucha’s nurturing marked by Perucho’s cleanliness and the
gentleness with which he treats her daughter, indicate the potential for upper-class motherhood to
reform a neglected child. She cleans, clothes, and educates him until she learns he is Pedro’s son.
Although Nucha’s loving treatment of Perucho serves as further proof of her maternal
character, her violence toward him and subsequent rejection of Sabel when she becomes aware
of his parentage again reinforce control of lower class subjects as key to upper-class motherhood.
Nucha’s realization that her daughter and Perucho are siblings occurs while the children are
bathing. As he has seen Nucha do with the baby, Perucho “la columpiaba en el líquido
transparente, le abría los muslos para que recibiese en todas partes la frescura del agua” (he
rocked her in the transparent liquid, he opened her thighs so she could receive the freshness of
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the water in every part; 322). Admiring their affection, Nucha remarks that they look like
siblings, and suddenly realizes that Perucho must be Pedro’s son. In the only act of violence she
commits in the novel, Nucha snatches her daughter away and threatens to beat Perucho if he
returns. While the intimacy between the children is not untoward (Perucho is four to six years
old and the girl is a few months old), Nucha’s decision to separate them when the boy opens the
girl’s thighs and her alarm at seeing “mi niña abrazada con él!” (my daughter, embracing him!;
322) is suggestive of her concern over her daughter’s sexual purity, just as her desire to limit the
girl’s contact with the wet nurse is a concern about blood purity.
Nucha’s rejection of the wet nurse and Perucho’s intimacy with her daughter echoes her
husband’s declaration on choosing Nucha as his wife: “La hembra destinada a llevar el nombre
esclarecido de Moscoso y a perpetuarlo legítimamente había de ser limpia como un espejo” (the
female destined to carry the distinguished name of Moscoso, and legitimately perpetuate it, was
to be clean as a mirror; 199). In her recent work on the discourses of blood purity and sexual
purity, Julia Chang, following Foucault’s argument, contends that blood-based hierarchies coexisted with modernity’s emphasis on sex as the crux of relations of power through Spain’s
Restoration period (299-300). Eugenic discourses furthered this connection between castidad
(chastity) and casta (caste) through the rise of sexology and calls for the purification of blood
(Cleminson 76; Campos 343-45). Nucha’s efforts to preserve her daughter’s purity from sexual
and sanguine contamination are consistent with her characterization as a good mother, but they
also illustrates the ways in which a desire for bodily normativity casts marginal subjects as
threats and facilitates their dehumanization—in this case, the dehumanization of the wet nurse
and Sabel’s son.
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After she becomes aware of Sabel’s relationship with her husband, Nucha insists on
removing Sabel and Perucho from the household, putting the well-being of the two women
further at odds. Pleading with Julián, the priest, Nucha explains, “Si el chiquillo y la mujer no
salen de aquí me volveré loca. Estoy enferma; estas cosas me hacen daño… daño” (If the kid and
the women don’t get out of here, I will go crazy. I am sick; these things upset me…; 325). The
extent of the threat Sabel poses becomes clearer as Nucha goes on to say, “‘O esa mujer se casa y
se va [...] o…’ Interrumpió aquí la frase. Hay momentos críticos en que la mente acaricia dos o
tres soluciones violentisimas, extremas, y la lengua más cobarde no se atreve a formularlas”
(“Either that woman gets married and leaves or ...” She stopped there. There are critical moments
in which the mind caresses two or three extreme, violent solutions, and the more cowardly
tongue does not dare formulate them; 325). It is impossible to know whether Nucha’s violent
solutions correspond to Julián’s fantasies about beating and whipping Sabel away from Ulloa
(240, 353) or if they would refer to Nucha’s own death. Although Sabel and Nucha are both
subject to Pedro’s abuse, which ends up killing the latter, the narrative frames the women as
being in competition with each other, and consequently as threats to one another—after all, only
one of their children will inherit the house of Ulloa.13
Through the pairing of Nucha and Sabel, Los Pazos de Ulloa anticipates Pardo Bazán’s
later short stories through a representation of lower class reproduction as a threat to the
legitimacy of the biologically-enervated upper classes, and consequently to civilized order.
Sabel’s absence would (according to Julián and Nucha) be morally beneficial, just as the death of
13

In “Inheritance and Inequality in a Spanish Galician Community, 1840-1935,” Rainer Lutz Bauer explains that
there was a strong cultural preference for a (legitimate) first-born son to be a major heir, but that (legitimate)
daughters were not necessarily excluded from the possibility of inheriting an estate (174). However, along with birth
order and gender, the offspring’s ability to participate in the domestic labor force was crucial in determining the
inheritance (176). Pedro’s view of women and Nucha’s delicate constitution indicate that their daughter would likely
not become the major heir—this is confirmed in the final scene, as well as in the sequel.
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the impoverished mother in ‘La estéril’ is beneficial in that it enables the construction of a
“good” family. The novel concludes, instead, with Nucha’s death. The tragedy of her death is
further dramatized in the final scene, in which Los Pazos de Ulloa reveals that the loss of her
civilizing maternal force has set the stage for an incestuous relationship between her daughter
and Perucho, a plot which is carried out in the sequel, La madre naturaleza (1887).
La madre naturaleza continues the examination of degeneration, focusing on the
relationship between Perucho and Nucha’s daughter, Manolita, a decade after Nucha’s death.
Nucha’s brother, Gabriel, belatedly learns that Nucha had written to him asking him to look after
her daughter and travels to Ulloa with the hope of marrying his young niece. Soon after arriving,
however, he learns that Manolita is in love with her half-brother. Nucha’s absence and Sabel’s
neglect has resulted in Perucho and Nucha’s daughter being raised by “Mother Nature,” ignorant
of their familial ties and ungoverned by social propriety. Consequently, the half-siblings fall in
love and succumb to their shared sexual attraction. In the novel’s conclusion, Perucho and
Manola become aware of their kinship, leading Perucho to leave Ulloa in heartbreak and Manola
to join a convent. Reflecting on the tragedy, Gabriel offers the novel’s final line: “Naturaleza, te
llaman madre...más bien deberían llamarte madrastra” (Nature, they call you mother… they
should instead call you step-mother; 405). While scholars have considered the irony of the
novel’s final line in which the focalizer refers to Mother Nature as a step-mother (Labanyi 279;
El Saffar 100), the conclusion’s return to the theme of bad mothers is a return to the elaboration
of Sabel’s neglect. In fact, the novel’s early chapters indirectly blame Sabel for the tragedy of
incest by describing her as the “ex-bella fregatriz [...] causa de tantos disturbios, pecados y
tristezas” (formerly-beautiful servant [...] the cause of so many disturbances, sins, and sorrows;
216). Nucha’s death does not correspond precisely with the tragedy of ‘Leliña,’ that the wrong
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(bad) mother has reproduced; rather, it insinuates the related idea that the wrong (good) mother
has died.
Conclusion: Plotting Eugenic Values at the fin de siècle
The racialization of the lower classes and pairing of good mothers and bad mothers from
Los Pazos de Ulloa to “La esteril” and “Leliña” clearly draw on theories of degeneration. As
Ricardo Campos Marín has demonstrated, medical studies of the mid-nineteenth century
established connected poverty to physical and moral degeneration (336). As anxiety surrounding
degeneration increased at the fin-de-siècle, hygienists fomented interventionist discourses that
focused on the health of the child. The connection between degeneration and eugenics hinges on
the question of reproduction, specifically on the intent of curing reproduction (through
maternology) and of using reproduction as a cure for social ills. In each of the Pardo Bazán texts
analyzed throughout this chapter, the idea that the death of the lower-class mother is necessary
for the upper-class mother to exist—and that this is beneficial for society—moves beyond
concerns surrounding degeneration and advocates for a eugenic mentality.
The term “eugenics” may not have become widely recognized as a term in Spain until the
second or third decade of the 20th century, but ‘La estéril’ and ‘Leliña’ indicate that the success
of one demographic at the expense of another was a common enough concept to appeal to
Spanish readers of popular literature. Moreover, Pardo Bazán’s depiction of lower-class mothers
anticipates the “soft” eugenic efforts of puericulture and conscious motherhood that would not be
explicitly articulated until over a decade after the publication of “Leliña.” Pardo Bazán’s
depiction of impoverished women as lacking sufficient resources (the dead mother in “La
estéril”), being neglectful (Sabel), or lacking intellectual capacity (Leliña and the wet nurse) to
be good mothers, frames their maternal inabilities as a threat to national improvement.
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Conversely, Pardo Bazán represents upper-class mothers as conscientious and deliberate in their
decisions to mother and care for others. What the pattern of Los Pazos de Ulloa, “La estéril,” and
“Leliña” lays bare is the acceptance of early eugenicist logic in the public consciousness and the
use of maternal desire to frame this logic as natural. In her study of the rise of eugenics in Spain,
Mary Nash notes that José Gómez described the objective of maternology at the 1919 Congreso
Nacional de Medicina as “la defensa de la vida de la madre y la protección del nuevo ser” (the
defense of the life of the mother and the protection of the new being; 632). But the question of
which mothers’ lives were defended belies the harder side of soft eugenics. By celebrating the
death of an impoverished mother but mourning that of a wealthy one, by lamenting both the
reproductive limitations of upper-class women and the reproductive ease of lower-class mothers,
these Pardo Bazán narratives speak to a desire for population control.
In Pardo Bazán’s works, the protagonists’ interest in caring for the members of the lower
classes functions as a form of bourgeois self-affirmation and a project of reform to minimize the
existence of pathologized subjects by clothing and educating them. The limited reproduction of
the upper classes in Los Pazos de Ulloa, “La estéril,” and “Leliña” challenges the idea that
women are defined by their capacity for biological reproduction and emphasizes upper-class
women’s agency and social value. However, in affirming themselves and their class by caring for
lower-class children or infantilized lower-class adults, they deny the subjectivity of lower-class
mothers, who are rarely given a name and who are defined in the text largely by their biological
reproductive abilities. In these depictions, conscious motherhood is only possible through the
erasure of agency of the marginal population. Charity toward members of the lower classes
serves as a kind of social reform in these narratives, and the decision of which subjects are
deserving of care contributes to the construction of eugenic hopes for racial improvement.
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Chapter 3
Blindness, Madness, and Suicide: Crip Time in Galdós’s Torquemada Novels

In La piedra angular and the short stories by Emilia Pardo Bazán, we have seen several
characters internalize the idea that their value is based on their expected capacity for production
and healthy reproduction. Elena’s lament in “La esteril” that she should not have lived if she
would not be able to bear children and Rojo’s suicide at the conclusion of La piedra angular,
inseparable from Moragas’s view of him as a degenerate subject, both illustrate the link between
valuing a life for its production and affirming that bodily difference or deviance should be
eliminated. In the Torquemada series, the negotiations of subjectivity and crip time of Rafael
Aguila, a blind aristocrat who eventually commits suicide, draw attention to the ideologies that
devalue disabled subjects. As in other novels by Benito Pérez Galdós, the Torquemada novels’
representations of crip time, of timelines that do not align with those of normative bodies, are set
at odds with discourses that define progress through increased productivity and profit. Within
this dynamic, Rafael’s trajectory underscores two fundamental aspects of the connection between
valuing productivity and desiring the elimination of disability in the constructions of crip time.
First, Rafael’s character exemplifies how nineteenth-century medical discourses conceptualized
disability in relation to time and productivity in ways that conflated acquired disability with the
threat of degeneration. Secondly, the decreased quality of care Rafael receives from his family
over the course of the series illustrates how the values of the exchange economy determine who
is worthy of care.
Scholars have generally agreed that the focus of the Torquemada series is a critique of
the rising culture of materialism and utilitarianism of 1880s and 1890s Spain—that is, of the
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pursuit of wealth that renders relationships transactional.1 The primary plot of the Torquemada
novels (1889-1895) follows the social advancement of Francisco de Torquemada, a moneylender
whose marriage to the impoverished aristocrat Fidela Aguila facilitates his social rise into elite
society and eventual position as a senator and marquis. Although Rafael, Fidela’s brother, is a
secondary character whose impact on the plot is minimal, his role in the series is crucial as he
opposes Fidela and Torquemada’s marriage in Torquemada en la cruz (1893) and develops a
critique of the cultural values that enable Torquemada’s success in Torquemada en el purgatorio
(1894).
There are relatively few scholarly works that grant Rafael sustained, critical attention,
and most scholarship on the Torquemada novels interprets his disabilities and suicide as a
straightforward representation of the decline of the economically unadaptable members of the
aristocracy during the rise of the bourgeois class in Spain.2 However, I propose that Rafael—as a
fading aristocrat, a violent political reactionary, and a failed prophet— offers complex and often
contradictory representations of the relationship between disability, degeneration, and futurity in
a society defined by the logic of the exchange economy. Rafael’s disability and his role in the
series open a space to interrogate how the cultural insistence that disabled people cannot have a
worthwhile future (that disability constitutes a living death) is intertwined with the expectation
that a good future for society would be one in which disability has been eliminated.
As Teresa Fuentes Peris has demonstrated, the Torquemada series satirizes the practice of
framing the worth of human life in monetary terms in discourses of economics and social
1

Among these, Geraldine Scanlon, Joseph Schraibman, Peter Earle, and Teresa Fuentes Peris.

2

Although Rafael is mentioned is most critical works on Torquemada, he is frequently alluded to as a symbol of the
declining aristocracy (Chamberlin 14) or as a fading Christ figure (Scanlon 272). Teresa Fuentes’ analysis of Rafael
is relatively brief, despite her thorough examination of health discourses in Galdós’s ‘Torquemada’ Novels: Waste
and Profit in Late Nineteenth-Century Spain.
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hygiene in the fin-de-siècle.3 According to Fuentes Peris, Galdós derides the “spirit of utility of
the time” (11)— the zeal for economizing that cast everything that did not contribute to profit as
being wasteful—through Torquemada’s interpretation of death and illness as tragic insofar as it
constituted a loss of human capital (Fuentes Peris 2-3). She observes that Samuel Smiles and
Jeremy Bentham, who impacted Spanish economic discourses, deemed a lack of productivity to
be wasted time and to add up to a wasted life, which demonstrates how wastefulness was
understood in temporal terms and associated with what we might now call crip time.4 Building
on Teresa Fuentes Peris’s analysis on the concept of human capital in the Torquemada novels,
my approach draws on Alison Kafer’s concept of crip time to examine Rafael’s negotiation of
his subjectivity as a blind person with a nervous disorder at a time when the determinants of the
value of human life were being redefined.
As we have seen in previous chapters, crip time asks how disability is conceptualized in
temporal terms, as well as how disability affects one’s orientation in time. Crip time signals, on
the one hand, the medical discourses, policies, and practices that conceive of disability as
curable/incurable or illness as chronic/temporary. On the other hand, it also refers to the
schedules and lifestyles that people with disabilities structure to keep living — and which
sometimes constitute a form of resistance to timelines that maintain social norms of production
and reproduction. In the works by Emilia Pardo Bazán, we have seen how an author might use

3

While the first attempts to mathematically estimate the monetary value of a human being took place in the late
seventeenth century, it was not until the late nineteenth century that economists and statisticians proliferated the
concept of human capital (Kiker 482-485).
4

For example, Ángel Fernández Caro wrote, “las naciones no pueden tener riqueza si no gozan de buena salud”
(nations cannot have wealth if they do not enjoy good health; qtd in Fuentes Peris 57) and would go on to affirm that
“un niño que muere antes de ser útil… no es solamente un motivo de aflicción para la familia, sino una pérdida real”
(a child who dies before being useful… is not only a reason of mourning for the family, but a true loss; qtd in
Fuentes Peris 57).
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representations of degenerate or disabled characters to subvert medical expectations and
practices that reaffirmed the importance of normative time.
By contrast, in the Torquemada novels Rafael consciously and explicitly challenges the
understanding of progress that renders monetary acquisition virtuous and non-productivity
dehumanizing. In Torquemada en la cruz and Torquemada en el purgatorio Rafael’s experience
of crip time is represented through his struggle to assert that his blindness has not left him out of
touch with contemporary values. He attempts to establish his social relevance by prophesying
Torquemada’s social failures, even as the Torquemada household grows increasingly successful.
With the birth of Torquemada’s son, Valentín, the quality of care Rafael receives from his family
decreases and he recognizes that Torquemada has succeeded. After realizing that he is worthless
in the economy of bourgeois transaction, Rafael commits suicide. In Torquemada y San Pedro
(1894), Galdós continues probing questions of profit, futurity, and the value of life that Rafael’s
suicide raises through a speculation on the future of Valentín, who becomes the only other
explicitly disabled and stigmatized character in the series. Valentín’s disabilities, marked by his
large head, weak limbs, and lack of linguistic development, would appear to confirm Rafael’s
prophecy that nature would not sanction his sister’s marriage with someone as unrefined and
unvirtuous as Torquemada. However, I argue that, in light of Valentín’s gradual neglect by
family members who see no hope for a disabled child, his trajectory in the final novel of the
series ultimately emphasizes Rafael’s criticism of the social devaluation of non-productive
subjects. Rafael’s cultural criticisms and the tragic fates of both characters suggest that the social
willingness to neglect subjects who are not expected to contribute to national wealth (and
therefore to national progress) would ironically prevent the creation of a worthwhile future for
Spanish society.
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The initial description of Rafael in Torquemada en la cruz negates his agency as it
constitutes his blindness as a kind of living death. Torquemada’s first impression of Rafael draws
a comparison between the young aristocrat and the religious images of young martyrs, equating
his disability with a tragic and premature demise. The narrator emphasizes that it is not only the
lines and colors of Rafael seated in his room that gave way to this comparison, but the absolute
stillness of his body, noting “la inercia de sus miembros” (the inertia of his limbs; 99-100). As
the narrator goes on to explain that “la ceguera, que le atacó el 83, y la inmovilidad y tristeza
consiguientes, parecían haber detenido el curso de la edad, dejándole como embalsamado, con su
representación indecisa de treinta años… la vida como estancada, suspensa, semejando en cierto
modo a la inmovilidad insana y verdosa de aguas sin corriente” (the blindness, which had
attacked him in ‘83, and the immobility and sadness that followed, seemed to have detained the
course of his age, leaving him as though embalmed, with an uncertain representation of thirty
years… his life as though it were stagnated, suspended, resembling the unhealthy and green
immobility of waters without current; 103). Through this description, the narrator constructs
Rafael’s blindness as a condition that separates him from the normal flow of time in a way that is
insalubrious and defined by inaction.
In the descriptions that follow, the narrator implicitly connects Rafael’s acquired visual
impairment with concerns related to hereditary degeneration in two ways: (1) through racial and
gendered signs of degeneration and (2) through his dependence and lack of economic
productivity. The immobility brought on by Rafael’s blindness causes or emphasizes markers of
racial purity and gender deviance associated with degeneration, which casts him into a broader
arc of crip time. Rafael’s gender, race, and disability appear mutually constructed in the
narrator’s descriptions of his “cutis blanquísimo… la belleza, más que afeminada, dolorida y
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mortuoria…” (incredibly white complexion … [his] beauty, more than effeminate, pained and
mortuary; 100) and “la mano del ciego, blanca y fina como mano de mujer, de una pulcritud
extrema” (his white hand, white and refined like the hand of a woman, with extreme pulchritude;
100). While his pallor and feminine refinement are presumably acquired through his confinement
to the domestic sphere,5 they nevertheless suggest qualities of hereditary degeneration. As
Richard Cleminson, Francisco Vázquez García, and Akiko Tsuchiya, have demonstrated, the
gender ambiguity of the feminine man constituted a clear sign of degeneration in fin-de-siècle
Spanish medical and literary discourses.6
With regards to race, Joshua Goode has established that nineteenth-century Spanish
anthropologists, beginning with Pedro González de Velasco, associated racial mixture (rather
than racial purity) with health and strength, following French anthropologist Paul Broca’s notion
that interbreeding uplifted the weaker races (41). The narrator of Torquemada alludes to this
anthropological claim in his description of the Aguila family as having “pura sangre, sin
cruzamientos que vivifican” (pure blood, without crossbreedings that vivify; 96). With his
femininity and blood purity implying a racial enervation, the temporal conceptualization of
Rafael’s blindness goes beyond his individual timeline and signals a hereditary decadence of the
aristocracy.
Rafael’s pallor and cleanliness are also indicative that his blindness and immobility have
prevented him from working during a time of financial duress for his family, evoking

5

In her analysis of disability in Victorian literature, Martha Stoddard Holmes notes that if gender was in part
defined through women’s confinement to the domestic sphere and men’s location in the workplace, “the disabled
man’s difference...is that he is either tied to the domestic sphere or else roams the streets without a regular
workplace” (94).
6

See ‘Los Invisibles’ by Richard Cleminson and Francisco Vázquez García (179, 192-94) and Marginal Subjects by
Akiko Tsuchiya (16-17).
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unproductivity as another concern usually associated with degeneration. In fact, the whiteness
and refinement of his hands appear in stark contrast to his sister’s old gloves, stained from doing
housework. Rafael, therefore, does not contribute to the household economy through productive
labor or through the labor of housework that enables his impoverished aristocratic family to go
on without servants. Not only is Rafael unproductive, but he is also a drain on the family
economy, as Cruz and Fidela work to keep him as well-dressed and perfumed as he was before
their family’s financial losses. Although his inability to work is ostensibly due to his blindness, it
is also associated with an aristocratic disinclination to work and with discourses of degeneration
that pathologized the absence of productivity.
As Fuentes Peris has demonstrated, a central anxiety surrounding degeneration was that
physical and mental pathologies would lower national productivity and economic growth (5355). A contributor to El siglo médico whom she cites writes that hereditary disease “priva … a la
familia del descendiente sano y a la patria de miembros útiles… el enfermo no solo no produce,
sino que, además, gasta, conduciendo a la ruina, a la degeneración y por último, hasta a la
extinción de la raza” (deprives the family of a healthy descendant and the nation of useful
citizens… the sick man not only does not produce, but also spends, leading to the ruin, the
degeneration, and finally the extinction of the race; qtd. in Fuentes Peris 88). While this quote
specifically refers to the degenerate inheritance of children, the same perspective equating
unproductivity with wasteful consumption is evident when the narrator indicates that the Aguila
sisters would rather deprive themselves of bread than deprive Rafael of the latest shoe fashions
(Galdós 101).
Although Rafael’s blindness is not hereditary, it clearly evokes the anxieties associated
with degeneration. In doing so, it illustrates how cultural discourses frequently conceptualized
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disabilities, and specifically blindness, as a problem of class through the emphasis on the ability
to contribute to the familial and national economy through production or reproduction.
In an 1891 conference, for example, doctor and politician Ángel Fernández Caro refer to
blindness as a “[problema] de gran interés higiénico y de no menos trascendencia social”
(problem of great hygienic interest and no less social significance; “Causas de la ceguera” 10).
His argument sustained that the 300,000 blind people living in Europe cost society thousands of
millions of pesetas per year, if one took into account the cost of supporting them financially, as
well as the loss of the labor that they could have produced if they had not been blind (10).
In the same speech Fernández Caro linked blindness to the issue of reproduction by
adding, “el ciego no debe ser improductivo para la Sociedad y es necesario cuidar de su
educación... para impedir la degeneración de la raza por la transmisión hereditaria” (the blind
should be productive to society and it is necessary to care for their education… to impede the
degeneration of the race by hereditary transmission; 15). Although he does not elucidate further,
the implication seems to be that through non-productivity, blind people would acquire
degenerate traits that could then be inherited by their children. In the Spanish press of the late
nineteenth-century, articles promoting education for blind children portrayed a similar cultural
logic that associated a lack of work with dehumanization, often contrasting the figure of an
educated and productive blind person with one that was alienated from society and existed only
as a drain on the resources of the family or of public charity.7 Rafael’s deathlike immobility and

7

In La Escuela Moderna “El ciego” (1897) by Rafaela Placer: “No se les ocurre que esas criaturas (ciegas) puedan
ser útiles para nada y no procuran más que alimentarlos y que se estén sentados en algún rincón donde no estorben:
éstos son los que están menos mal. Otros hay de suerte más aciaga: se aprovechan de su desgracia para excitar la
compasión y caridad pública…” (It does not occur to anybody that these blind creatures could be useful for anything
and they do not try to do more than feed them and keep them seated in some corner where they aren’t in the way:
these are the lucky ones. Others have a more bitter fate: they are taken advantage of to excite excite compassion and
public charity; 106). Comparable passages can be found in “La educación de los sordo-mudos y ciegos” (1878) by
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the subsequent degenerative traits that appear to result from it reflect the cultural expectation that
he cannot contribute to a national future, and may be consuming resources necessary to achieve
national progress.
Despite the narrator’s association of Rafael’s blindness with a deathlike and degenerate
life, Rafael himself appears to be at peace with his quiet, melancholy existence at the beginning
of Torquemada en la cruz. In contrast to Torquemada’s and the narrator’s view of Rafael’s crip
time, Cruz and Fidela initially see their brother’s stagnation in time as preserving their familial
pride. Explaining the sacrifices the sisters made to keep Rafael well-dressed, the narrator states
that “era en ellas como un orgullo de familia el tenerle aseado y elegante, y si no hubieran
podido darse este gusto entre tantas privaciones, no habrían tenido consuelo” (it was for them
like a familial pride to have him clean and elegant, and if they hadn’t been able to give
themselves that joy in the midst of so many privations, they would have had no consolation at
all; 100-101). Even though the expenditure of the Aguila family’s resources on Rafael may seem
wasteful because he is unproductive—and even though their attention to Rafael may objectify
him to some degree—their caregiving relationship demonstrates that social usefulness or
productivity do not have to be prerequisites for deserving dignity. While the narrator signals the
wastefulness of Fidela and Cruz’s care earlier by noting that they deprived themselves of food to
buy their brother luxuries, the narrator also emphasizes the compassion of their attentions to him
by describing the pleasure Rafael experiences at the cleanliness and the textures of his clothes.

Pedro de Alcántara García in Revista Contemporánea and in the “Edición de la noche” section of the July 7, 1884
issue of La Correspondencia.
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Rafael’s passivity and peaceful familial life are interrupted, however, when he expresses
his disgust toward Fidela’s potential engagement with Torquemada. The first instance in which
the narrator allows us access to Rafael’s subjectivity is when he is attempting to ascertain what
his sisters are keeping from him, which he soon discovers is the engagement. Overcome by
anxiety and anguish at the revelation, he proclaims that such a marriage would be a humiliation
given their family name (187). Despite Cruz’s love for her brother, whom she considers one of
the “orgullos de la raza” (pride of the family line; 101), when Rafael refers to Fidela’s
engagement as a degradation, Cruz suddenly views his preservation of family pride differently.
She condemns his familial pride as an anachronism, describing it as “el maldito orgullo de raza.
Nosotros lo hemos perdido… Pero él conserva ese orgullo… su ceguera le conserva tal y como
fue en mejores tiempos” (that damned pride. We have lost it… but he preserves that pride… his
blindness conserves him just as he was in better times; 183). The change in Cruz’s view of
Rafael’s familial pride illustrates the changing social dynamics in Spain as the familial pride that
Rafael defends and represents becomes increasingly useless—and even inconvenient—to his
sisters, who are aware that marriage (rather than ancestry) is the way to reacquire a position
among the social elite.8
Cruz associates Rafael’s resistance to the marriage with his stagnant or unhealthy
temporality, implicitly aligning the union between Fidela and Torquemada with contemporary
understandings of progress. Their marriage and reproduction is not just an instance of the “logics
of normative time” in which adults work, marry, and reproduce (Kafer 54), which I have

8

This also reflects broader social changes in European culture “from a symbolics of blood to an analytics of
sexuality” (Foucault 148). The symbolics of blood refer to the aristocracy’s methods of “marking and maintaining
caste distinctions... [through] the antiquity of its ancestry,” whereas, with the rise of the bourgeoisie “the concern
with genealogy became a preoccupation with heredity,” specifically, with marriage, sexuality, and money (124).
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explored in the second chapter in relation to Emilia Pardo Bazán’s depictions of the
stigmatization of female sterility. It is also normative in that it exemplifies the creation of a new
elite class poised to ensure progress through order and the productivity of the working classes.
Donoso, Torquemada’s friend who arranges the engagement, urges him to marry by appealing to
his debt to society as a member of the “clases directoras” (directing classes; 123). He defines the
responsibilities and social influence of the usurer's new position by proclaiming “las personas de
posición constituyen lo que llamamos clases directoras de la sociedad. ¿Quién da la norma de
cuanto acontece en el mundo? Las clases directoras” (people of a certain position constitute what
we refer to as the directing classes of society. Who sets the norm with regards to what happens
in the world? The directing classes; 123-124).9
Donoso goes on to attribute peace, order, and progress—defined by railways,
urbanization, hygiene, and policing—to the benevolent rule of the so-called “directing classes,”
and emphasizes that for Torquemada to fully hold his position as a member of the directing
classes, he must have a suitable family. Indeed, historian Adrien Shubert’s scholarship indicates
that marriages between the aristocracy and upper bourgeoisie in the late 1880s led to the creation
of a “new urban elite” with increased political power and influence based on industrial ventures
and railway investments (104). In this way, the novel (however ironically) associates
Torquemada’s marriage, and specifically a marriage that will further his class position, with a
normative view of national progress.

9

The power and responsibility of the influential social elite is echoed in an article by M. García Muñoz published in
the January 15, 1899 issue of La Correspondencia de España, which reads: “Y es deber de las clases directoras y
más aún de aquellos que ocupan ó pueden ocupar altas posiciones en la política y en la gobernación del Estado,
cumplir una misión educadora cerca de esas otras clases menos instruidas, haciéndoles ver el error en que viven,
rectificando sus juicios…” (it is the duty of the directing classes and of those who occupy or could occupy high
political positions, to carry out an educating mission for the less instructed classes, making them see the errors in
which they live, rectifying their judgement; 1)
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Consequently, while Rafael’s disability and degenerate qualities already cast him as a
threat to the future, his refusal to support Fidela’s marriage to Torquemada constitutes a
resistance to normative time — albeit an ineffective one which reinforces his exclusion from
normative timelines. Rafael’s arguments are effectively invalidated as his thoughts regarding the
engagement are attributed to blindness. Cruz explains to Rafael, “quedaste ciego; no has visto la
transformación del mundo y de los tiempos” (you became blind; you have not seen the
transformation of the world and of the times; 186). Donoso reiterates this argument by assuring
Rafael that “si recobraras la vista, verías que el mundo ha marchado, y que te quedaste atrás, con
las ideas de tu tiempo amojamadas en la mollera” (if you were to recover your sight, you would
see that the world has changed, and that you were left behind, with the ideas of your time
petrified in your skull; 206). While there is plenty of evidence in the novel that Rafael’s
blindness does not preclude him from acquiring information about the social world around him,10
Cruz and Donoso’s comments are indicative of how normative temporalities “cast disabled
people out of time” (Kafer 34). Rafael is not only cast as an indirect threat to the future, but as
irrelevant and out of touch with the present.
Moreover, the ways in which Rafael expresses his rejection of Fidela’s engagement
provides further evidence of his degeneration and declining health. When his sisters proceed with
the engagement plans despite his criticisms, Rafael takes to desperate measures — he threatens
to commit suicide; he briefly leaves their home and turns to mendicancy; and he attempts to
purchase a bomb. Each instance of his resistance is suggestive of mental degeneration and
10

Torquemada en la cruz alludes several times to Rafael’s capacity for sensory substitution. For example, “La falta
de vista habíale aguzado el oído, dándole una facultad de apreciar las más ligeras variaciones de timbre de voz…
conoció por la voz no solo el temple de su hermana, sino hasta sus pensamientos, a nadie declarados” (the lack of
sight had sharpened his hearing, granting him an ability to appreciate even the slightest variations in the timber of
someone’s voice… he knew by her voice not only his sister’s temper, but even her thoughts, which she had not
shared with anyone; 167)
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portrayed somewhat comically. After Cruz explains how dire their financial situation is, Rafael
proposes suicide as an alternative solution to Fidela’s marriage. In a highly melodramatic
moment, Cruz agrees to commit suicide with him and invites Fidela to join them. Rafael is
ultimately dissuaded when Fidela bursts into tears (although it remains uncertain whether Cruz
would have gone through with the plan). Although Rafael’s proposed suicide is in response to his
particular circumstance, the “vértigo insano, entusiasmo suicida” (insane vertigo, suicidal
enthusiasm; 188), which overcomes him at that moment, points to the contemporary belief in
criminological discourses that suicide was a symptom of degeneration (Campos, et al. 99;
Plumed Domingo and Novella 62)—an issue which I will address in greater detail in my analysis
of his suicide in Torquemada en el purgatorio.
Rafael’s subsequent attempts to resist the marriage of Fidela and Torquemada further
imply that he is a degenerate subject. Soon after the threat of suicide, Rafael turns to the streets,
preferring to rely on the charity of strangers than to condone Fidela’s relationship with
Torquemada. For the reasons stated above, mendicancy, because non-productive, was likewise
considered a symptom of degeneration (Gold 392, Fuentes Peris, “Visions of Filth” 135). Rafael
discovers that people are less charitable than he had hoped, and he returns home having suffered
the hardships of mendicancy for only one night. Finally, overtaken by an “ira epiléptica”
(epileptic ire; 248), which was also associated with degeneration and criminality (Lombroso 263;
Campos et al. 134), he attempts to purchase an explosive in the hopes of killing Torquemada.
When his friend refuses to sell him a bomb, he offers a monologue on class warfare, which is
humorous given his assertion that the aristocrats will rise against the oppressive bourgeoisie —
but also resonates with the association between crime and degeneration in psychology and
criminal anthropology of the time (Campos Marín “Crimen y Locura” 95; Cleminson and
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Fuentes Peris 385), specifically the designation of anarchist terrorism as symptomatic of
degeneration.11 Although Rafael’s responses are presented comically (for instance, by the
exaggerated melodrama of his suicide attempt and the brevity of his begging), they also lead to
moments of poignant reflection in which Rafael comes to agree with Cruz and Donoso that he is
alienated from the present state of society.
Rafael initially argued that he understood the situation surrounding his sister’s marriage
perfectly; however, at the conclusion of Torquemada en la cruz, he appears to internalize Cruz
and Donoso’s insistence that his blindness has excluded him from the social changes that define
progress. Rafael comes to see himself as belonging in the past, reiterating this idea when he is
suicidal and when he leaves his family to become a beggar (211, 219). Despite perceiving
himself as a burden, he attempts to find his own sense of self-worth, saying “el ser una carga y
un estorbo no me priva de la dignidad…” (being a burden and a hindrance does not deprive me
of dignity; 203) and “sin valer nada, absolutamente nada para los demás… quiero buscar mi
valor en mi mismo” (without being worth anything, absolutely anything to others… I want to
find value in myself; 223). By estimating his own value, Rafael draws on the language of public
hygienists who framed health in terms of economic benefits or repercussions,12 and yet attempts
to subvert this association by asserting his own worth. Although his lack of economic value
11

In Faces of Degeneration, Daniel Pick has shown that an increasing number of anarchist attacks in France and
Italy in the 1870s and 1880s established anarchist violence as an important category of criminality in the cultural
imaginary (131). Cesare Lombroso’s criminal anthropology text, Gli anarchici (The anarchists) was published in
1894 and influenced Spanish psychology, especially as Spain also became a site of increasing anarchist violence
(Campos et al. 109).
12

In the 1906 text Nuestras madres y el engrandecimiento patrio, Andrés Martínez Vargas writes that, beyond the
emotional value, “existe otro valor numérico que los economistas han concedido a cada niño… hay quien se ha
atrevido a poner un precio de vil metal a cada criatura; pero el hecho es positivo y conviene consignarlo” (there is a
numerical value that economists have assigned each child… some person has dared to put a price of base metal on
each creature; but this is a positive fact and it is worth recording; 20). Fernández Caro alludes to the practice of
assigning human life an economic value (based on anticipated earning potential) in political economy in an earlier
work in “Causas de la ceguera” (1891).

109

undermines the significance of Rafael’s opinions, he maintains that he is right to oppose
Torquemada’s marriage.
At the conclusion of Torquemada en la cruz and through Torquemada en el purgatorio,
Rafael attempts to foretell the future, presumably as a way to find value in himself and to make
sense of a society that seems to have left him behind. The nature of his first predictions signal
that his motivation to take on the role of the blind prophet is rooted in his lack of agency and a
desire to see his opinions validated. Immediately after his friend silently rejects Rafael’s request
for a bomb, Rafael begins to weeps and foretells a time in which impoverished young aristocrats
who are sighted will take up arms against the bourgeoisie, adding with certainty “tu lo has de
ver, tú lo has de ver” (you will see; you will see; 249). At that moment, Donoso arrives with
news that Fidela has fallen ill on her wedding day, to which Rafael responds with equal
assuredness: “Mi hermana se muere. Ahí tiene usted el pronóstico y el diagnóstico, y el término
final… Lo sé, lo adivino: no puedo equivocarme… ¡He aquí la solución, la única racional y
lógica! Dios no podía menos de disponerlo así en su infinita sabiduría” (My sister is dying. There
you have the prognosis, diagnosis, and the final word... I know it, I divine it: I cannot be
wrong… Here is the only rational and logical solution! God, in his infinite wisdom, could not
have arranged it in any other way; 250). Framed as a response to his feelings of impotence, his
predictions are an attempt to engage with concerns about the future in the limited way that he
can, given that he is precluded from influencing it and seen as not having a future of his own.
Unable to stop Fidela and Torquemada’s marriage, Rafael maintains that his criticism of their
union will be validated through social intervention (class warfare) or divine intervention (his
sister’s death). Soon after, Rafael and Donoso arrive at Torquemada’s house to find that Fidela
has almost completely recovered. Although this initial failure would seem to discredit his ability
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to anticipate the future, Rafael’s prognostications in Torquemada en el purgatorio continue to
provide suspense and to highlight the new social values that enable Torquemada to succeed.
Torquemada en el purgatorio picks up six months after Torquemada en la cruz and
chronicles the first two years of Fidela and Torquemada’s marriage and social ascent — as well
as the concomitant decline of Rafael’s mental health and his ongoing project of predicting the
future. Rafael is reintroduced in a scene in which he energetically shares his epiphanies with
Cruz after having spent a sleepless night calculating future probabilities. Given Rafael’s excited
state during his explanation, it is unsurprising that Cruz quickly pathologizes his behavior.
Although Cruz is worried for her brother’s health, it is also clear that she is displeased by
Rafael’s predictions and exuberant state because his audible mockery of Torquemada threatens
to put their family in an uncomfortable position, as they are living in Torquemada’s home and
benefiting from his wealth. One of Rafael’s epiphanies, for example, is that he will grow
accustomed to Torquemada’s opulence and that Torquemada’ s materialism will eventually seem
natural to him (rather than grotesque). This thought sends him into fits of loud and uncontrollable
laughter, which Torquemada overhears. Cruz’s need to calm Rafael down, therefore, constitutes
a gentle, domestic reflection of the medical impulse to contain unruly and unhealthy bodies, as
well as in the economic and legal efforts to contain subjects who fought against (or simply did
not explicitly support) the rising capitalist system (Huertas García-Alejo 57).
The same tensions continue as Rafael predicts that Fidela will become disgusted with
Torquemada and soon take a lover; that Torquemada will not be able to convincingly perform
the bourgeois conduct necessary for his social success; and that nature or God will not grant
Torquemada and Fidela a child (455-456). Each of these predictions, if realized, would interrupt
Torquemada’s success and challenge the concept of normative time dictated by the values of
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bourgeois capitalism. Fidela’s infidelity would undermine her union with Torquemada, and in
doing so confirm that Rafael had been right about the marriage. If Torquemada was unable to
feign refinement and subsequently mocked for his attempt to join the ruling classes, it would
indicate that wealth alone was not valued above education and sensibility. Finally, Torquemada’s
inability to have a child with Fidela would suggest that his values and practices are not
sanctioned by nature (456). It would also have the effect of weakening his claim to the
aristocratic cachet of the Aguila family and making his social position less secure as he would
fail to contribute to the national project of raising citizens, which Donoso noted was a crucial
responsibility of the ruling classes.
Despite Cruz’s pathologization of Rafael’s behavior, the question of whether his
predictions will prove accurate remains an intriguing issue throughout Torquemada en el
purgatorio. Although Cruz insists that his proposed scenarios are the products of an unwell
mind, the novel’s discursive strategies prevents them from being discounted outright. First, by
associating Rafael’s blindness with a lack of awareness regarding social change on the one hand
and, on the other, with the possibility of anticipating the future, Galdós playfully intertwines the
metaphor of blindness as ignorance and the trope of blindness as a higher form of insight.13 This
is reminiscent of Galdós’s Angel Guerra (1891), in which Lucía, a blind character, has visions
and dreams that offer spiritual insights — albeit ones that are not always accurate. While Lucía
has a “special gift,” Chamberlin notes that “her blindness to reality… as well as errors of her
inner life… can be seen as undercutting the certainty of her proclamation,” leaving readers to
make their own choice about her prophecies (8). A similar dynamic is at play in Rafael’s
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For a brief history of the use of these tropes in literature, see Kenneth Jernigan’s “Blindness: Is Literature Against
Us?”
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trajectory in the Torquemada novels, emphasized by Cruz’s initial awe at Rafael’s uncanny
ability to seemingly read people’s minds, affirming that “La falta de vista le aguza el
entendimiento. Todo lo sabe” (His lack of sight sharpens his understanding; he knows
everything; 183).
Secondly—and playing off of the same contradiction—Rafael’s ability to occasionally
know what should be unknowable, combined with his occasional emotional and violent
outbursts, plays on the nineteenth-century theorization of the degenerate genius. This
“degeneration superieur” (superior degeneration; Magnan and Legrain 106-107) was an
affliction of the nervous system characterized by inexplicable actions, as well as high
intelligence and rationality. Rafael’s methodology for discerning the future appears to be a
highly imaginative and intelligent process based on rationality: “para calcular el porvenir, cojo
yo las figuras humanas, cojo los hechos pasados, los coloco en el tablero, los hago avanzar
conforme a las leyes de la lógica” (to calculate the future, I take the human figures, I take the
past facts, I situate them on the board, I make them advance in accordance with the laws of logic;
270). Moreover, the diagnosis of “degenerate genius” was unsurprisingly reserved almost
exclusively for the privileged classes (Morel 17), to which the aristocratic Rafael belongs.
Finally, the narrator’s constant criticism of Torquemada’s character and conduct (mocking his
miserliness, willingness to exploit others, foul eating habits, and frequent malapropisms), hints at
the possibility that the novel may ultimately confirm Rafael’s predictions—even as
Torquemada’s success continues to grow.
Although several developments appear to ensure Torquemada’s marital and professional
success, two in particular—the birth of his son and a banquet held in honor of his lucrative
investments— mark the culmination of his social ascent and finally reveal Rafael’s predictions
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of Torquemada’s failure to be unfounded. As with Fidela and Torquemada’s engagement, the
birth of Valentín, Fidela’s child, alters Rafael’s role in the family, as well as his mental state. The
arrival of Valentín displays what Lee Edelman has termed “reproductive futurism,” referring to
the logic that defines the future primarily through the propagation of the human species, which is
politicized and emblematized in the figure of the child, and often valued at the expense of nonnormative lives (4). In the context of Torquemada, the future of humanity is, as Donoso earlier
indicated, politically inseparable from the trajectory of the “directing classes,” which must in
turn reproduce heirs, “ciudadanos útiles que ofrecer a esa misma colectividad que nos lleva en
sus filas” (useful citizens to offer the very collectivity that carries us within its ranks; 139).
Indeed, Valentín’s arrival marks the definitive union of Torquemada’s wealth with the Aguila’s
prestige: Cruz had earlier stated that it will be necessary “que nazca algo” (that something be
born; 173) to facilitate her control of Torquemada’s finances, while Torquemada, in turn, is in
need of a male heir to secure his bond with the aristocratic family. When Rafael fails to
congratulate Torquemada for his son’s birth, the latter enthusiastically repeats, “Varón, Rafael,
varón, para que tu casa y todita tu nobleza de antaño… tenga representación en los siglos
venideros y futuros” (a son, Rafael, a son, so that your house and every bit of your nobility of
yesteryear… will be represented in the coming and future years; 394). Rafael’s expectation that
they could not have a child and his shocked silence on hearing that Valentín has been born,
likewise, feeds into the cultural understanding that the child legitimizes their union and
guarantees the future of the Torquemada family.
The way in which the Torquemada household celebrates Valentín, and the indications
that he has displaced Rafael, illustrate how ableism and political economy are intertwined in the
logic of reproductive futurity. The political and economic value of the child is a source of fantasy
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for his parents long before his birth. As soon as he is born, he is swaddled in an excess of objects
of consumption: two nursemaids, more clothing and silks than Torquemada had owned in the
first fifty years of his life. While Valentín becomes the recipient of so much care and attention,
Rafael finds himself cast aside. Although the comparison between the kinds of care they require
infantilizes Rafael,14 it also reveals how the allocation of care is a way of valuing life— and of
valuing some lives over others. The narrator notes that “sus hermanas lo querían siempre; pero la
nueva vida les distraía en mil cosas… le atendían, le cuidaban; pero sin que fuera él como en
otros tiempos, la persona principal” (his sisters loved him as always, but the new life distracted
them… they attended to [Rafael], they took care of him; but not, as they used to, as though he
were the most important person” (414). By contrast, they clothe, feed, and dote on Valentín
“como si de ello dependiera la suerte de toda la Humanidad” (as though the fate of all of
humanity depended on it; 419).
As the narrator notes (and Rafael agrees), the refocusing of Cruz and Fidela’s attention
toward the child is “natural” because, although both require care, Rafael is an adult with an
incurable condition while Valentin is “una esperanza” (a hope; 414). The hope, of course, is that
he will become what Rafael is not: a productive citizen. While Rafael’s jealousy might seem
childish, particularly in view that his basic physical needs are being met, it is clear that his
emotional needs are disregarded as he descends into a “tristeza fúnebre, un laconismo sombrío”
(funereal sadness, somber laconicism; 414). After all, Cruz had earlier suggested that alienation
was negatively impacting his mental health (270). Additionally, while the neatness of his
clothing was one of the few sources of pleasure through which he felt valued (in the midst of
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Rafael says, for instance, “ambos somos igualmente niños” (both of us are equally children; 419), and, later,
“antes era yo el chiquitín; ahora soy un triste objeto” (I used to be the little boy; now I am a sad object; 459).
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discourses that insisted on his worthlessness), after the birth of Valentín, Rafael considers that “a
lo mejor le faltaban botones… y en cambio las dos señoras y el ama consagraban días enteros a
los trapitos del crío” (perhaps he was missing buttons… and by contrast the two ladies and the
nursemaid consecrated whole days to the infant’s little clothes; 414). The mountains of luxuries
that pile around Valentín while Rafael appears in shoddier shape than when his family was
impoverished illustrates how care and the wealth of the ascendant bourgeoisie are allocated to
best promote the values of their class, including the value of potential production at the expense
of disabled subjects.
Valentín’s birth disturbs Rafael not only because the infant monopolizes his sisters’
attention, but because it undermines Rafael’s claims to be able to calculate the future. After the
birth of the child, Rafael reflects on the failures of his previous predictions, finally exclaiming,
“equivocado en todo!” (mistaken in everything!; 416). Although he is disgusted by the existence
of Valentín as a marker of the success of the new social elite, he notes that, at times, he loves the
child. Predicting Valentín’s “cretinismo y… caquexia” (cretinism and cachexia; 417), he adds
that even if the child is a hybrid monstrosity at least he will have ignited Fidela’s maternal love
(417). Then, reflecting on the potential inaccuracy of his prediction regarding Valentín’s ill
health, he realizes, “el colmo de mis equivocaciones sería que el chico creciera listo y fuerte…
No me faltaba más que eso para creer que el deforme y cacoquimio soy yo; y en ese caso…” (the
culmination of my mistakes would be if the boy would grow up to be smart and strong… That’s
all it would take for me to think that I am the one who is deformed and cachectic; and in that
case…; 417). Although Rafael does not finish his thought, this is arguably the moment in which
he decides to commit suicide. Valentín’s birth has sparked Rafael’s realization that he has no
point of connection to the future of society. Rafael conceives of the failure of his calculations as
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a metaphorical deformity. By equating his mental processes to a physical deformity at the
moment of his suicidal ideation, Rafael re-affirms the devaluing of non-normative bodies that
casts them out of a desirable future, even as he acknowledges his own proximity to other forms
of disability. Ultimately, the diminishment of Cruz and Fidela’s care, along with the realization
that his predictions have all been incorrect, lead Rafael to see himself as worthless within
capitalist value relations and reproductive futurism.
Rafael’s negotiation of his subjectivity in the scenes leading up to his suicide constitutes
one of the flashpoints of the series’ social critique. Beyond Galdós’s ironic use of the figure of
the blind prophet, Rafael’s attempts to foretell the future are rooted in questions about the
deduction of social laws. In this sense, Torquemada echoes Galdós’s earlier novel, Marianela
(1878). In Marianela, Pablo, who has been blind since birth, becomes fully sighted after a
surgery. His transition into sightedness explores philosophical ideas regarding the nature of
beauty, reality, and knowledge through which Galdós’s applies Auguste Comte’s positivist
theories in literature. Rafael’s experience of crip time in Torquemada lends itself to a different
question about the nature of knowledge and reality: if blindness in Marianela exposes the
importance of observation within positivist philosophy, in Torquemada it explores what Elena
Delgado refers to as the “proyecto de modernidad como epistemología” (the project of modernity
as epistemology; 905).
According to Delgado, Galdós’s late works in the 1890s problematize the project of
modernity through two discursive strategies: (1) the subversion of symbols of progress and (2)
the rupture of epistemological hierarchy by centering on marginalized characters and including
prophecies and dreams as ways of accessing unknowable information. Particularly in the
culminating chapters of Torquemada en el purgatorio, these strategies are inseparable from
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Rafael’s experience of crip time. When he realizes that his predictions were inaccurate, Rafael
recognizes that he is definitively cast out of normative time, which leads to two scenes that
display Rafael’s critique of a system that values people according to their ability to gain wealth.
In the first, Rafael, once more recovering from an epileptic attack, excitedly offers Torquemada a
mock speech to deliver at the banquet in which he crudely subverts symbols of capitalist
progress. The second scene, set later that evening, centers on Rafael’s reflection on his place as a
non-productive subject and, finally, on his disdain toward the future. By focusing the novel’s
final chapters on Rafael’s attempt to contend with the neglect he has experienced and the social
values of the 1890s, Galdós uses marginalization and disability as avenues through which to
understand and condemn utilitarian values associated with progress.
In what is arguably the climactic moment of Rafael’s trajectory, he offers his brother-inlaw an ironic sample speech for a banquet held in honor of Torquemada’s initiatives in railway
investments as a service to national and public interests (Galdós 422). Rafael, devalued and
dehumanized for his inability to contribute to familial or national wealth, reverses the rhetoric of
dehumanization and productivity to animalize those who revere the production of wealth.
Performing a sample speech in front of their friends and family, Rafael likens Torquemada to the
golden calf and decries the fact that his sycophantic audience will adulate him only in the hopes
of receiving a trickle of his prosperity. Still delivering the speech as though he were
Torquemada, Rafael boldly tells his imagined audience: “y mientras vosotros me aclamáis con
con delirio, yo mugiré, repito que soy becerro, y ... viéndoos agrupados debajo de mi, me abriré
de las cuatro patas y os agraciaré con una evacuación copiosa, en el bien entendido de que mi
estiércol es efectivamente metálico. Yo depongo monedas… y vosotros os atropelláis para
cogerlo...este maná precioso” (and while you deliriously acclaim me, I will bleat — I reiterate
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that I am a calf— and… seeing you all grouped below me, I spread my four legs and grace you
with a copious evacuation, as it is well understood that my feces is indeed metal. I deposit
coins… and you run over each other to pick them up…[like] precious manna; 425). The
hysterically vulgar scene uses wealth (specifically, wealth acquired through Torquemada’s
railway investments) as a symbol of capital and progress to condemn the ruling class. Crip time
is crucial to this scene as Rafael’s criticism of capitalist progress (symbolized by the railway)15 is
again rooted in his pathologized behavior and his marginalized perspective enables him to voice
the critique that “las riquezas...son, en esta edad triste, la suprema virtud y la sabiduría por
excelencia” (riches are, in our sad age, supreme virtue and wisdom par excellence; 425).
Beyond the obvious subversion of the prestige of the social elite, Galdós’s pairing of
Rafael’s mock speech with Torquemada’s actual banquet speech disrupts the division and
relation of authority between Rafael’s marginal position and Torquemada’s centrality. Although
Rafael’s speech causes Cruz a great deal of embarrassment, Torquemada applauds Rafael’s
speech, saying that he wishes he had the vocabulary to offer up such clever wordplay at the
banquet. Although it lacks the captivating imagery and outright disdain that Rafael employs,
Torquemada’s speech does parallel Rafael’s in several ways. Highlighting the celebration of
wealth and positioning himself as a model capitalist, Torquemada’s speech is, as Geraldine
Scanlon observes, “a paean in praise of the utilitarian virtues of hard work and the pursuit of
wealth and a glorification of [Torquemada] himself as a supreme example of the self-made man”
(271). The narrator presents Torquemada’s speech with a great deal of irony, drawing attention
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See the first chapter of Geraldine Lawless’ Modernity’s Metonyms, entitled “‘Le Grand courant de la civilisation
moderne’: The Railway Metonym” for an analysis of the literary use of the railway as a metaphor for progress, and
later as “central to modernity’s ailments…[including] war, hypocrisy, and empty heroic gestures” in the Spanish
context (4).
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to his gaffes in footnotes and through parenthetical descriptions of the audience response, but, at
the speech’s conclusion, the banquet hall applause nevertheless mirrors the sycophantic behavior
Rafael had attributed to Torquemada’s admirers. Had Torquemada’s speech not been preceded
by Rafael’s, it might read as a misguided but sympathetic celebration of practicality, charity, and,
above all, the “bello ideal el progreso” (beautiful ideal of progress; 441), despite the narrator’s
interjections. However, by presenting Rafael and Torquemada’s as parallel versions of the same
“capitalist Sermon on the Mount” (Scanlon 271) Galdós emphasizes the incisiveness of Rafael’s
criticisms and Torquemada’s shamelessness, and satirizes the rhetorical forms that the worship
of wealth could take in cultured circles. Despite the inaccuracy of Rafael’s predictions and the
construction of his disability as casting him out of time, Galdós indicates that Rafael’s social
criticism, though marginalized and pathologized, is relevant.
When Torquemada returns from the banquet, he and Rafael have a discussion in which
the view of progress Torquemada had espoused in his speech stands in contrast with Rafael’s
desolation at being unable to imagine a positive future. Raphael’s melancholic state is not, as
Torquemada assumes, due to his blindness. Rather than focusing on Rafael’s blindness as a
personal problem, the novel indicates that his melancholy is due to his social devaluation: Rafael
dismisses Torquemada’s assumption by saying “ya estoy hecho a la oscuridad… no va por ahí.
Mi padecer es puramente moral… padezco porque me siento demás en el mundo y en mi familia,
porque me he equivocado en todo” (I am used to the darkness… that is not what it is about. My
suffering is purely moral… I suffer because I feel excessive in the world and in my family,
because I have been wrong about everything; 454). Whereas Rafael’s initial description in the
Torquemada series relied on ocular-centric expectations that equated blindness with a worthless
life, in his final conversation, Rafael does not associate his blindness with his quality of life.
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Instead, his lamentable quality of life is due to his understanding of the social values that have
contributed to his devaluation and lack of familial intimacy.
Even as he acknowledges that he cannot predict the future, Rafael’s new understanding of
the monetary value of life nevertheless leads to a bleak outlook for the future. On a personal
level, the birth of Valentín and the absence of his sisters’ attention have rendered him “un triste
objeto que estorba en todas partes” (a sad object that gets in the way wherever it is; 459). On a
broader, political scale, he laments “es preferible la muerte al desconsuelo de ver lo más bello
que en el mundo existe en manos de los Torquemadas” (death is preferable to the disconsolation
of seeing what is most beautiful in this world fall into the hands of the Torquemadas; 461). These
remarks illustrate Rafael’s assumption that he will never be cared for as he had been before and
that the values Torquemada celebrated at the banquet — utilitarianism coded as practicality;
wealth equated with virtue —will predominate. Rafael continues to express his nostalgia for the
Old Regime and he never explicitly connects utilitarian values to his devaluation within the
family. However, by consistently pairing his critique of materialism with the neglect of his nonproductive body, the novel nevertheless demonstrates how discourses that value productivity and
wealth are enacted through the disinterest in caring for disabled bodies. Through Rafael’s
suicidal conversation the novel draws attention to the social dynamics that contribute to his sense
that the future (though unknowable to him) is worthless, offering a poignant counterpoint to
Torquemada’s celebrated proclamation “el progreso es mi bello ideal” (progress is my highest
ideal; 441). When their conversation ends, Rafael ends his life by leaping from the third story
floor, concluding Torquemada en el purgatorio.
Scholars have traditionally interpreted Rafael’s suicide as symbolic of the end of the
aristocracy (Sánchez Barbudo 50; Earle 39) and more recently considered it in relation to the
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socio-cultural implications of suicide at the time of the novel’s publication (Fuentes Peris 82).
Fuentes’s analysis concludes that Rafael’s suicide can be read as ironic given that a primary
sociocultural concern was that suicide detracted from the national economy, whereas Rafael’s
suicide does not represent economic loss because he is an “economic burden” (82).16 While I
agree with Fuentes Peris’s interpretation, I would add that this irony demonstrates how suicide
fulfills the elimination of deviance, which was the objective of discourses of medical and
political economy of the time. However, a socio-cultural debate that has not yet been taken into
account in analyses of Torquemada is the medicalization of suicide that occurred in the late
nineteenth-century, which redefined suicide from an individual expression of free will to a sign
of physiological degeneration (Plumed Domingo and Novella 166, Lawless 147-155).17 Rafael’s
explanation of his suicide resists the medicalized view that suicide was committed by degenerate
subjects who were not in control of their actions. Rafael’s deliberate rejection of a future that
rejects him indicates that his death constitutes one of the cases in which, as Geraldine Lawless
mentions, “suicide was associated with a lack of hope for the future, not just of an individual, but
of a society” (151). The question Rafael’s suicide raises regarding the impossibility of a
worthwhile future is again revisited through speculation on Valentín’s future.18
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Jesús Sarabia y Pardo’s El suicidio como enfermedad social (1889) exemplifies the argument that suicide
constituted a social problem because it robs a nation of its workers.
17

Torquemada en el purgatorio precedes Émile Durkheim’s 1897 Suicide: A Study in Sociology, which definitively
establish suicide as a sociological problem across Europe. Before Durkheimer, however, hygienists and
psychologists had associated suicide with mental illness and degeneration — notably, J.E. Esquirol in Maladies
Mentales (1838), Pedro Felipe Monlau in Elementos de higiene pública (1847), and Juan Giné y Partagás in Tratado
teórico-práctico de frenopatología (1876).
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Robert Weber notes that by opening Torquemada y San Pedro on the anniversary of Rafael’s suicide, Galdós
connects his death with the three elements around which the novel principally unfolds, namely (1) Valentín’s
“imbecility” (2) Fidela’s death and (3) Torquemada’s death (25-26).
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Soon after Valentín’s birth in Torquemada en el purgatorio, a physician remarks on his
rachitic complexion and large head; in the novel that follows, set one year later, the confirmation
of Valentín’s abnormalities tests the limits of reproductive futurism. While the figure of the
healthy child is generally used to represent a hopeful future, the figure of the ill or disabled child
represents the opposite — anxieties about a dystopian future (Kafer 28-34). As scholars have
noted, depictions of unhealthy children are common in naturalism and specifically in Galdós’s
novels (García Ramos 3, Cabrejas 333). Unlike the other disabled children in Galdós’s novels,
however, much discussion about Valentín centers explicitly on other characters’ expectations of
his physical and intellectual limitations. Before Valentín is born, his father hopes that he will be
a reincarnation of his first son, also named Valentín, a macrocephalic mathematical genius who
died suddenly of meningitis. Although the first Valentín exhibited physical deformities, his
capacity for productivity led Torquemada to imagine a prosperous future for him as an engineer.
Fuentes Peris has observed that Torquemada’s understanding of the first Valentín’s death
illustrates the way in which the preservation of life was conceptualized as the preservation of
human resources. His death is “in Torquemada’s eyes, a wasted opportunity, because his life
could have been highly productive and profitable, not only for his father’s sake — as Valentín
would have been able to make money for him and add to his fortune — but for the nation’s sake
and also for humanity as a whole” (Fuentes Peris 38). At two years of age, the second Valentín
represents the opposite: he destroys his toys, is a ravenous eater and wine-drinker, tortures small
animals, steals any trinket he can, and beats people with the cane he requires to walk (499). In
short, he disappoints all the hopes for the future that the family had invested in their new heir
(498).
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Valentín’s developmental disabilities may seem to fulfill Rafael’s prophecy that nature
would not sanction Torquemada and Fidela’s union with a healthy child. However, the novel’s
emphasis on the quality of care the child receives and how it shapes his future instead reinforce
Rafael’s criticism of the devaluation of bodies that do not fit into the economy of exchange.
Rafael had stated that it was natural that Valentín should receive more attention because he
represented a new hope. Indeed, as Valentín develops further signs of degeneracy (longer ears, a
larger head, and twisted legs) and proves to be a “falsa ilusión de la familia” (false hope for the
family; 498) the quality of his care begins to diminish. Cruz asks the nursemaid to remove the
child with his animalistic howls to a distant bedroom (506), echoing Rafael’s move to the third
floor “donde estorbo menos” (where I am less in the way; 459). Although Cruz continues to
attend to his hygiene, his food, and his clothes, these are simply “obligaciones de la casa”
(domestic obligations; 572) and Torquemada, though he continues to love his son, “veía en
[Valentín] una esperanza absolutamente fallida, y su carińo era como cosa oficial y de
obligación” (he saw in Valentín an absolutely failed hope, and his affection was something
official and obligatory). The expectation that Valentín will not develop the mental or physical
capacities to be productive casts him out of the normativity of reproductive futurism and into
crip time, in which he is imagined as not having a future.
As in Rafael’s case, the novel again uses disability to depict the difficulty of imagining a
worthwhile future. Scholars have read Valentín’s deformities and “idiocy” as a punishment for
Torquemada’s sins (Correa 145; Earle 33; Cabrejas 341), as well as an omen regarding the
dangers materialism could bring to the future of Spanish society (Urey 57-58; Scanlon 273).
Scanlon in particular notes that Valentín is “a symbol of a future born of a present devoted only
to the material” (273). While I agree that the hopelessness surrounding his future portends a
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negative future for Spanish society, it is crucial to note that his impairment alone does not
determine whether his future is worthwhile. In this regard, Valentín’s projected future echoes
Rafael’s final reflection on crip time. Rafael indicated that his decision to commit suicide had
nothing to do with his blindness, but was shaped by what he understood to be a rise in
detrimental social values and a diminishing quality of care. Similarly, the future associated with
Valentín invites a critique of the quality of care he receives and the social values that determine
it. In line with this perspective, I am particularly interested in Valentín’s relationship with his
mother, which hints at a possible future that does not come to be realized.
Fidela, Valentín’s mother, is the only character who continues to believe in a future for
her son and continues to care for him until her death. She believes that he will be a poetic genius
(525), and is the only one who appears to understand his pre-linguistic grunts, patiently holding
affectionate conversations with him in which she imagines that he tells her he loves her. The
boy’s response to Fidela surprisingly undermines the other characters’ and the narrator’s frequent
allusions to his inhumanity (498, 529). When she falls ill, he climbs into bed with her and
touches her tenderly, leading the narrator to marvel “creyérase que comprendía la obligación de
ser dócil y bueno” (one would think he understood the obligation to be docile and good; 529).
His behavior validates the loving conversations Fidela imagines between them, as well as her
belief that there is hope for his improvement. When she dies soon thereafter, the narrator notes
that “ya no había esperanzas de que la bestiecilla llegara a ser persona” (there was no longer any
hope that the little beast would become a person; 553). The narrator’s phrasing clearly
dehumanizes people with cognitive or communicative disabilities, but it also suggests that there
had been hope for Valentín’s future when Fidela was alive. This implication pushes back against
any potential interpretation that Valentín’s disabilities fulfill Rafael’s prophecies because, while
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Rafael anticipates his nephew’s disabilities to be a straightforward manifestation of Fidela and
Torquemada’s biological incompatibility. The narrator ultimately validates Fidela’s hopes—
perhaps Valentín would not have been a poet, but he could have had a better future, one in which
his humanity was affirmed.
Although the series ends with Torquemada’s death, the definitive hopelessness of
Valentín’s future serves as a conclusion in its own right. By the end of the Torquemada novels, it
is clear that Valentin will not be receiving care after his mother’s death. Although the specifics
of his future are not elucidated, the novel does not allow for positive expectations of Valentín’s
life. In the conclusion of Torquemada en el purgatorio, Rafael recognizes that he is incapable of
foretelling the future but nevertheless feels certain that it is not a future worth living. Valentín’s
trajectory is similarly unknown and pessimistic: Valentín may die as other characters had
suggested (401, 511) or he may continue to grow “cada día más indócil, más bruto” (each day
less docile and more brutish; 573), but with the absence of anyone who cares for him and who
sees him as a person with a future worth investing in, his uncertain future is tragic, regardless.
Rhian Davies observes that “despite the reservations of both the narrator and the majority of the
characters, it might be possible that he could be educated — but only if others are prepared to
believe in him. Does this perhaps suggest that education is possible if people believe in its
potential?” (56). Although Davies is right to note that the late 1890s saw a heightened interest in
special education, I would like to make the distinction that Valentín’s relative neglect does not
draw attention to whether people believe in education, but whether people can believe in the
worth and dignity of a person regardless of their potential for productivity. To this effect, I agree
with Delgado’s reading of the lack of care Valentín can be expected to receive. As she sees it,
Valentín’s fate “indica que es la ausencia o pérdida de un único interlocutor válido lo que marca
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la verdadera monstruosidad” (indicates that it is the absence or loss of a valid interlocutor that
marks true monstrosity; 93).
In his famous 1897 speech entitled “La sociedad presente como materia novelable”
(“Present-Day Society as Material for the Novel”) Galdós discusses new trends in social life and
concludes by declaring, without further specificity, “Quizás aparezcan formas nuevas, quizás
obras de extraordinario poder y belleza, que sirvan de anuncio á los ideales futuros” (Perhaps
new forms will appear, perhaps works of extraordinary power and beauty, which could announce
the ideals of the future; 16). The Torquemada series does not announce the ideals of the future
(or practices to move toward them) that Galdós would reference in his speech. Despite Rafael’s
condemnation of materialism and rejection of Torquemada’s view of progress, he does not
illustrate any way to a better future, as his alternative is the rejection of the future itself through
suicide. As Kafer has argued, the rejection of the future by those who are denied futures does not
provide a way of imagining “alternate temporalities that do not cast disabled people out of time,
as the sign of the future of no future” (34). However, the suffering Rafael experiences upon
losing his sisters’ attention and the emotional abandonment that Valentín faces after his mother’s
death signal that caregiving may provide a solution to the difficulties of imagining and creating a
worthwhile future.
The Torquemada series connects the question of care to the value of productivity by
tracing the devaluation of Rafael and Valentín by their own families. In doing so, the
Torquemada novels demonstrate that care is a theoretical gesture, a gesture that upholds or
rejects social theories. In Torquemada en el purgatorio and Torquemada y San Pedro, Cruz,
Fidela, and Torquemada’s motivations to care for Rafael and Valentín, as well as the reasoning
behind their allocation of care, upholds the theories of political economy that valued people for
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their potential to serve as human capital. However, although the two characters with explicit
disabilities in the Torquemada series do not receive the dignity of sustained care, the novels lay
the groundwork to suggest that caregiving is a way of participating in—and therefore potentially
subverting—cultural expectations of which lives are valuable and deserving of a future. The next
chapter will explore how Galdós’s Misericordia (1897) posits caregiving as a subversive and
creative practice that champions new social values.
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Chapter 4
Normative Time and Transgressive Caregiving in Galdós’s Misericordia (1897)

Benito Pérez Galdós’s Misericordia (1897) opens with a detailed representation of
beggars outside the church of San Sebastian in the winter. While many of Galdós’s novels
portray the working class, Misericordia is the only one of his works that represents the social
structure, living conditions, and practices of the begging class. By representing an assembly of
bodies in a public space, Galdós draws attention to the bodily demands (the need for shelter,
food, medicine) that fall outside the domestic sphere. At the time the novel was written,
increased urban poverty and the consolidation of bourgeois conceptualizations of the nuclear
family raised the question of who would care for subjects who fell outside of legal and blood
relations (the elderly, orphaned children, and people with illnesses or disabilities).1 The social
question, therefore, haunted the perimeter of the family as an institution of control: who is
responsible for the unproductive subjects of the population? How can they best be “cared” for
(reformed or isolated) to facilitate the ongoing production of the social body?
Misericordia picks up this debate by contrasting the compassionate nature of the elderly
beggar, Benina, with the often violent forms of institutional and performative charity. Through
her mendicancy, Benina provides food and medicine for members of the impoverished middle
class, including her sick employer, Doña Paca, as well as other beggars, such as Almudena, her
blind, Jewish Moroccan friend who contracts leprosy. Unfortunately, at the end of the novel,

1

Pilar Muñoz López has written about the family’s responsibility toward marginalized and less productive relatives
in Sangre, amor e interes, particularly chapters 9 and 10. Adrian Shubert’s Historia Social de España briefly
outlines the social efforts to strengthen family ties among the poor and to establish poorhouses that emphasized
work ethic (78-82). Mariano Esteban de Vega discusses the questions and attempted solutions surrounding the social
question during the Spanish Restoration in “La asistencia liberal española.”
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Benina’s admirable compassion is not met with financial reward. On the contrary, after Doña
Paca receives a substantial inheritance, she banishes Benina from her home, and Benina and
Almudena conclude by living happily in a hovel. Scholars have approached Misericordia with
special attention to its moral and economic worldview, alternately celebrating Benina’s moral
success or concluding that Benina’s financial ruin cautions against excessive generosity.2 A
reading from the perspective of disability studies extends these claims by drawing out the
political implications of Benina’s caregiving to characters with diseases and disabilities. Alison
Kafer’s distinction between crip time and normative time, in conjunction with feminist theories
on care, allow us to explore Benina’s caregiving as a creative, and even transgressive act.
Previous chapters have established Kafer’s concept of “normative time” as fitting into
normalizing discourses of productivity and maternology in the late nineteenth-century. This
chapter builds on those connections while also considering the relationship between care and the
construction of normative time. Drawing on work by Jack Halberstam, Kafer describes
normative narratives of time as those that “presume a linear development from a dependent
childhood to an independent adulthood” that is defined by work and marriage (35; 54).
Normative time, then, is defined by continued productivity, as well as the idealization of
independence, both of which were sustained through practices of care. On the topic of care,
feminist political philosopher Martha Fineman has argued that, through the division of public
and private spheres, one of the key political roles of the family in capitalist culture became to

2

For scholars that refer specifically to both Benina’s morality and her economic failure, see Walter Glannon’s
"Charity and Distributive Justice: Misericordia Reexamined” (1985), Anthony Purdy’s Literature and Money
(1993), Peter Bly’s "La pobreza económica y moral: paralelos temáticos y estructurales entre La de Bringas y
Misericordia" (1997), Hazel Gold’s "El nomadismo urbano y la crisis finisecular en Misericordia" (1997), Teresa
Fuentes’s Visions of Filth (2003), and Amy Wright’s “La mirada y los marginados en la Misericordia Galdosiana”
(2009).
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uphold “the myth that autonomy and independence can be attained” (214). Within the
nineteenth-century Spanish context, Pilar Muñoz López has demonstrated that, as political
discourses positioned the nuclear family as the foundation of the capitalist state, familial
dynamics were increasingly defined by the gendered division of labor (199). The complement of
the husband-as-provider was the discrete angel of the house, who cared for her children, ill and
disabled family members, and her husband within the confines of the private sphere (199). In
other words, normative time, with its idealization of independence, required that the reality of
dependency (of ill and disabled, as well as healthy/able-bodied subjects) be concealed, and the
institution of the traditional, heteronormative family provided one method of doing so.
Another method would be through custodial institutions such as asylums and almshouses,
which relied on tactics of containment, surveillance, and violence to keep disabled and deviant
subjects out of sight. In the first attempt to regulate public assistance, the 1849 Ley de
Beneficiencia created two lasting models of medical assistance for mental health: a private one
which optimistically offered paying clientele the possibility of recovery, and a public one,
“escasamente medicalizada, sumida en el custodialismo” that housed thousands of “locos
pobres” (scarcely medicalized, sunken in custodialism; Campos et al 14). Public concern over
the objectives and practices care in custodial institutions is evident, for instance, in Concepción
Arenal’s criticisms of the prison-like charitable asylums, about which she wrote “El bello ideal
de la caridad es que no haya dolores; el de la Beneficencia que no se vean. Quita, pues, al pobre
de la vista del público” (The beautiful ideal of compassion is that there not be suffering; the ideal
of charity houses is that the suffering not be seen. Charity houses therefore remove the poor from
the view of the public; 19). Arenal’s critique indicates that custodial institutions were not put in
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place to respond to the needs of poor or ill subjects, but rather to remove them and either render
them productive or keep them out of the way of productive subjects.3
The concept of care— whether in the domestic sphere or in public institutions—has a
contentious history in feminist disability studies. Feminist political theorists and philosophers
have argued that the acknowledgment and feminization of caring labor has lead to the
exploitation and abuse of caregivers, often at the hands of people to whom they provide care
(West 90; Bubeck 160). Conversely, disability studies scholars have criticized the long and
ongoing history of abuse and exploitation that people with disabilities have suffered under the
guise of "care," including involuntary institutionalization, sterilization, and medicalization
(Beckett 361; Shakespeare 224). Feminist disability theorists have urged for the integration of
these perspectives through the acknowledgement of interdependence (the understanding that no
one is independent, but rather, that each person is dependent on others) and analyses of the
complicated power dynamics that arise in relationships of (inter)dependency (Fraser and Gordon
22; Watson et al. 332; Hughes et al. 261). It is therefore crucial to examine the ease with which
situations of physical, emotional, and sexual exploitation or abuse can develop within
relationships of dependence and care, but it is equally important to consider the potential positive
intimacies that may arise from interdependence when both people providing and receiving care
feel valued.
Approaching Misericordia with attention to the relationship between care and normative
time allows us to investigate the two models of care Galdós depicts. Drawing on language from

3

For further examples, Fuentes’ Visions of Filth provides a comparison between British vagrancy laws and Spanish
collection and expulsion of vagrants (176-179) and Fernando Álvarez-Uría Miserables y Locos: Medicina Mental y
Orden Social en la España Del Siglo XIX explains the use of labor as a moralizing discipline in custodial
institutions.
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disability studies, we may think of these as caregiving/caring labor and custodial care (Gabbard
92). Galdós draws attention to caregiving and custodial care through the novel’s title, which
refers both to Benina’s compassion and to the almshouse called “Misericordia.” Benina’s
attention to Doña Paca and Almudena’s physical and emotional states when they are ill
constitutes caregiving, which takes into account the needs and preferences of each care recipient.
By caring for subjects who are not members of her nuclear family and begging for money to do
so, Benina subverts established norms about the act of caring for others and renders
interdependence visible. As the novel progresses, her acts of caregiving put her in increasingly
marginalized positions. While not everyone who falls outside of normative time falls into crip
time, an inability or unwillingness to adhere to normative time puts a subject in the vulnerable
(and often pathologized) position of being considered not productive or valuable. Because
Benina is unpaid and her labor is not acknowledged as an economic contribution—and because
she is responsive to the experiences of crip time of her care receivers—Benina is unable to
satisfy the requirements of normative time.
Conversely, “Misericordia,” the almshouse run by the priest Don Romualdo, exemplifies
custodial care in that its primary aim is the regulation or removal of dependency from the public
space to facilitate productivity in a capitalist society. Custodial care upholds normative time and
its tactics are enacted by characters who adhere to normative narratives of time in their own
lives. Although custodial care in the novel is implemented through religious and state
institutions, its tactics of surveillance and isolation are likewise carried out in the domestic
sphere.4 The characters who succeed in Madrid’s developing capitalism—namely, Don Carlos,

4

Gabbard’s analysis of custodial care in Jane Eyre also includes the domestic sphere as it focuses on Bertha
Mason’s imprisonment in Rochester’s attic and puts her mistreatment in dialogue with contemporary criticisms of
British asylums, which employed physical restraints and warehoused patients.
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Juliana, and Don Romualdo—align their practices enacted to maximize productivity and profit
with the utilitarian values of custodial care. Through the contrast between the values and
practices intrinsic to these two models of care, the novel develops a valuation of caregiving that
challenges normative time by rejecting utilitarian values, as well as nationalistic discourses on
progress.
The characterization of Benina’s care recipients as unhealthy or disabled is crucial in
understanding the implications of her caregiving. Misericordia depicts Almudena and Doña Paca
as differing examples of subjects who are unable to adapt to the burgeoning capitalist society of
Madrid. Doña Paca’s failing finances, nervous attacks, and her children’s poor health indicate
that she is subject to the degenerations of the upper class. As a Moroccan beggar, Almudena is
also marked for degeneration. The narrator mentions Almudena’s “atavismo” (240), a reference
to Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso’s view that Africans and Arabs had failed to evolve
into civilized society and that, within Europe, the lower classes belonged to a lower race, one
more closely related to African races (91). However, ill health could be attributed to both
characters through their class standing alone. Criminologist Rafael Salillas tethered degeneration
to mendicancy by explaining that in his view, “degeneración… es perder las condiciones de
sustentación económica… perder las condiciones de estabilidad social” (degeneration…is the
loss of economic sustenance… the loss of the conditions of social stability; 398). A framework
of social degeneration, then, denied the possibility of health or able-bodiedness within the social
class that depended on the charity of others. As Teresa Fuentes Peris has demonstrated, the
shared utilitarian ethic of discourses in political economy and public health established the
relationship between health and work by claiming that work led to good health and that people in
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good health had a responsibility to contribute to society by cultivating a productive work ethic
(Fuentes, Torquemada 31).
Both of Benina’s care recipients, then, are pathologized for falling into the category of
economically unadaptable, non-productive subjects. As T.E. Bell notes, the popularity of social
Darwinism among contemporary Spanish sociologists and economists was well-reflected in
Galdós’s personal library and influenced his own works (3-9). Social Darwinism, introduced in
Spain primarily through Herbert Spencer, depended on individualism, competition, and the
classification of social “types,” which were defined by their social and financial function. In
economics and sociology, social Darwinists argued that the economic struggle for existence
improved the race by allowing superior types to flourish. Benina’s use of her money to care for
people to whom she is bound in interdependent relationships undermine the assumptions of class
division, self-reliance, and independence underlying the “ley social, económica” (social,
economic law; Galdós 119) of social Darwinism.
However, despite their shared dependence on the charity of others, Almudena’s trajectory
of health and social stigma differs significantly from that of Doña Paca. Almudena’s mendicancy
satisfies Salillas’s definition of “parasitismo social” (social parasitism; 413) but, because he is
blind, Almudena is an acceptable subject for charity, “cuyo parasitismo, es, no sólo tolerable sino
obligado,” as sociologist Constancio Bernaldo de Quirós explained (28). Despite this
classification, Quiros promoted the idea that all beggars, whether disabled or not, were in the
process of continual degeneration, losing their energy and individuality (29). Moreover, because
mendicants were only permitted to request charity within the jurisdiction of their birthplace
(Arenal 92), Almudena’s identity as an immigrant puts his tentative acceptability in question.
Whereas Doña Paca’s racially unmarked (white) European body and former class standing
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enable her to return to a non-pathologized position after she receives an inheritance, Almudena
cannot share in the same privilege. The racial and national differences that cast Almudena out of
the social body only intensify after Almudena contracts a disease that other characters believe to
be leprosy and consider an African disease. This fear of contact and contraction, of invasion and
intimacy, demonstrates the slippage between constructions of disability, disease, and race.
Analyzing the ethics of care and the relationship between disability and race in fin-de-siècle
Spain enables us to understand Benina’s relationship with Almudena as a position against
utilitarian and darwinistic ideologies, as well as against the racial hierarchies implicated in
Spanish imperialism.
By the time Galdós published Misericordia, he had lost faith in the middle class’s
capacity to lead the charge of social change. The extreme poverty he witnesses and documents is
proof that the regenerationist projects of social reform he hoped would modernize Madrid have
been unsuccessful (Martínez de Contrasta 100). What is at stake, then, in Misericordia’s
depiction of Madrid’s most impoverished class is both an acknowledgment of the degree to
which social reform has failed and a subsequent attempt to find hope and a new system of values
in the social life that has resulted from the first decade of the Restoration. The novel connects the
productive, economic, and hygienic practices of those who are models of Spanish citizenship and
successful agents of capitalism to the violence of custodial care and normative time. In doing so,
Misericordia also examines the interdependent bonds of caregivers and care recipients as giving
rise to social values that challenge expectations of progress defined by productivity and imperial
hierarchies. Benina and Almudena’s friendship offers a model of caregiving that becomes radical
because it re-writes kinship into non-biological bonds, including connections across racial and
national differences.

136

From the novel’s beginning, characters’ abilities to adhere to normative time is directly
related to their economic practices and their familial structures. Benina’s search for a duro (a five
peseta coin) ties the privations of capitalism to the urgency of caregiving that sets the practices of
care outside of normative work schedules. The urgency of Benina’s financial need sets her apart
from the temporalities of the bourgeois shoppers and the beggars who populate the scene in the
heart of Madrid. While the other beggars of San Sebastián live outside the practices of
production that comprise normative time, they nevertheless live on day-to-day charity.
Conversely, Benina’s pressing needs — not yet known to the reader — exceed the amount
received in alms. As she informs Almudena, she is in a rush and cannot go home without
acquiring a duro. Although the idea of quickened urban activity may appear to be a characteristic
result of modernity’s technological advances and capitalist opportunities, this is not the
productive temporality in which Benina engages. At El Retiro, she stands outside the capitalist
rhythm, not desiring luxuries but lamenting the middle-class’s unwillingness to distribute even a
small amount of wealth in a way that would release her from her anxiety. Throughout her search,
the reader does not know why she needs the money or what would happen if she went home
without it. It is not until she and Almudena take money from a generous alcoholic prostitute and
Benina sets off to pick up Doña Paca’s medicine that we learn the duro was not to satisfy
Benina’s own needs or the needs of a family member, but to care for her friend.
Benina’s relationship to Doña Paca, not just as a servant but as a servant who provides
for the family, complicates the separation between family and household staff espoused by
nineteenth-century liberalism. The narrator describes Doña Paca’s widowhood and economic
decline, as well as the unconventional role Benina came to fill. As Jo Labanyi has noted, with the
rise of capitalism, production shifted from the household to the public sphere, which changed the
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delineations of the family, the role of its members, and its economic function. Whereas “family”
formerly included all members of the household involved in production, the new model of the
family was theoretically limited to a husband, wife, and children and curtailed the wife’s role in
economic production (Labanyi, Culture and Gender 10).
Throughout most of Misericordia, the liberal model of the family is not possible for Doña
Paca’s family — initially because Benina’s relationship with the children who view her as a
second mother establishes her as an inseparable part of the household, and later because she
takes charge of the economic “production” and decisions that keep the family afloat. Benina’s
reliance on mendicancy to support the family is not only a source of ambiguity because it blurs
the line between the deserving and undeserving poor (Fuentes Peris, Visions), but also because it
suggests that, outside of the defined family and class hierarchy, caregiving is a non-normative
act, and care can be undeserved even when both receiver and giver agree to it. Outside of charity,
time spent providing care to subjects who are not immediate family is economically
unproductive, which the novel emphasizes when Benina leaves her paying job with an affluent
family to continue caring for Doña Paca and her children. Benina’s position in the family is
therefore not only a subversion of family, but also of gender and class, as she comes to provide
for the family through her mendicancy.
In contrast to the economic tactics that provide for Benina and the Zapata family’s
surprising interdependencies, Don Carlos and Juliana’s economic practices align with capitalist
conceptualizations of normative time. As Julio Rodríguez Puértolas notes, Misericordia portrays
“esa típica galería galdosiana de personajes en decadencia por inadaptación a las realidades de la
nueva sociedad capitalista… y frente a [ellos] hay otros que, a niveles diferentes, saben funcionar
en la nueva sociedad” (that typical Galdosian gallery of characters in decline due to their
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inadaptability to the realities of the new capitalist society, and before them, there are others who,
at varying levels, know how to function in the new society; 108). Among the first group of
unadaptable characters, we find Doña Paca, her daughter Obdulia, and Don Frasquito Ponte,
while the second is composed of Juliana and Don Carlos, who thrive in the new economic
environment (108). Don Carlos, Doña Paca’s widowed brother-in-law, has made a significant
fortune through impeccably managed finances and opportunistic investments in urban property.
Conversely, Juliana, Doña Paca’s daughter-in-law, belongs to the working class and makes a
living by sewing and living frugally. Despite their difference in position, both Juliana and Don
Carlos implement a strict economic governance, limit their generosity (particularly beyond the
bounds of their immediate family), and forcefully exhort others to emulate these economic
practices.
Through Juliana and Don Carlos we can see how normative time is enacted in different
ways across class and gender differences, while upholding the values of production, regulation,
and reform. Introduced in the novel as the methodical almsgiver, Don Carlos refuses to help
Doña Paca because he believes she should help herself by emulating his practice of recording
every income and each expense with the mechanical regularity that almost echoes Juliana’s
“enorme tarea en la Singer” (enormous task at the Singer; 118). Ascribing his prosperity to his
bookkeeping habits, Don Carlos sends Doña Paca a risible accounting ledger (despite Benina’s
explanation that they have no income to track) and a small monthly allowance that he promises
to increase or decrease depending on their ability to efficiently adopt his habits. As in the
problematics of custodial care, Don Carlos’ assistance is not rooted in what would most help his
sister-in-law, but in what would benefit society, which he believes to be Dona Paca’s reform and
adherence to economic self-regulation. The ledger is meant to hold her individually accountable
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for her unavoidable, continued poverty while ignoring its social causes. Juliana, likewise,
discontinues her household’s generosity toward Doña Paca when Juliana establishes her own
nuclear family and “cures” her husband of his thieving ways, forcing him to develop “el hábito y
el gusto del trabajo productivo” (the habit and joy of productive work; 117) — though as we
later learn, this change in her husband’s behavior is due to Juliana’s autocratic demands and
physical abuse toward her husband. Both of these examples reveal that Don Carlos and Juliana’s
adaptability to capitalist society depends on neglecting the needs of others in ways that verge on
or explicitly entail violence.
Don Carlos and Juliana’s unwillingness to provide for Benina further illustrate that the
utilitarian view of “thrift” limits economic assistance to the realm of the nuclear family at the
expense of friends or extended family. When Benina visits Don Carlos his lack of generosity
toward his sister-in-law contrasts starkly with the opulence in which he frames the memory of
his wife: “La pared del centro ostentaba el retrato de Doña Pura, cubierto con una gasa negra, en
marco que parecía de oro puro. Otros retratos de fotografía, que debían de ser de las hijas, yernos
y nietecillos de D. Carlos, veíanse en diversas partes de la estancia” (The middle wall boasted the
portrait of Doña Pura, veiled in black muslin, in a frame that seemed to be pure gold. Other
portraits, which must have been the daughters and sons-in-law, and grandchildren of D. Carlos,
could be seen throughout the room; 129). Don Carlos’s performance of reverence and respect
toward his deceased wife while her sister barely subsists with Benina’s help may be read as
Galdós’ criticism, not only of the miserliness of the upper class, but of the cruelty of limiting
physical and economic care to the nuclear family.
The same critique is carried out in Juliana and Antonio’s family economy, despite the
fact that they belong to the working class and therefore have less financial stability than Don
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Carlos. Between Juliana’s sewing and Antonio’s newly acquired work habits, their financial
strain lessens, and on occasion Antonio “solía sorprender a su madre con esplendideces y rasgos
de amor filial, que eran las únicas alegrías saboreadas por la infeliz señora en mucho tiempo: le
llevaba una peseta, dos pesetas, a veces medio duro [...]” (tended to surprise his mother with gifts
and tokens of filial love, which were the only joys the unhappy woman had experienced in a long
time: he would give her a peseta or two, sometimes half a duro [...]; 118). However, Juliana soon
becomes pregnant with twins and “desde que se posesionaron de la casa los mellizos, ávidos de
vida y de leche, que había que formar con buenos alimentos, el dichoso y asendereado padre no
pudo obsequiar a la abuelita con los sobrantes de su ganancia, porque no los tenía” (from the
time the twins took over the house, avid for milk and life, which had to be formed with good
nourishment, their happy and tired father could no longer surprise their grandmother with the
leftovers of his earnings, because there were none; 118). As we later learn, it is Juliana, not
Antonio, who manages the household economy. However, reorganization of the family budget to
exclude Doña Paca anticipates Juliana’s readiness to define family through economic ties rather
than intimate ones, as she does more forcefully toward the end of the novel when she exiles
Benina and Almudena from Doña Paca’s house to ensure the family’s prosperity. Although it is
easier to criticize Don Carlos’s lack of generosity because he has greater wealth and his children
have reached adulthood, the narrative emphasis on Antonio’s monetary gifts as one of Dona
Paca’s few remaining pleasures makes it difficult to avoid lamenting the prioritization of the
nuclear family (as comprised of a husband, wife, and children) over all other kinship ties.
While Don Carlos and Juliana prove their adaptability to capitalist society through their
self-discipline, both display nervous symptoms which manifest themselves as a “crónico temblor
nervioso” (chronic nervous tremble; 130) for Carlos and “monomanías histéricas” (hysterical
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monomanias; 316) for Juliana. In his analysis of neurosis in Misericordia, Rupert Allen has
argued that hysteria could be considered a form of hypnosis turned inward “frente una realidad
inaguantable —en este caso, la miseria absoluta” (when faced with an unbearable reality — in
this case absolute destitution; 38). He presents a series of brief case studies on Benina, Frasquito
Ponte, Doña Paca, Obdulia, Antonio, Almudena, Juliana, and Don Carlos to conclude that “el
efecto universal ejercido por la psicopatía de la miseria, que termina haciendo víctimas
incurables a todos —aun a los que encuentran lo que debe de ser para ellos una relativa
prosperidad” (the universal effects exerted by the psychopathy of destitution [...] ends up making
incurable victims of everyone — even those who find what should be, for them, a relative
prosperity; 46). I agree with Allen in two important arguments: that the economic environment
negatively impacts characters in Misericordia across class divisions and that disability (including
mental and behavioral disabilities) appears to be ubiquitous in the novel.
However, the scholarship that has been published since Allen’s article on positive and
negative uses of imagination in Misericordia (Rodgers 188) and the narrative’s shifting fictional
levels (Kronik 37) makes it difficult to accept his argument that Almudena and Benina
experience complete breaks with reality. Moreover, if the “psychopathy” he describes is caused
by confronting the unbearable reality of poverty, why isn’t it most evident in the many
mendicant characters, such as the alcoholic Pedra, whose tragic life is described in detail? Rather
than interpret Don Carlos’s facial tic as rooted in “la idea de un mágico rito que protege de la
calamidad” (the idea of a magic ritual that protects from calamity; 43) or Juliana’s monomania as
“un caso, claro, del autocastigo debido a la vil agresión contra Benina” (a case [...] of selfpunishment due to her vile aggression against Benina; 45), Juliana and Don Carlos’s nervous
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symptoms appear to resonate with contemporary anxieties about the degenerative effects of
modernity.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century two theories dominated discourses on
degeneration. Psychiatrist Valentin Magnan and criminologist Cesare Lombroso framed
degeneration in terms of racial inheritance, while Max Nordau’s 1892 work Entartung
(Degeneration) departed from these earlier theories by arguing that degeneration was due to
environmental causes, specifically “the increasingly vertiginous pace of modern life” (MartinMárquez 176). In the discussion of whether degeneration was purely hereditary or could be
acquired, Spanish scientists primarily responded to their French and Italian counterparts, rather
than develop a dialogue with homegrown theories (Campos et al. 28). Among them, Victoriano
Garrido y Escuin, José María Escuder, and Luis Dolsa y Ramos defended (with various degrees
of intensity) the notion that degeneration could not occur without a hereditary cause (Campos et
al. 28- 30). Conversely, Mateo Bonafonte Nogués argued that degeneration could be acquired in
infancy through infection or trauma, and Hauser emphasized the detrimental effects of living in
an industrial society, which included a heightened vulnerability to illnesses (Campos et al. 31,
159). Daniel Pick summarizes the ambivalent question behind degeneration across Western
Europe at the turn of the century by asking, “was degeneration separable from the history of
progress (to be coded as ‘regression’, ‘atavism’ or ‘primitivism’), or did it reveal that the city,
progress, civilisation and modernity were paradoxically the very agents of decline?” (106).
Rodríguez Puértolas’s argument that Misericordia “no se trata de un determinismo
naturalista, sino de una siniestra racionalidad socio-económica” (does not deal with a naturalist
determinism, but rather with a sinister socio-economic reasoning;102) demonstrates how Galdós
responds to this question. Although Misericordia depicts the physical impairments or illnesses
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(alcoholism, weaker frames, asymmetrical bodies) around which anthropologists, criminologists,
and hygienists pathologized the lower class as degenerate, Galdós frequently undercuts the
presumed racial degeneration of the lower class by drawing attention to economic factors that
cause disability and illness.
As Allen notes, Don Carlos’s “compulsion” consists of “su apego al orden físico y
moral” (his attachment to physical and moral order; 43). The introduction of Don Carlos in the
second chapter emphasizes extreme self-regulation in every aspect of his life: “Era hombre tan
extremadamente metódico, que su vida entera encajaba dentro de un programa irreductible,
determinante de sus actos todos, así morales como físicos, de las graves resoluciones, así como
de los pasatiempos insignificantes, y hasta del moverse y del respirar” (He was such an
extremely methodical man that his entire life fit into an irreducible program determinant of all
his acts, moral as well as physical, of serious resolutions, as well as of insignificant pastimes, and
even of moving and breathing; 69). The discipline and docility of his body are further displayed
when Benina visits Don Carlos, and he boasts about the punctual and almost constant attention to
his financial accounts. The “programa irreductible” that joins his physical and moral acts is
revealed to be the scrutiny and documentation of expenses. The earlier, slightly hyperbolic,
suggestion that his breathing is methodically regulated resonates in his explanation that “no me
acuesto sin pasar todos los apuntes a la agenda” (I do not go to bed without transcribing my notes
into the agenda;131) as well as in his facial tic, described as a “crónico temblor nervioso,
movimiento lateral como el que usamos para la denegación” (chronic nervous tremble, a lateral
movement such as the one used for negation; 130).
The continuous repetitive motion records economic rhythms on his body in the spirit of
regularity with which he records them in his books. When this gesture becomes all the more
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marked as he shows Benina his unending calculations, the inseparability of his tic and his
financial regulation is confirmed (131). The manifestation of normative time as a physiological
symptom, however, interrupts its very normativity by signaling the vulnerability of exhaustion
and the involuntary rhythms underlying discipline. This contradiction is perhaps best crystallized
in the description of disrupted temporality above Don Carlos’s cold hearth: “Sobre la chimenea
nunca encendida, había un reloj de bronce con figuras, que no andaba, y no lejos de allí, un
almanaque americano, en la fecha del dia anterior” (Over the chimney that was never lit, there
was a bronze clock with figures,which did not work, and not far from there, an American
almanac, set to the day before; 129).
The causal link between Juliana’s enactment of normative time and her development of a
hysterical obsession with her children’s health is less explicit than that of Don Carlos’s financial
markings and facial tics. Daniel Lorca argues that Galdós crafts two differing representations of
Juliana: first, the hard-working wife who is capable of reforming her lazy, thieving husband into
an industrious family man, and, second, the financially-obsessed, physically-abusive tyrant who
takes over Dona Paca’s household affairs. By first establishing an appreciation for Juliana’s
thrift, hard work, and ability to reform her husband, the revelation that her methods are
comprised of surveillance and violence leads to a critique of the technologies of capitalism
(Lorca 91). Both sets of these characteristics constitute normative time in that they enable Juliana
to maximize the profit of her household by upholding productivity, limiting expense, and holding
her husband to her standard of work and thrift by monitoring and threatening him. Despite her
immense success in governing her own household, as Juliana extends her governance into Doña
Paca’s domestic affairs, she begins to suffer from insomnia and an overwhelming fear that her
children will fall sick, though there is nothing to suggest they would. Insomnia, the first
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symptom, extends from her vigilance as “se levantaba todas las mañanas sin haber pegado los
ojos” (she got up every morning without having closed her eyes; 315). Just as Don Carlos’s tic
intensifies as he looks over his accounting books, the worsening of Juliana’s ailments coincides
with the intensification of her governance: “con estos alifafes enojosos, no se atenuaba el
absolutismo gobernante de la tirana, sino que se agravaba” (these irritating afflictions did not
attenuate the absolutism of the tyrant, but rather aggravated it; 315). Juliana’s surveillance of her
husband and the “previsión” (foresight or precaution) with which she oversees the family budget
become oppressive when they are turned onto her children. Crossing the line between caregiving
and custodial care, her attentions to their health turn violent: “con las precauciones de que les
rodeaba [...] les molestaba, les hacía llorar” (the precautions with which she surrounded them [...]
bothered them, made them cry; 316). In this way, Galdós signals that the requirements of
normative time do not only require that a subject work, marry, and reproduce, but rather that one
constantly enact practices that maximize profit for the individual and society. It is the constant
nature of normative time that begins to wear on Don Carlos and Juliana.
Although I have disagreed with Allen’s assessment that Juliana’s neurosis is a form of
self-punishment for her treatment of Benina, it is crucial to note that there is a structural and
ethical connection between Juliana’s exclusion of Benina and Almudena from the Zapata home
and her pathological obsession with her children’s health. What both of these instances share is
Juliana’s fear of illness and her investment in preventative measures. Her precaution minimizes
contagion, but it also signals her inability to function as a caregiver as she treats illness as a
social problem to be removed rather than responding to Benina and Almudena or her children’s
needs. Combined with her precaution (which must intensify to the point of obsession as her
constituency grows), her inability to provide care incites the “monomanías histéricas” she
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develops regarding her children’s health. The unravelling of Juliana’s disciplinary time into a
paranoid hypochondria pathologizes normative time and explicitly looks to Benina’s model of
caregiving when Juliana goes to her for a cure.
Scholarship on Misericordia has, on the one hand, noted the similarities between Don
Carlos and Juliana’s economic practices, and, on the other hand, the shared values of charity
between Benina and the priest Don Romualdo. Don Romualdo is first introduced when Benina,
hesitant to admit to Dona Paca that she supports the family through begging, lies by saying that a
priest named Don Romualdo has hired her as a cook (although, to her knowledge, there is no
Don Romualdo). When this fictional priest comes to Dona Paca’s door to give her news of the
inheritance, the narrative introduces an element of metafiction that scholars have largely read as
a manifestation of Benina’s generosity. Joaquín Casalduero claims that in Romualdo’s
manifestation, Benina does not merely invent a character, but invents justice itself (1108). John
Kronik considers the appearance of the priest a “[representation] of the triumph of compassion”
(46) that elevates Benina to the position, not only of a Christ-figure as Robert Russell had
previously suggested, but also to the position of a Galdós-figure. A reading that distinguishes
between caregiving and custodial care, however, complicates the idea that Don Romualdo is a
manifestation of Benina’s values. Like Benina, Romualdo is generous with his resources and
attempts to help sectors of the lower class make ends meet, but unlike her, Romualdo’s
caretaking model is one of custodial institutionalization, which echoes the values of efficiency
and reform enacted by Don Carlos and Juliana. While Walter Glannon argues that Romualdo’s
distributive model of charity is “the only viable alternative to the lack of efficacy apparent in
Benina’s indiscriminate generosity” (260), a reading focused on dependence and models of care
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demonstrates, to the contrary, that while Romualdo’s model may be more efficient, it ultimately
disengages from the lived realities of its subjects.
Though Don Romuando’s miraculous appearance and generosity invites a comparison
with Benina’s desire to help others, her position as a marginalized subject makes her wary of
custodial institutions, such as Don Romualdo’s Misericordia. Even before her imprisonment in
San Bernardino, she refuses to take Ponte to a hospital because she is certain that “en el Hospital
se moriría sin remedio” (he would certainly die in the hospital; 195) and both she and Almudena
refuse to accept assistance from asylums for the poor or blind (248). When Romualdo’s clerical
acquaintances, who advise Benina and Almudena to stop wandering the streets and live with
more constant shelter and food in an asylum, such as the “Misericordia,” their response
illustrates the shortcomings of charitable asylums:
Nada contestó Almudena, que amaba la libertad, y la prefería trabajosa y miserable a la
cómoda sujeción del asilo. Benina, por su parte, no queriendo entrar en largas
explicaciones, ni desvanecer el error de aquella buena gente, que sin duda les creía
asociados para la vagancia y el merodeo, se limitó a decir que no se recogían en un
establecimiento por causa de la mucha existencia de pobres, y que sin recomendaciones y
tarjetas de personajes no había manera de conseguir plaza. (248)
Almudena, who loved liberty and preferred it, arduous and miserable, to the comfortable
subjection of the asylum, said nothing. Benina, for her part, not wanting to go into long
explanations nor dispel the error of those good people, who undoubtedly believed them to
be associated with vagrancy and loitering, limited herself to saying that they did not go to
an establishment due to the abundant existence of the poor and that without
recommendations and letters there was no way to acquire a position.
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Almudena’s internal response indicates that the relative comfort of the asylum does not
necessarily lead to increased livability, as it requires the sacrifice of one’s liberty. Benina’s
reaction suggests that there are other unspoken reasons (“largas explicaciones”) for avoiding the
asylums. While some may overlap with Almudena’s preferences, others—considering her earlier
mistrust of caretaking at the hospital—may relate to the poor conditions of custodial institutions.
Moreover, in her understanding, asylums are for vagos, lazy loiterers of the underclass. Indeed,
Benina is aware of her value to the community, even though it is not readily apparent to others. If
she became dependent on an asylum, Madrilenian society would have rid itself of one more
beggar, but her friends would lose their caregiver.
The novel invites criticism of the motivation and management of Don Romualdo’s
custodial institution through the sudden revelation that he disdains the beggars who seek help in
his asylum. Explaining his position as owner and administrator of the Casa de Misericordia, Don
Romualdo mentions that he cannot step into the street without being accosted by “mendigos
importunos” (importunate beggars; 269) hoping to be taken in by his asylum. He adds
“Podríamos creer … que es nuestro pais inmensa gusanera de pobres y que debemos hacer de la
nación un Asilo sin fin, donde quepamos todos… Al paso que vamos pronto seremos el Hospicio
más grande de Europa” (One would think that our entire country is an immense maggot nest of
the poor and that we should make the nation into an endless asylum, in which we all fit… at this
rate, we will soon be the largest hospice in Europe; 269). Don Romualdo’s dehumanizing phrase
“gusanera de pobres” aligns him, and the Casa de Misericordia, with the new conceptualization
the poor as a threat to social health. By calling for a nation-wide asylum Don Romualdo echoes
the fears José María Escuder articulated in his medico-legal texts of a nation overrun by
degeneration and disorder. In Locos lúcidos (1883), Escuder writes “la civilización de una nación
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está en razón directa al número de manicomios [...] España es el país clásico de locos” (a
nation’s civilization is in direct correlation with its number of insane asylums; Spain is the
classic country of the insane;10). Though Don Romualdo manages a poorhouse, rather than one
of the psychiatric institutions to which Escuder refers, both custodial institutions share the
regulatory function of maintaining the social order by removing unproductive subjects from the
public space.
The relationship Don Romualdo draws between custodial enclosures and society
resonates with Galdós’s earlier novels: La desheredada (1881) refers to the asylum Leganés as a
theoretical city (72) and to Madrid as “un manicomio suelto” (239), while Fortunata y Jacinta
offers sequential chapters set in and around a convent entitled “Las Micaelas por dentro” and
“Las Micaelas por fuera,” signaling the continued surveillance and control exercised on the
protagonist’s body.5 If, as Liana Ewald has written, La desheredada’s representations of
confinement serve as sites of exploration for Galdós’s growing concerns over the new societal
order of bourgeoisie values, his frustration manifests more fully over a decade later in
Misericordia. While both La desheredada and Fortunata y Jacinta describe an existing social
reality in which the proliferation of disciplinary technologies creates a carceral archipelago, in
Misericordia, Don Romualdo’s view of a nation-asylum appears more explicitly threatening
because it is not a description, but a proposal to extend technologies of surveillance and
intervention.
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For an analysis of confinement in Galdós’s earlier novel, see Liana Ewald’s "Confinement,
Consolation, and Confession in Galdós' La desheredada” (2008). For an analysis of discipline
and tactics of resistance in Fortunata y Jacinta, see Akiko Tsuchiya’s Marginal Subjects:
Gender and Deviance in Fin-de-siecle Spain (2011).
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The cruelty of Don Romualdo’s hyperbolic proposal to convert Spain into a hospice is
amplified by coinciding with Benina’s forceful imprisonment in the municipal asylum. The state
in which she and Almudena emerge from it — filthy, sick, lice-ridden, and starving —
denounces the failure of the institution as a caretaking model. The description of it as an
establishment that “más parece mazmorra que hospicio” (more closely resembled a dungeon than
a hospice; 294) recasts Romualdo’s desire to transform the whole country into an asylum as an
idea that threatens public welfare as well as freedom. The carceral conditions of charitable
asylums were a topic of public concern, as demonstrated by Concepcion Arenal’s criticism of
custodial institutions in El pauperismo (1879), which explains that almshouses were unappealing
to people who needed them because “socorro” and “reclusión” had become synonymous (394).
The distinction between how Benina and Don Romualdo care for others belies the generosity that
seemingly connects the two characters and emphasizes the intimacy of Benina’s labor of care.
In contrast to the model of custodial care that establishes the caregiver’s power over the
care receiver, Benina’s model of caring labor affirms Don Ponte, Almudena, and Doña Paca’s
agency over their own care management and cultivates relationships of interdependence or
mutuality. Although Benina is occasionally cast in a maternal role in relation to other characters,
she does not engage in the paternalistic practices of custodial care that seek to render care
recipients passive. This is what makes her model of care transgressive: it eschews the
individualist values of self-interest and control present in the custodial approaches enacted by
Don Carlos, Juliana, and Romualdo. Rather than use the inequities of dependency to proclaim
her superiority as an “independent” person or to reify class distinctions through segregation and
charity, she takes her friends’ needs as the starting point for her caring labor as “ninguna
necesidad de las personas sometidas a su cuidado se le olvidaba” (none of the necessities of
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people under her care was forgotten; 23). Despite her friends’ appreciation of Benina, it is
evident that her role as a caregiver is socially undervalued as she moves through progressively
more marginalized spaces in the novel and is rejected from Doña Paca’s house in accordance
with the dictates of decorum.
Moreover, as someone who is both economically dependent and a caregiver, Benina’s
transgressions are multiplied. Feminist political philosophers Martha Fineman and Diemut Grace
Bubeck have articulated two distinct ways in which caring labor is stigmatized through capitalist
values and familial constructions. According to Fineman, the political role of the family is to
uphold the myth of independence that condemns recognition of dependency, such as caregiving
(215). Bubeck’s view is that caregiving is undervalued because it does not create products or
profit. Although both of these political philosophers draw from 20th century U.S. contexts, the
aspects of their theories that I engage with here are broadly applicable to capitalist societies with
gender inequities, including turn-of-the-century Spain. Benina’s open acknowledgment of her
economic dependency is indecorous (as Doña Paca indicates), but it is no less indecorous than
her kinship ties with Doña Paca, which upend the privatization of dependency through the
family. Narratively, the combination of her public mendicancy and private, non-familial
caregiving unmasks what Fineman calls “the costs of necessary caretaking” (215). In
Misericordia, caregiving costs money and time. Desperate to care for her friends, Benina pushes
herself to a position of marginalization as her attachment to Doña Paca prevents her from
seeking paid employment. As the narrative progresses, she rushes into continuously longer hours
of seeking charity in increasingly riskier places when her friends’ illnesses worsen and coincide
with each other (250).
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Benina’s economic marginalization both illustrates and extends Bubeck’s view that
caregiving is undervalued because it is non-productive, unpaid labor despite being necessary for
the continuation of society. Her emphasis on care as work that “needs to be done” (174) reveals
another aspect of social deviance in Benina’s caregiving. While caring for a child may be
considered socially necessary in that it contributes to the future of the nation, Benina’s care
receivers may be considered drains on society’s resources, and therefore a threat to progress.
Almudena’s “atavismo” (240), Don Ponte’s likeness to a mummy (157, 163), and Doña Paca’s
heartbroken declaration that she only aspires to death (100) cast each of these characters on the
wrong side of survival within the economic laws of social Darwinism. Each of them shows
symptoms of a social decline keeping with contemporary anxieties of degeneration (Labanyi,
Gender and Modernization 132-134). In keeping them alive, Benina rejects the utilitarian
discourse that implies a non-productive life is a wasted life and deviates from discourses on
social progress by finding value in “degenerate” subjects. Benina’s friendships suggest that, by
deviating from utilitarian ethics and liberal individualism, caring labor provides a space in which
caregivers and care-receivers can develop their agency in relational ways.
The implications of Benina’s caregiving extend to discourses on imperialism and
degeneration as her friendship with Almudena brings to the fore the complex distance or
proximity between Spain and North Africa that was rhetorically enacted in late nineteenth
century Spanish anthropology. As Susan Martin-Márquez notes, Spanish discourses in the latter
half of the nineteenth century alternatingly rejected and embraced their historical relationship to
Moorish Africa either to distance themselves from the “lower races” as described in degeneration
theories or to make a case for imperial expansion into North Africa. The desirability or
undesirability of a “blood brotherhood” that united Spaniards and North Africans culminated in a
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“racial panic” in the late nineteenth-century about what it meant to be Spanish and whether racial
degeneration and superiority were due to environmental or hereditary factors (Martin-Márquez
39, 175; Álvarez Junco 455). Benina’s friendship with Almudena and Juliana’s categorical
rejection of both him and Benina enact the ambivalent relationship these anthropological Spanish
discourses assumed toward North Africa; however, this is further complicated by the nature of
the disabilities that mark Almudena’s body and how they relate to his race.
Had Almudena’s disability and disease — his blindness and skin sores — been
represented as congenital, it would have been difficult to avoid reading the character as a
straightforward symbol of racial degeneration transposed into the heart of Spain. Conversely, the
representation of his disabilities as acquired frames his blindness as a “tragic accident” and his
“leprosy” as the result of poor institutional care even as it draws attention to his skin and codes
its difference as dangerous. Although leprosy had never been fully eradicated from Spain, most
of Europe it was seen as a distinctly foreign illness, and one that was highly contagious and
incurable. Despite the centuries of leprosy in Europe, medical doctors continued to emphasize its
origins in “los ardientes climas de la Arabia, de la Siria y del Egipto; desde cuyo último país
acompañó sin duda en su peregrinación á los hebreos” (Méndez Álvaro 7). Ethnographic studies,
too, insisted on the “Disposicion de razas de climas cálidos a la lepra” (Guallart y Beguer 14-15).
In this context, Almudena’s leprosy emphasizes his position as a racial Other and poses a
particular threat to the Spanish bourgeoisie (the class to which Juliana ascends while he contracts
the illness).
To further complicate the representational possibilities of Almudena’s leprosy, it is worth
noting that Bernabeu and Ballester have argued that as philanthropic institutions attempted to
monopolize the care of leprosy patients, their rhetorical use of the illness as a parable saturated it
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with moral implications. In comparing literal leprosy with the “leprosy of the soul,” religious
invective inadvertently collapsed the distinction and leprosy came to symbolize “moral defects
and consequences entailed by lack of respect for the prevailing social values” (Bernabeu and
Ballester 414). From the beginning of the novel, Almudena’s morality is already at odds with
conventional Spanish Catholicism by virtue of his Jewish faith and with the bourgeois utilitarian
work ethic because of his mendicancy. His disease, which Juliana is quick to diagnose as
leprosy, emphasizes and racializes these aspects of his otherness. The conflation of racialized
otherness and contagious illness— that is the rendering of race as contractible— is reminiscent
of the expulsions of moriscos during the first wave of Spanish nation building, during which the
decision to retain morisco children under the age of five seemed to suggest that “although race
can be passed on from generation to generation through blood, close physical and even cultural
contact may also produce an unredeemable contagion of the body politic” (Martin-Márquez 15).
The idea that race can be contagious destabilizes racial categories. Benina’s loyalty to Almudena
contributes to this slippage between disease and race, as Juliana is afraid of contracting leprosy
through Benina despite her lack of symptoms.
In examining how the shared antinomies of the Third World and disability are imagined
as “natural” rather than “political,” Erevelles observes that the racial superiority of white people
over people of color was (and still is) constructed through discourses of disability. In nineteenth
century Spain, the co-construction of disability and race were articulated through the prominent
discourses of scientific racism and nation building. The Black Legend, which had been a
racialized concept from its inception but developed new life under the anthropological lens of the
nineteenth century, created an impossible double-bind for Spaniards attempting a respectable
claim at “whiteness” (Martin-Márquez 39-40). On the one hand, the expulsion and persecution of
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Jews and Moors was seen as “barbaric,” while, on the other, to admit to the realities of the
convivencia, which allowed for and encouraged miscegenation, would be to accept that the
Spanish bloodline was tainted (41). This ambivalence resonates in the character of Almudena,
whose name situates him firmly in the history of the Spanish capital (Chamberlin 491), even as
the novel emphasizes his ethnic and national differences. Juliana’s suggestion that Almudena be
exiled, framed in terms of public health, exemplifies her cruelty and echoes the historical and
ongoing fear of contaminated bloodlines. In the last decades of the nineteenth century,
Africanists called for a renewal of the colonial endeavor under the guise of “economic and
cultural development,” strategically emphasizing both their cultural proximity to and superiority
over Africa. In doing so, they revised the historical dynamic between Spain and Moorish Africa
for their imperial gain (Martin-Márquez 55). The strategic denial or reassertion of past
relationships and interconnections is illustrated in the utilitarian self-interest with which Doña
Paca’s family disowns the very people who have provided for them. Their decision gives credit
to Almudena’s bitter phrase “Ispania terra n’gratituda” (Spain is an ungrateful country; 301).
Furthering the racialization of disability, Almudena’s incarceration as the cause of his
skin disease illustrates the ways in which disability can be, as Erevelles claims, the disabling of a
body by the social relations of capitalism (19). In contrast to the development of his blindness,
which can be read either as accidental or as a cosmic punishment for disobeying his father and is
followed by Almudena’s claim that he spoke with angels, his leprosy has more mundane and
material causes. While his first disability, blindness, reminds us that representations of disability
often deviate from the lived realities of people with disabilities, Almudena’s leprosy calls
attention to the multiple marginalizations that lead to its manifestation. Despite Almudena’s
colorful narrativization of the incidents surrounding his eye infection, poverty in Misericordia is
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inseparable from images of disabled bodies, ranging from amputations to alcoholism to
starvation, some of which may have drawn individuals into penury, such as Almudena’s
blindness, and others clearly caused by living without resources, such as his leprosy. The
proliferation of these disabilities blurs the line between the deserving and undeserving poor
(Fuentes Peris 11), but it also attends to the contemporary questions of what was hereditary, what
was acquired, and whether acquired symptoms of degeneration could be passed on. In light of
increased class mobility brought in by capitalism and of arguments put forth by de Gobineau and
Lombroso that the lower classes belonged to a lower race (more closely related to African races),
these questions about the deserving poor and the ways in which degeneration could be acquired
were central to the co-construction of race and disability.
Considering the mutuality of race and disability in the construction of the able-bodied,
white normative subject, Erevelles has expanded Frantz Fanon’s concept of internal colonization
to include violence against people with disabilities (122). She argues that internal colonization,
the inward application of the technologies of observation and control carried out in projects of
empire, was exercised in the government interventions that categorized, sterilized,
institutionalized, and euthanized people with disabilities. In Misericordia, Juliana’s expulsion of
Benina and Almudena from Doña Paca’s house echoes international efforts of segregation
implemented to stop the spread of leprosy. The First International Leprosy Conference, held in
Berlin in six months after Galdós penned Misericordia, concluded that segregation was the best
ways to minimize the spread of the disease — both in terms of isolating individuals displaying
symptoms of leprosy and of curtailing and monitoring immigration.6 Juliana’s response that,

6
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rather than take Almudena to the hospital as her husband suggests, “más cuenta le tiene…
mandarle para su tierra” (it would be better [...] to send him to his country; 303) illustrates the
ease with which the impulse to institutionalize can pivot from internal to international social
control through the racialization of disability and disabilization of race. While Misericordia does
not explore the technologies of control that were tested out in Spanish colonies, Galdós’s
portrayal of Juliana reveals his awareness of the fear of contagion and desire for order that
underlie both an expulsion from Spain based on race and religion and an expulsion from Spanish
society based on health.
Juliana’s answer, however, is hardly unexpected. Her readiness in suggesting and
implementing the segregation of potentially contagious subjects is anticipated in her
championing of individualist utilitarian ethics. Discourses on public health intertwined health
and hard work as the Restoration pressed for a social order that would contribute to the
development of capitalism. Referencing workhouses, as well as labor-as-therapy in asylums and
prisons,7 Huertas notes that since industrialization, “la medicina se convierte en un acto de
regulación de la capacidad de trabajo” (medicine becomes an act of regulating the capacity for
work; 114). Hygienic discourses imposed discipline and surveillance on subjects for the good of
the individual and for the good of the nation, while continually emphasizing a need for self-

Spanish law, see the 1903 Boletín jurídico-administrativo: Apéndice al Diccionario de la administración española
peninsular y ultramarina.
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kinds of work and the 1886 decree meant to minimize the cost of keeping the prisoner, see Trinidad Fernández,
Pedro. La defensa de la sociedad:: cárcel y delincuencia en España (siglos XVIII-XX). Alianza Editorial, 1991.

158

containment at the levels of the individual,8 as well as class and race in debates about contagion,
quarantine, and “cordones sanitarios” (Fuentes, Visions 164; Chakrabati 91-92). As Fuentes
notes, Galdós had taken a firm stance against the isolationist treatment of lepers over a decade
before the International Leprosy Conference by criticizing “the use of hygiene as a political
weapon” (165). In his letters to La Prensa, Galdós repeatedly condemns the inhumane and
inflexible public health measures of isolation and cordones sanitarios during the 1885 cholera
outbreak, criticizing the assumption that disease and deviancy were inseparable, and arguing that
these measures were ineffective and incited unwarranted fear (Fuentes 163-165). In 1892,
however, Galdós expresses a different view regarding the cases of cholera in Toledo, saying that
“la epidemia es benina [...] solo ataca a los alcohólicos, a los disolutos, a los que hacen vida
relajada y a los que viven en moradas estrechas y en barrios insalubres” (the epidemic is benign
[...] it only attacks the alcoholics, the dissolute, those who lead relaxed lives and live in cramped
dwelling and in unhealthy neighborhoods; qtd in Fuentes 169). Almost parenthetically, he adds,
“Es un consuelo relativo, pero consuelo al fin” (It is a relative comfort, but a comfort
nonetheless; qtd in Fuentes 169). Five years later, it would be difficult to imagine Almudena’s
illness as a “relative comfort” under the rationalization that it has “only” affected an abject
subject.
In Misericordia, Galdós complicates the link between physical and moral hygiene in the
figures of Benina and Almudena, returning to his earlier criticism of unwarranted fear of disease
and the inhumanity of public health measures through Juliana. Her exclusion of Benina from
Paca’s household marks the restoration of the family’s bourgeois order by defining kinship
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through bloodline and marriage. While the contagion cements and justifies this separation,
Juliana had effected a shift in Benina and Paca’s relationship several chapters earlier when she
encouraged Paca to take on a younger and more productive servant, adding that Benina “no le
sirve a usted para nada” (isn’t useful to you at all; 288). Attempting to defend Benina as her
friend rather than her servant, Paca makes an appeal about Benina’s moral worth (rather than her
usefulness) in exclaiming, “¡Ay!... Pero es muy buena la Nina!” (Oh! But Nina is so good!; 288).
Within Juliana’s framework of utilitarian ethics, however, Benina’s goodness and relative
uselessness do not make her family, but instead deem her one of the deserving poor. Juliana
responds enthusiastically, “debemos socorrerla… darle de comer” (we should help her… give
her food; 288), thereby articulating and establishing a social divide that turns Paca’s capacity to
help Benina into a classist affirmation of difference, rather than a caretaking act of intimacy. It is
perhaps this practical perspective on decorum that allows Paca to shift so quickly from telling
Benina “no te abandonaré nunca” (I will never abandon you; 298) to recommending that she and
Almudena join Romualdo’s institution. Paca’s willingness to forsake the intimacy between
herself and Benina is demonstrated through Paca’s insistence that there is not enough room for
them to stay with her and that Almudena’s filth will affect her stomach and nerves (298), even
before Juliana has diagnosed him as a leper. Benina’s position, altered from family-member to
former servant, causes her great grief as “la pena inmensa que oprimía el corazón de la pobre
anciana reventó en un llorar ardiente, angustioso, y golpeándose la frente con el puño cerrado
exclamó ‘ingrata, ingrata, ingrata!’” (the immense pain that oppressed the heart of the poor old
woman burst into an ardent, anguished cry, and, beating her forehead with a closed fist, she
exclaimed ‘ingrate, ingrate, ingrate!’; 300).
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Having suffered Paca’s rejection, Benina returns to Almudena, with whom she continues
to cultivate a caring friendship for the remainder of the novel. With regards to this conclusion,
Sara Schyfter claims that “Misericordia is the only Spanish novel of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries on the Christian-Jewish theme that has a happy ending, one in which the
lovers’ religions do not interfere with their personal fulfillment” (100). To imagine Almudena
and Benina as lovers, however, ignores several instances in which their relationship is clearly
removed from implications of romance or eroticism. Although Almudena expresses jealousy
over Benina and professes his love for her, Benina rejects his proposals and reminds him that she
is several decades his senior. In her final interaction with Paca, Benina responds to accusations
that her relationship with Almudena lacks decorum by saying “Él me quiere a mi… y yo le miro
como un hijo” (He loves me… and I regard him as a son; 298). In turn, when Benina tells him on
their way to the hospital not to worry, he responds “estar tigo contentado [...] y si no quierer tú
casar migo, ser tú madra mía, y yo niño tuyo bunito” (I am happy with you [...] and if you do not
want to marry me, be my mother, and I will be your pretty son; 310). Because of their age
difference and perhaps because of racial difference (particularly considering Schyfter’s
observation of the dearth of Christian-Jewish relationships in Spanish novels of the time), Benina
and Almudena are not lovers.
However, their friendship does not minimize the intensity of their union nor its impact on
the themes of caregiving and interdependence. In Halma (1895), often read alongside
Misericordia as one of Galdós’s spiritual novels, the eponymous wealthy widow attempts to
establish an asylum in the country, but finds that state interests continue to manipulate her
charitable efforts. In the end, she succeeds in establishing her own mode of charity, but only by
marrying her cousin, one of the men under her care at the asylum. Although the novel concludes
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with “an unconventional family of adult children” (Ewald 283), Ewald notes that, by marrying,
“Halma exchanges subservience to the State in matters related to her asilo for the freedom to rule
her charitable refuge as she wishes from within the bonds of matrimony” (282). The vision of
caregiving between Benina and Almudena references a maternal and marital relationship, but
ultimately finds happiness outside the heteronormative framework. In this sense, Misericordia
expands upon the notion of a new model of care that Halma initiates by rejecting the necessity of
marriage bonds to justify caregiving. Instead, the consolidation of the bourgeois family that takes
place at the end of Misericordia, resulting in Benina and Almudena’s expulsion, reveals the
damaging effects of narrow definitions of kinship. Conversely, Benina’s continued relationship
with Almudena provides them both with a sense of mutual appreciation and offers her a
worldview that enables her to disengage from the ingratitude of Spanish utilitarianism.
The re-establishment of the bourgeois family at the end of the novel not only leads to
Benina’s heartbreak over Doña Paca’s family, but also to Almudena’s declaration that Juliana’s
ingratitude is a microcosm of the ingratitude (that is, the devaluation of care) of the nation as a
whole. Benina had previously rejected Almudena’s invitations to go to Morocco or Jerusalem
because she perceived them as less civilized places than Spain, but after being disowned by Paca
and Juliana, she agrees to go. Collapsing the moral distinctions Benina had assumed existed
between Spain and the Near East, she declares: “[...] se llega de una parte del mundo a otra, y
[...] sacamos la certeza de que todo es lo mismo, y que las partes del mundo son, un suponer,
como el mundo en junto; quiere decirse, que en donde quiera que vivan los hombres, o
verbigracia, mujeres, habrá ingratitud, egoísmo, y unos que manden a los otros y les cojan la
voluntad” (one goes from one part of the world to another and [...] comes to the certainty that
everything is the same, and that all parts of the world are like the world in its entirety; that is to
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say, that wherever men or women, there will be ingratitude, egoism, some who kill others and
who take their freedom; 310). Benina’s criticism of the ingratitude, egoism, and suppression of
agency takes aim at the devaluation of her caregiving, the utilitarian ethic that prioritizes wealth
over extended kinships, and the loss of agency in custodial care — all of which Galdós posits as
national problems. The novel therefore connects the restoration of the nuclear family with her
disillusion in the superiority of Spanish civilization over that of Northern Africa and the Near
East and, concomitantly, connects her deviation from normative time through caregiving to a
questioning of nationalist discourses on progress.
The final scene of Misericordia, in which Juliana asks Benina to assure her of her
children’s health, has been read as the moral triumph and social failure of indiscriminate charity
(Glannon 254), and as the novel’s articulation of the need to renounce capitalism (Wright 93-94).
However, reading Juliana’s expulsion of Benina in the context of contemporary hygiene
discourses allows us to interpret this crucial scene as a conflict between the preservation of
futurity and the urgency of caregiving in the present. In No Future, Lee Edelman critiques the
rhetorical use of the image of the child, arguing that the ideal future citizen is upheld “always at
the cost of limiting the rights of ‘real’ citizens” (11). Although his claim builds to an argument
against the devaluation of queer lives enacted through the exaltation of reproduction and
heteronormativity, Alison Kafer extends this view of reproductive futurity to consider that the
figure of the Child is, of course, always a white, able-bodied child (29). The mistreatment of
living people for the sake of protecting future citizens also resonates with the ableism of
eugenics, forced sterilizations, and public hygiene. The containment of epidemics and the
practice of hygiene effectively prevented painful diseases, but the utilitarian ethics at the core of
hygienic discourses valued public health and the uninterrupted continuation of the production of
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healthy citizens at the expense of the living conditions of subjects suspected of contagion, as
illustrated in the living conditions of Benina and Almudena. Juliana’s monomaniacal and
unwarranted fear for her children’s health reveals the contradiction of isolationist, ableist
practices, as her obsession with future health (hygiene) and the future of the nation (her children)
negatively impact her present health and capacity to care for her children. In asking Benina for a
cure, Juliana reverses the relationship between quarantine and contagion as sites of caretaking
and health, thereby privileging Benina’s caring labor to living persons over the practical fear of
contamination of future citizens.
Although Benina’s caregiving is not productive in a capitalist sense, it is a creative act
that has the capacity to challenge the racial and economic hierarchies that construct some lives as
more valuable than others. Like the marginal subjects Akiko Tsuchiya has examined, Benina has
“a productive role, allowing us to imagine identities that have the potential to challenge and
redefine established norms” (27). By revealing theories of degeneration and the economic laws
of utilitarianism to be social constructs, Misericordia creates the space for a new set of values to
construct a new social reality —namely Benina’s creation of a discourse that values the lives of
Almudena and other subjects who cannot or choose not to adhere to normative time. Through
Benina, Galdós not only questions the values of nation-building that give rise to the inhumane
treatment of marginal subjects, but ultimately invites us to imagine an ideal beyond a vision of
progress as defined by productivity and hierarchical order. It invites us to desire a society in
which all people are cared for and in which care is rewarded.
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Chapter 5 Early Eugenics and Crip Time in Sofía Casanova’s El doctor Wolski (1894)
Whereas previous chapters have analyzed representations of degeneration and the
eugenic impulses they evoked in late realist works, this chapter turns to Sofía Casanova’s El
doctor Wolski (1894), a modernist novel that constitutes one of the first representations of an
explicit eugenic proposal in Spanish literature. The novel centers on Enrique Wolski, a young
Polish doctor who dreams of regenerating his lost nation by using his medical knowledge to raise
children who will someday re-establish Poland, a nation that had been partitioned between
Germany and Russia since the late 18th century. Enrique’s expectations for the future are
temporarily ruined when his fiancée, Mara, is diagnosed with tuberculosis. Mara, knowing that
he would be unable to marry a chronically ill woman, chooses to leave him. Enrique soon
recovers from his heartbreak and marries Gelcha, a healthy Polish woman. Over the course of the
novel, Enrique becomes particularly concerned with concepts that would become crucial to
eugenic debates in the early twentieth century: specifically, the idea that unhealthy propagation
should be made illegal and the need to create and scrutinize medical genealogies for family
planning. Although scholars have noted that El doctor Wolski centers on the new science of
eugenics, surprisingly, no scholar has acknowledged that it is among the first representations of
eugenics in Spanish literature or examined the ways in which it anticipates the eugenics debates
of the early twentieth century.
Disability studies scholar Alison Kafer’s concepts of curative time and crip time are
helpful in understanding how Casanova explores eugenic issues. Curative time—the view of
disability as a problem that requires intervention at any cost—is the cornerstone of eugenic
proposals. In El doctor Wolski, Casanova examines the documentation of familial medical
histories as a methodology of eugenics that narrows the definition of health. As a result of
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narrowing conceptualizations of health and of the place of unhealthy subjects in society, Mara,
Gelcha, and Enrique’s nihilist friend, Iwan, all fall (or threaten to fall) into crip time, a timeline
that does not align with the expected functions of a normative body and, in this case, does not
appear to align with a national eugenic future. Through these characters, Casanova reveals an
early awareness of the medical attempts to legally codify scientific perspectives on healthy
reproduction and illustrates the ways in which eugenic initiatives of family planning threatened
to overstep the rights of individuals, especially those of women.
Casanova is far from being the only Spanish modernist whose literature explored the
implications of applied eugenics. While the definition of modernist literature has been broadly
debated,1 its general timeframe, from the late-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, coincides
with the rise of eugenic theories and its applications. In the Spanish context, key modernist
figures explored eugenic ideas, for example, in Miguel Unamuno’s Amor y pedagogía (1902),
Ramón Pérez de Ayala’s Prometeo (1916), and Ricardo Baroja’s El pedigree (1926). In fact,
Alison Sinclair proposes that the Spanish literary context in particular may have served as a
space for “exploratory” texts in which eugenic ideas could be “entertained and thought about,
without a requirement of acceptance or belief” (240, 245), thereby making eugenic ideas more
familiar and more open to contestation than didactic eugenic literature would have (246).
Indeed, what makes El doctor Wolski remarkable is not only that it popularized the
scientific discourse of the moment, as Carmen Pujante Segura has indicated, but also that its
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publication in 1894, serialization in 1896, and appearance as a short story in 1920 anticipated
and popularized criticisms of eugenics, while functioning as an exploratory text. El doctor
Wolski was such a commercial success that it was reprinted three times in the year of if its initial
publication, and was serialized soon after in Revista Contemporanea, which was one of the most
prestigious and intellectually influential journals of its time.2 The 1920 adaptation was published
in the extremely popular Novela Corta collection, which had the explicit objective of
disseminating ideas of cultural importance to a broader readership by offering abridged literature
at the low price of five cents.3 While it is impossible to know the degree to which this
commercial success may have impacted later eugenics discussions and criticisms, El doctor
Wolski is undeniably a text that had its finger on the pulse of precisely the medical issues and
social concerns that would shape eugenic discourse in the first third of the twentieth century. In
the course of my analysis, I reference early twentieth-century conferences, monographs, and
newspaper articles dealing with eugenics, as well as medical texts from the late nineteenthcentury that paved the way for eugenic discourse to take root in Spain and were
contemporaneous with the period in which Casanova wrote and published El doctor Wolski.
While Casanova is categorized as a modernist, there is less of a distance that one might
expect between the exploration of eugenics in El doctor Wolski and the consideration of theories
of degeneration and proto-eugenic impulses in the realist literature by Emilia Pardo Bazán and
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Benito Pérez Galdós, published between 1886 and 1904, examined in previous chapters. This is
in part because because El doctor Wolski, Casanova’s first novel, was initially published in 1894
and therefore responds to the cultural context investigated by realist authors during that decade.
At the turn of the century realist authors continued to draw on scientific discourses in their
representations of contemporary society, but also delved into characters’ psychological and
spiritual developments as ways of imagining social changes that would seem improbable within
the frameworks of their texts. While realist novels prior to the 1890s evoked ambiguity around
psychological and moral questions, this trend comes to the fore in Pardo Bazań’s La Prueba
(1890), Una Cristiana (1890), and La piedra angular (1891) and with Galdós’s Nazarín (1895),
Halma (1895), and Misericordia (1897). Casanova’s El doctor Wolski, likewise, draws from
scientific discourses of the time and, in its conclusion, centers on Mara’s emotional and spiritual
experience as a way of conceiving a re-evaluation of social values. Through these literary
strategies, Casanova follows a trend that Roberta Johnson has identified in other women
modernists writing at the turn of the century, who merged realist literary elements with those of
sentimental literature and frequently centered on the reimagining of domestic structures and
gender identity (vii). Indeed, Casanova’s interest in early eugenic debates deals precisely with
the familial and gender dynamics that, as Johnson notes, modernist women sought to reconceive
(11-12).
To delineate the terms of the full-fledged eugenics debate in Spain, we turn to the 1928
Primer Curso Eugénico Español and the 1933 Primeras Jornadas Eugénicas, which historians
generally consider the two formative events of the Spanish eugenics movement, and to the
journalistic explanations of eugenics in the two decades that preceded them. As Marie-Aline
Barrachina has demonstrated, the program for the Primer Curso Eugénico Español organized to
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take place in 1928, indicates that the central issues in Spanish eugenics were conscious maternity
and family planning, including references to sexual education, birth control, abortion, and
marriage certificates (1009). In 1933, the Primeras Jornadas Eugénicas continued the discussion
on conscious maternity through conceptualizations of sexual difference and identity (1012,
1015), as well as on the ethical and juridical limits of state intervention in family planning (10241026). These conferences mark a movement toward the application of eugenic theories—in fact,
Hildegart Rodríguez, the result of the first recorded eugenic pregnancy in Spain, presented at the
1933 conference at the age of seventeen. However, the public interest for such a movement had
been sown in the preceding years.
While the relative scarcity of eugenic texts in the early 1900s has made it difficult to
identify specific characteristics of Spanish eugenics before the 1920s,4 some of the trends that
would come to the fore in the eugenics conferences of the 20s and 30s were already present in
the first decades of the twentieth century. Of the twenty Spanish newspaper articles I consulted
that explicitly address the question of eugenics between the years of 1900-1915,5 half of them
mentioned the possibilities or consequences of using scientific understandings of the laws of
heredity to determine matrimonial selection or restriction, with one writer going so far as to
define eugenics as a “política matrimonial” (Andrenio 1). The possibility of restricting marriage
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led to the questions of whether scientific knowledge of the laws of heredity was accurate and
whether eugenics could grow into a tyrannical project. Though early proponents of eugenics in
Spain emphasized that selective reproduction would minimize human suffering, articles in the
well-circulated newspapers Nuestro Tiempo and Nuevo Mundo expressed the fear that it would
grow to be repressive (Altamira 194) and tyrannical (Andrenio 1). In brief, fin-de-siècle
discussions on eugenics were characterized by their debates over the laws of heredity in marriage
selection and eugenics as a form of anticipatory puericulture, as well as the anxiety of whether
individual rights would be threatened by eugenic projects, precisely the issues that Casanova
explores in El doctor Wolski.
Like El doctor Wolski, later texts of eugenic literature by Unamuno, Pérez de Ayala, and
Baroja focus on attempts to control reproduction, all of which fail — either because love
becomes an impossible factor to control or because the laws of heredity are not yet properly
understood. However, unlike these texts, Casanova’s examination of eugenics does not address
the attempts and failures of eugenics comedically. Instead, Casanova deploys conventions of
realist literature to demonstrate her awareness of the political (in this case, scientific) arguments
of the time and conventions of sentimental literature to delve into their respective consequences
for social life. In Sinclair’s analysis of works by the men writers of eugenic literature, she
proposes that Spanish writers’ “mockery of eugenics” constitutes a kind of “playful literature”
that contrasts with literature that openly and directly promotes or condemns eugenics precepts.6
The largely tragic nature of El doctor Wolski makes it difficult to associate it with the idea of
playfulness. However, by not mocking Enrique’s eugenic hopes Casanova creates a space to play
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out the ways in which health is constructed in relation to time and what this implies for nationbuilding projects and for unhealthy or disabled subjects.
By using Enrique as the primary focalizer, the omniscient third-person narrator charts the
development of Enrique’s theories in the first half of the novel and their results in the second
half, Casanova demonstrates the optimistic and even humanitarian motivations that might make
eugenics appealing. However, his eugenic ideology and practices are challenged through the
narrator’s inclusion of other male characters’ comments on the philosophical limitations and the
impracticality of his project, as well as depictions of the suffering that eugenics cause his first
fiancé, Mara, and his eventual wife, Gelcha. Hooper has noted that Casanova strategically avoids
criticisms of “any ‘unfeminine’ display of authority” (26, 28) by engaging in political debates
through her male characters, who discuss issues related to medical intervention and nationbuilding. While the terms of the political debates Casanova explores are made especially explicit
in Enrique’s conversations with Iwan, ultimately Mara and Gelcha’s experiences constitute the
most compelling arguments against eugenics. By presenting a eugenic ideology through
Enrique’s focalization and subverting it through several other characters’ responses, Casanova
does not dismiss eugenics out-of-hand, but rather takes its appeal and potential consequences as
a serious topic of exploration—and one that requires insight into women’s experiences (Mara
and Gelcha’s) for full consideration.
At the beginning of the novel, the utopic drive of Enrique’s eugenic project reflects the
desire to minimize suffering that made early arguments for eugenics through family planning
compelling and, concomitantly, reveals soft eugenics’ dependence on the documentation of
medical histories. Enrique envisions a future in which “el hombre… prolongará su vida, evitará
el dolor” (man will prolong his life and avoid pain; Casanova 92) and intends to contribute to
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such a future by having family with Mara—a union of both love and convenience, which would
provide him the opportunity to care for his children even before they are born (93). This hope for
the possibilities of family planning would be reiterated in Spanish journalists’ description of
eugenics in the 1910s as a science positioned to “disminuir la infelicidad desoladora de los
mortales” (diminish the desolate unhappiness of mortals; Urbina 3) and liberate humankind from
“los mil alifafes que nos ha legado la degeneración” (the thousand ailments that degeneration has
bequeathed us; Araujo 205). The sheer optimism in such statements nevertheless return us to the
question of what lives are worth living: with the possibility of controlling longevity and quality
of life, a long life becomes more valuable than a short life; a painful life is less worthwhile than
one free of pain.
Moreover, if scientific knowledge promises to become a way of securing health and
ability, then the reproduction of unhealthy and disabled persons is interpreted as being due to
ignorance, and unhealthy reproduction becomes blameworthy. The issue of culpability is central
to the historically specific version of curative time that Enrique seeks to enact in El doctor
Wolski. In Kafer’s analysis of curative time and eugenic practices, she notes that sterilization,
segregation, and institutionalization have all been “justified” by concerns about the health of
idealized future children (31). In Enrique’s curative desires, we see how eugenic practices are not
only justified, but compelled. Take, for instance, the young doctor’s argument that “hay que
señalar las deficiencias de la crianza de los niños y protestar contra los errores de la pseudo
pedagogía para que el hombre pueda gozar plenamente el placer de vivir” (One must signal the
deficiencies in the upbringing of children and protest against the errors of pseudo-pedagogy so
that man may fully enjoy the pleasure of living; 94, my emphasis). Given that Enrique’s
approach to paternity foregrounds that his partner “[le] conviene” (is convenient to [him]; 93)
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and that he will care for his children “antes de que nazcan” (before they are born; 93), his call to
protest the deficiencies of childhood upbringing implicitly extends to pre-natal and even
preconception health, which become more explicit as the novel progresses.7 In this light,
Enrique’s declaration that corrective interventions in parenthood are required highlights a sense
of medical and social responsibility that drove the question of medical and state intervention in
reproductive unions.
Enrique’s belief in the necessity of medical intervention in family planning becomes
more militant during the two years he spends working in children’s hospitals, eventually leading
him to propose that it should be criminal to have children under unhealthy conditions—in other
words, that medical knowledge regarding the laws of heredity should form the basis for legal
intervention in reproduction. In a letter to Mara, he describes children’s hospitals of Paris, St.
Petersburg, London, and Berlin as cemeteries for the living, expressing his horror at the hundreds
of children’s bodies overgrown with tumors and devoured by tubercules. This experience leads
to his conviction that “es el mayor de los crímenes dar la vida en condiciones perjudiciales al
nuevo ser” (it is the worst of crimes to bring a new life into prejudicial conditions; 105) and that
the reproduction of ill persons should be considered “ilegal y atentatorio a los derechos del
hombre” (illegal and harmful to the rights of man; Casanova 105). While Enrique’s first use of
“mayor de los crimenes” appears to be for rhetorical effect, the second is a proposal he intends to
espouse at a Berlin conference. What Casanova astutely reveals through Enrique’s letter is that
the deepening ties between medical and legal professions at the end of the nineteenth century
would almost inevitably have effected a slippage between the use of terms such as “criminal”

7

As an unnamed contributor explained in España Médica in 1912 “la eugenica no es la puericultura intrauterina,
sino, según los fundadores de esta ciencia, es más bien la puericutura ante-uterina” (eugenics is not intrauterine
puericulture, but rather, according to the founders of this science, ante-uterine puericulture; 14).
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with regards to the laws of nature and the proposal of legal action.8 Indeed, it is unsurprising that
the first person to propose a premarital certificate of health in Spain was a pediatrician.9
The intensification of Enrique’s eugenic views in relation to tuberculosis (first in the
children’s hospital and, later, with Mara) also reflects the way in which anti-tuberculosis
conferences laid the groundwork for eugenic ideas in Spain. As Raquel Álvarez Peláez has
shown, the eugenic ideas of conscious maternity functioned in some ways as a continuation of
“la higiene del matrimonio” (marriage hygiene; 183). The concept of marital “hygiene” had
begun in the mid-nineteenth century to address Spain’s infant mortality rate and emphasized the
deleterious impact of alcoholism, syphilis, and tuberculosis on the social body. In fact, while the
premarital health certificate as a eugenic policy would not be formally proposed to the senate
until 1915, the idea of restricting marriage was suggested as early as the 1880s in antituberculosis conferences.10 Medical professionals continued to insist on state interventions to
prevent tuberculosis well into the twentieth century, as we can see in the first Spanish national
congress against tuberculosis in 1908, during which the early eugenicist and specialist in
tuberculosis Bernabé Malo de Poveda referred to the absence of legislation against tisic

8

See Los ilegales de la naturaleza for an in-depth explanation of how “herencia, determinismo, somaticismo, leyes
naturales…, se erigen en fronteras biológicas que delimitan lo natural y lo antinatural” (heredity, determinism,
somaticism, natural laws… are erected into biological frontiers that delimit the natural and the unnatural; ix), as well
as how these came to be reflected in Spanish legislation in the fin de siècle.
9

In 1915, the pediatrician Baldomero Álvarez González officially proposed legislation to prohibit marriages of
people with illnesses or disabilities (Campos, Martínez, Huertas 182).
10

The 1888 Congreso Médico in Barcelona featured a presentation entitled “Condiciones de aptitud física para
contraer matrimonio” (Conditions of Physical Aptitude for Marriage; 1000) and the speech on the contagion and
prevention of tuberculosis centered largely on the need for legal and medical intervention to prevent subjects with
tuberculosis from marrying (91-93).
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marriages as a “crimen de lesa humanidad” (crime against humanity; cited in Ricardo Campos, et
al. 181).11
In El doctor Wolski, Mara’s diagnosis challenges Enrique’s plans and his eugenic
worldview. Enrique’s conversation with Iwan explains the contemporary medical understanding
that if tuberculosis had been acquired through contagion it could be cured, but if it was
hereditary it was incurable and would be passed on to the next generation.12 The nature of the
disease implied a shortened life span for Mara and the possibility for contagion to her children
would make Enrique’s hope of raising them to regenerate Poland impossible. Moreover, because
Mara’s tuberculosis is potentially incurable, her prognosis directly contradicts Enrique’s central
tenet: that anything is possible through willpower and science. Enrique is forced to confront the
limits of scientific advancement, as well as his willingness to enact his strict eugenic code by
choosing not to marry the woman he loves. In this way, the illness Mara develops precisely
during the years in which Enrique develops his particular version of curative time compels a
consideration of what it would mean for lived human relationships (rather than what it would
mean for the race or species) if a premarital health certificate were codified into marriage law.
When Enrique makes the decision to forsake his fiancée, his adherence to conscious
maternity emphasizes that the internal logic of curative time (that all disability requires a cure)

11

A 1912 article by journalist Fidel Urbina in El liberal, one of the most widely-read newspapers at the time, would
call for eugenics using a similar rhetorical framing, asking, “¿Sabemos reproducimos? ¿Sabemos criar a nuestros
hijos? No solamente no sabemos, sino que lo hacemos pésimamente, indignamente, criminalmente” (Do we know
how to reproduce? Do we know how to rear our children? Not only do we not know how to do so, but we do so
horribly, indignantly, criminally; 3).
12

In 1882, Robert Koch’s discovered the bacterium that caused infections of tuberculosis, which had previously
thought to have been hereditary, rather than contagious. Specialists in tuberculosis, however, demonstrated the
hereditary predisposition toward tuberculosis. Notably, in the 1888 Congreso de Ciencias Médicas de Barcelona,
Francisco Suñer y Capdevila referred to a fetus with tuberculosis he had found in his research in order to argue that
tuberculosis could be hereditary and that subjects with tuberculosis should not be allowed to marry (81-83).
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responds to incurable conditions by disregarding present suffering and hyperfocusing on
intergenerational improvement. On discovering that Mara has tuberculosis, Enrique mourns the
loss of the children he had expected and laments that if he is unable to cure her, “necesitaré todo
mi valor y toda la fuerza de mi voluntad para sacrificarme y perderla” (I will need all the strength
of my will to sacrifice myself and lose her; 120). His resolve to leave her if her illness proves to
be hereditary and incurable indicates that he is unwilling to care for Mara during the remainder
of her life. Enrique’s disgust toward the idea of potentially contributing to “la propagación de
una enfermedad espantosa” (the propagation of a horrifying illness; 117) suggests that he does
not imagine the reproduction of people with illnesses as reproduction of humanity, but as the
reproduction of an illness. This language echoes his description of the patients in the children’s
hospital as “carne de sepultura” (flesh for the grave; 105), in which he similarly refers to his
patients as embodiments of illness and interprets their incurability as a kind of living death, a life
without a future or present. His disinterest in caring for Mara exposes the limits of Enrique’s
hopes for a future in which science can facilitate longer lives without suffering. Within the
framework of curative time, the impossibility of curing Mara’s tuberculosis during her lifetime
forces a re-imagining of the temporal parameters of cure: Enrique can only contribute to curing
tuberculosis by practicing negative eugenics, that is by minimizing the number of unhealthy
births.
Iwan’s nihilistic philosophy and Mara’s experience of being diagnosed with tuberculosis
offer a narrative criticism of Enrique’s eugenics. In contrast to Enrique’s belief that medical
professionals and healthy citizens have the responsibility to create stronger and healthier
generations for the good of humanity, Iwan sustains that suffering is inescapable and that
national regeneration is impossible. Earlier in the novel, Iwan has posited that the propagation of
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humanity is the greatest crime (Casanova 94), offering an ironic turn on the eugenic rhetoric that
the propagation of humanity under poor conditions was a crime against humanity. In some ways,
Iwan’s philosophy can be thought of as being anti-future. His rejection of Enrique’s eugenic
project presents some parallels to queer theorist Lee Edelman. Edelman’s rejection of
reproductive futurity (that is, of the investment in imagined hetero-normative and able-bodied
reproduction at the expense of the present) lead him to reject the future altogether, proclaiming
“fuck the future” (Kafer 28; Edelman 29). However, while Kafer, too, rejects reproductive
futurity, especially in its use within eugenic discourses, she argues that from a crip theory
perspective the rejection of the future in untenable. For Kafer, crip time is simultaneously a life
experience that one may fall into or be cast into and, more agentially, an experience that can be
used to re-evaluate “notions of both time and futurity” (27), the goal of which can be to imagine
a future that includes people with disabilities.
In his conversation with Enrique, Iwan imagines a future for Enrique and Mara’s
relationship that provides a significant counterpoint to Enrique’s curative time. Iwan’s
acceptance of suffering as a part of life serves as an avenue by which to normalize Mara’s
prognosis as he suggests that “todo se reduce a tener una mujercita más fastidiosa que la
generalidad, algo más casera” (everything comes down to having a little wife who is more
fastidious than most, a bit more of a homebody; 116). Moreover, although Iwan agrees with
Enrique that it is better to not have children who will inherit tuberculosis, his anti-future belief
that all procreation propagates suffering prevents him from imagining healthy and unhealthy
offspring as antithetical in their experiences. He urges his friend to marry Mara, “goza, mientras
viva; entierrala cuando muera, y si tienes hijos críalos, y si no lo tienes mejor” (take pleasure
while she lives; bury her when she dies; if you have children raise them, and if you don’t, all the
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better; 121). Iwan’s ability to imagine Mara and Enrique’s life—even a happy life—with an
incurable illness and with or without children highlights the cruelty of Enrique’s project, which
has rendered him entirely incapable of entertaining the possibility of a future with Mara.
Mara’s response to her prognosis serves as a further critique of Enrique’s eugenic views
and the difficulties that they would imply for disabled or chronically ill women. During the
course of Enrique’s discussion with Iwan, Mara is unaware that her fiancé and doctor have
diagnosed her with tuberculosis, and she expresses her concern over Enrique’s recent distance
toward her. As Jason Szabo has demonstrated, the paternalistic withholding of information from
the patient was a mainstay of nineteenth-century medical practice that had the effect of
sustaining the belief that a cure was possible, even when it was not (10). While Szabo does not
examine this aspect of the doctor-patient relationship in relation to female patients, feminist
scholars such as Jill Harsin have demonstrated that physicians frequently communicated with
their female patients’ husbands or future husbands, rather than with the patients themselves (73).
Mara, a student of medicine in her own right, deduces her diagnosis when her tutor inadvertently
repeats her doctor’s suggestion that she take a trip to Crimea, a common therapeutic voyage for
patients of tuberculosis. Finding that her illness is the motivation for Enrique’s distant behavior
only causes Mara greater confusion.
Mara’s gendered exclusion from the flow of diagnostic and prognostic information
shared by her doctor, her fiancé, and her tutor, as well as her attempt to deduce from their
behavior whether her illness is serious, positions her in the liminal temporality of “prognosis
time.” Citing anthropologist Sarah Lochlann Jain, Kafer explains prognosis time as the
experience of being subject to diagnoses and prognoses that “interrupt the idea of a timeline and
all the usual ways one orients oneself in time—one’s age, generation, and stage in one's assumed
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timespan” (Jain qtd. in Kafer 36). Because the ways in which one orients oneself in time are
culturally constructed, the fictional representation of how Mara attempts to re-orient herself is
also a representation of both the eugenic and gendered values that shape women’s relation to
time. Reeling from her diagnosis, Mara repeatedly shouts “Qué haré ahora? En qué emplearé
estos miserables días que me quedan? Cuándo moriré?” (What will I do now? In what will I
employ these miserable days that I have left? When will I die?; 135). She vacillates between
imagining a future for herself, including a long (if sickly) life married to Enrique, and seeing
herself as already dead. However, because Enrique has already made the decision to prioritize his
eugenic values over his commitment to Mara, the irony of her attempt to orient herself in relation
to her previous marital plans compels the question of what she will do next, and what place it is
possible for her to find in society.
Mara’s struggle to imagine value in a life that lacks longevity returns to the issue of
conscious motherhood and culpability in unhealthy reproduction as she expresses anger at her
mother. She asks “Y si la tisis nació conmigo, si nací condenada a perecer...por qué mi madre me
dio el ser, o por qué no me ahogó en la cuna?” (And if this tuberculosis was born with me, if I
was born condemned to suffer… why did my mother give me life, or why didn’t she smother me
in the cradle?; 137). Mara’s resentment toward her mother, who died of tuberculosis, and her
sense that it would have been better not to have lived complement Enrique’s fear of unhealthy
propagation as she express both her experience of crip time and her own eugenic views. In her
anger, Mara also blames María, her governess and “segunda madre” (second mother; 138). She
accuses María of having hidden her family’s history of tuberculosis from her and of being too
ignorant to notice her symptoms, reinforcing the hygienic understanding that the prevention of
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illness requires vigilance, and that the presence of illness signals carelessness and ignorance at
best and malevolence at worst.
Surprised by her anger toward her late mother and her governess, Mara immediately
repents. After asking for their forgiveness, she expresses her remorse in the form of a prayer,
exclaiming: “Perdóname, perdóname, Dios mío!... tuya es mi vida” (Forgive me, God! My life is
yours; 138). Hooper has discussed the way in which Mara’s spirituality is not the “backwardlooking, repressive Catholicism of Inquisitorial Spain, …[but] the new, social Catholicism,
which promoted a woman-centered ethos based on philanthropy and caring” (49). In the decades
to follow El doctor Wolski, Spanish Catholicism would develop a fraught relationship with
eugenics—from the cancellation of the first Spanish eugenics conference effected by Catholic
conservatives to the eugenic discourses of hispanidad constructed through the national
Catholicism of the Franco regime.13 In this instance, however, Mara’s spirituality functions as an
appeal to the sanctity of life, thereby challenging the eugenic ideas that would undervalue the
lives of bodies that were not expected to contribute to social improvement.14
The chapter in which Enrique receives Mara’s farewell letter continues to explore her
vacillation between mourning the loss of the life she expected and accepting her prognosis. The
letter itself resonates with both defenses and critiques of eugenics as she sacrifices their
relationship to free Enrique from the torment of his indecision and exiles herself to Poland. On
the one hand, her decision to leave Enrique parallels his decision to leave her. She resolves the

13

See Ricardo Campos’s “Autoritarismo y eugenesia punitiva: higiene racial y nacionalcatolicismo en el
franquismo, 1936-1945” and Robert Cleminson’s “Iberian Eugenics? Cross-overs and Contrasts between Spanish
and Portuguese Eugenics, 1930-1950.”
14

This is notably different from the Catholic protests against eugenics in the 1920s, which did not argue against
conscious maternity through an appeal to the sanctity of life, but out of displeasure with what they deemed
pornographic and materialist propaganda. See “Maternidad, feminidad, sexualidad. Algunos aspectos de las
Primeras jornadas eugénicas españolas” by Marie-Aline Barrachina.
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earlier question of whether her tuberculosis was non-hereditary (and therefore curable and not a
threat to her progeny) by including proof of her investigation into her own medical history.
Through an estranged aunt, she has learned that her parents were first cousins who both died of
tuberculosis, and she laments that “no hay esperanza para mí en la tierra… nací destinada a vivir
poco y mal” (There is no hope for me on earth… I was born to live briefly and poorly; 147). Like
Enrique, she presents the reproductive possibilities of their union as reasons for their separation,
reiterating that “nuestro hogar sería un hogar desierto, aterrador; desierto, si a la cuna preparada
no descendía un ángel; aterrador, si de la cuna veíamos desaparecer el ser adorado, que la
herencia condenaba a morir pronto o a vivir miserablemente” (Our home would be a desert, a
terror; a desert if no angel descended into the prepared cradle; a terror if we saw our adored child
disappear from the cradle, condemned by heredity to die quickly and live miserably; 147). With
these reflections, Mara again devalues her life, limiting her future to a shortened and miserable
lifespan, and chooses to enact the conscious motherhood (conscious lack of motherhood) that
Enrique, too, would have selected.
On the other hand, the clear tragedy of the letter narrativizes the critique that eugenics
would threaten romantic relationships. In one of the earliest Spanish newspaper articles on
eugenics, Rafael Altamira warned that this new science threatened “la poesía de uno de los
sentimientos más poéticos del mundo… del amor” (191), and even before that, medical
professionals at anti-tuberculosis conferences and panels resisted the idea of marriage restriction
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with the same argument.15 While later writers would parody this theme in eugenic literature,16
Casanova frames the tension between love and rational eugenic choices as a Romantic tragedy to
explore the personal devaluations and individual sacrifices that enacting eugenic values would
entail. Tuberculosis had long been perceived as a Romantic disease, not only because many
tubercular patients exhibited conventionally beautiful characteristics (pallor with flushed cheeks
and bright eyes), but also because the tragedy of young lives wasting away, particularly cutting
love short, lent itself to the Romantic glorification of emotional intensity and individualism
(Dubos 44). The dramatic nature of Mara’s farewell letter and the setting in which Enrique reads
it, on the balcony by the garden, calling out for his beloved and collapsing as he sees her figure
running away into the night, draws on Romantic overtones to illustrate the tragedy of sacrificing
love for practicality.
In a reprise of the scene in which Mara learns her prognosis, the chapter in which Enrique
reads the letter is punctuated by a final moment that centers on Mara’s calm acceptance of her
future. Having separated from Enrique and prepared herself to leave for Lituania, a spiritual
peace rooted in a physical sensation comes over her: “Mara quedóse de pie junto a una ventana;
se oprimió el pecho con las manos, sintiendo un agudo dolor, y apoyando su abrasada frente en
la vidriera, sonrió al sentir la suave frescura del cristal en sus sienes” (Mara remained standing
by a window; she pressed her hands to her chest, feeling a sharp pain, and rested her hot forehead
on the glass; she smiled at the cool sensation of the crystal on her temple;150). The window’s
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Even within these medical, professional settings, the idea of sexual attraction as an instinct that could not be
effectively legislated was picked up in such sentimental phrases as “el amor [es]... más que un instinto, un
sentimiento grandioso” (love is … more than an instinct, a grand sentiment; 1888 Congreso Médico 1012) and “no
se le pueden poner puertas al amor” (one cannot make doors that close out love; Third Annual Antituberculosis
Conference 457).
16

See Sinclair’s analysis of Miguel Unamuno’s Amor y pedagogía (1902), Ramón Pérez de Ayala’s Prometeo
(1916), and Ricardo Baroja’s El pedigree (1926).
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liminality functions as a material symbol of the liminality of her prognosis—the uncertainty
regarding her life plans, as well as her social marginalization. Given this symbolic function, the
pleasure Mara can experience from it, however brief, is striking. In a more literal sense, however,
the scene also valorizes a simple sensorial pleasure. The acute pain in her chest and gentle
coolness on her forehead are experienced simultaneously. In fact, the pleasure she takes in the
pressing against the cool glass is due to her fever. It is a small detail, but one that goes against
the expectation that living with chronic illness means living a life defined by pain and devoid of
pleasure. This scene marks the end of the first half of the novel and the last mention of Mara
until the final chapter. As Hooper has noted, it is plausible that readers would interpret her
absence as an implication of her death. In this sense, Mara’s search for “otro mundo donde los
tristes serán consolados” (another world, where sad persons would be consoled; “Fin de siècle”
150) suggests Mara’s ascension to heaven and clears the way for Enrique’s renewed attempt at
eugenics.
In the second half of the novel, Enrique’s new relationship with Gelcha (his wife-to-be) is
shaped by his insistence on knowing their familial medical history in an attempt to ensure the
health of their future offspring—a practice that would become a key eugenic recommendation in
years to follow. Replicating Mara’s investigation into her family’s medical history, Enrique
requests information on Gelcha’s medical genealogy, refusing to marry her until he has reviewed
the medical records for several generations of her family. The need for documentation as proof
of genealogical health constitutes what Ellen Samuels refers to as “biocertification,” the medical
documentation through which disability, health, and personhood are constructed. While Samuels
examines the rise of biocertification in relation to U.S. race relations in the early twentieth
century, it was also a cornerstone of early British, and subsequently, Spanish eugenics. Whereas
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genealogical documentation had previously functioned for aristocrats to lay claim to their
ancestry, in the nineteenth-century family trees began to appear in medical literature, such as
Francis Galton’s 1869 book entitled Hereditary Genius, as well as in medico-legal verdicts
presented to the court by Spanish psychiatrists José María Escuder and Juan Giné y Partagás in
the 1880s and 1890s.17
The purview of family history investigations broadened beyond the figures of the genius
and the criminal in the early twentieth century with eugenicists’ calls for a proliferation of
pedigree documentation. In his 1904 Speech entitled “Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and
Aims,” Francis Galton emphasized the need for the historical investigation and systematic
collection of information on the conditions of eugenic families to determine the conditions for
ideal reproduction, an issue which he would further specify in a 1912. Notably, both speeches
were reported in the Spanish press with reference to the eugenic benefits of developing “árboles
genealógicos de familias” (Lafora 14) and “extensas genealogías y fotografías de familias, en las
que se ve la herencia de accidentes anatómicos, físicos, fisiológicos y patológicos” (“El
congreso” 14).18 The Spanish eugenic interest in “documents… to authenticate a person’s social
identity through biology” (Samuels 122), continued beyond Galton with prominent eugenicists
such as Nicolas Amador and Luis Huerta calling for a “pedigree o historial genético” as a part of
conscious motherhood (Huerta qtd. in Lázaro 82).19
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For information on family trees in Escuder’s work, see “Cerebral Degenerations and Spanish Alienists in the 19th
Century” by Santiago Giménez Roldan. For information on family trees in the work of Giné y Partagás, see Los
ilegales de la naturaleza by Campos, et. al, p. 99. For more information on the history of the medical use of
pedigree’s, see “The Crane’s Foot: The Rise of Pedigree in Human Genetics” by Robert Resta.
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Galton’s 1904 speech was summarized in the May 1905 issue of La Lectura and the October 8, 1905 issue of
Nuestro Tiempo, including references to the proposed “investigación histórica y colección sistemática de las
circunstancias de familias eugénicas” (Altamira 192).
19

For Amador’s call for pedigrees and genealogical documentation see Álvarez Pelaez, p. 185.
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Enrique’s medical investigations into his and Gelcha’s genealogies echoes Mara’s earlier
inquiry into her own family history, but with a significant difference: whereas Mara sought out
information regarding her own family history to determine whether a cure for her existing
condition was possible, Enrique’s investigation illustrates how the intensification of preventative
medicine narrows the parameters of what constitutes a healthy body. By all appearances, Gelcha
is healthy, and yet Enrique insists on “pruebas irrefutables de que ni en su familia, ni en la mía,
ha habido desde cuatro o cinco generaciones un solo caso de enfermedad hereditaria”
(irrefutable evidence that there has not been a single case of hereditary illness for four or five
generations in her family or in mine; 198). In her work on biocertification, Samuels focuses on
the way that this practice bolsters medical authority and produces “documentary sprawl”
(Samuels 175). In El doctor Wolski we can see how, in relation to curative time, the medical
demand for a proliferation of official documents reframes health in terms of predispositions—not
of what illnesses exist, but of what illnesses may exist. Gelcha’s status as a healthy woman is put
into question by the possibility that she may be more likely to develop an illness in the future.
In this way, Enrique’s demand for such a deep familial investigation illustrates the way in
which the act of tracing family genealogies in eugenic studies redefined health in terms of
probability. Galton referred to the tracing of pedigrees as the “actuarial side of heredity,” which
could be applied to the various classes of society to treat issues of health “mathematically” (3).
In the novel, Enrique takes a similar hardline approach to probability as he claims he will refuse
to have children if either of his great-great-grandparents exhibited symptoms of a hereditary
illness. His actuarial approach to health narrows the definition of what it means to lead a healthy
life. At the beginning of the novel, Enrique takes the position that it is the greatest crime to bring
a child into the world under detrimental conditions, by which he means through the union of
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relatives or ill persons. Through his genealogical approach to prenatal hygiene, however, his
argument shifts from implying that persons with a great probability of developing illnesses
should not be born to implying that only persons with no possibility of developing illnesses
should be born. In short, that any degree of suffering through health complications renders life
not worth living.
As Enrique’s eugenic approach to Gelcha’s pregnancy narrows the definition of what
constitutes a healthy body, he reasserts his earlier view that behaviors which may contribute to
unhealthy propagation are (or should be) “criminal.” In a scene in which Enrique forbids Gelcha
from reading Tolstoy’s latest novel,20 he reminds her that reading immoral novels threaten her
nervous system, adding “No recuerdas mi cuento de las palomitas ciegas que arrojaban al mar
todo lo que a su alcance ponía Dios para nutrir y dar vida a sus hijuelos?” (Have you forgotten
my story of the little blind doves that threw into the sea all of the things that God put within their
reach to nourish and give life to their chickadees?; 203). Gelcha responds, dutifully quoting him,
“Érase una bandada de palomitas ciegas [… ] que cometían el crimen espantoso...” (Once upon a
time there was a flock of little blind doves [...] who committed the dreadful crime…; 203).
Although Enrique’s story of the little blind doves remains untold, the moral is evidently that it is
a “crime” to waste resources and opportunities that will nourish future generations. The phrase
“crimen espantoso” (dreadful crime) that Enrique and Gelcha employ in the story is not the
literal criminalization for which Enrique had earlier advocated (Casanova 105). However, his
choice of words nevertheless returns us to his view that any lapse or failure in prenatal hygiene
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The title of the novel is not specified. In 1894, Tolstoy’s latest novel would have been Anna Karenina, which was
not recent at all, as it had first been published in 1877. In El doctor Wolski, however, the implication is that Gelcha
wants to read Tolstoy’s recent novel because it has led to much discussion in her social circle and she desires to
participate in this form of readership. There is some irony in the fact that Enrique’s infantilizing fable usurps the
place of Gelcha’s engagement with the social examination of Tolstoy’s realist work.
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(in this case, Gelcha’s disturbance of her nervous system by reading) is a crime against
humanity.
While the “crime” in Enrique’s allegory (that is, the misuse of resources) is an offense
against eugenic hopes rather than a literal unlawful act, there is an aspect of punishment
embedded in the tale. On the one hand, the doves’ blindness in the story is presumably the cause
of their carelessness. On the other, as we have seen in Enrique and Mara’s response to her
tuberculosis, the presence of a preventable disease or disability serves as proof of the mother’s
failure.21 This logic is replicated in the arguments of the prominent pediatrician Andres Martínez
Vargas, who would go on to become a eugenicist, and proposed in a 1906 lecture that infant
mortality was preventable because it was due to maternal ignorance, which made mothers
“verdugos de sus propios hijos” (executioners of their own children; 23-24). As a consequence of
this construction of maternal culpability, the trope of blindness in the dove story functions
retroactively for Gelcha: any imperfections in her children would indicate, in Enrique’s view,
that she was neglectful or, in other words, “blind” like the doves who cast away the resources
that would maximize the health of their offspring. In other words, by symbolizing the doves’
lack of foresight as blindness, Enrique frames any perceived lack of foresight on Gelcha’s part—
such as the act of reading or any other activity deviating from his hygienic program—as a
metaphorical disability, as a disabling form of neglect that threatens the health of their children.
Through his story, Enrique proposes that the (broadly-defined) neglect of one’s unborn children
is both a choice that should be systemically prohibited and a sign that casts the parent’s health
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Although men’s responsibility to make an intelligent, eugenic selection through their marriage is dramatized in
several of the previously mentioned eugenic texts, there is no doubt that soft eugenics concentrated specifically on
motherhood, specifically on the shortcomings of mothers. For more information on this, see Mary Nash’s
“Maternidad, maternología y reforma eugénica en España 1900-1939.”
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into question.
The goal of the dove story is that Gelcha internalize his desire for curative time, and
prioritize it over her other desires. Indeed, eugenicists and other medical professionals in the fin
de siècle repeatedly expressed the social need for the masses to make eugenic decisions of their
own accord. Supporters of enacting legal eugenic measures, including prominent eugenicists
Enrique Madrazo and Malo de Poveda, nevertheless expressed the hope that eugenic values
would be socially embraced and enacted willingly.22 Likewise, those who argued against legal
marital restrictions, including Gregorio Marañón, Manuel Mer i Guell, and Eudald Xalabarder,
held that people should be dissuaded from these marriages through widespread education
(Marañon 69-70; Campos, Marinez, Huertas 184). Enrique’s dove story serves as a pedagogical
tool, albeit one to inculcate eugenic values in Gelcha, rather than to teach her to think critically.
For instance, when she complains (in a tone described as endearing and childish) that she would
like to read the newspaper, he reminds her of the little blind doves to which she responds, “Ah!
No: Yo no quiero ser como las palomitas ciegas…” (Oh! No, I do not want to be like the little
blind doves; 205). Although Enrique very clearly determines what aspects of Gelcha’s behavior
are acceptable, his desire for her to discipline herself connects with these medical discussions.
Departing from Enrique’s attempts to educate Gelcha, El doctor Wolski demonstrates how these
restrictions are likewise oppressive.
Through his efforts to instill eugenic values in Gelcha, Enrique’s medical objective—to
prevent suffering—approaches the climax of its dramatic irony. Although Gelcha does not
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Malo de Poveda, one of the most stalwart proponents of the premarital health certificate, wrote a play entitled
Amor y Conveniencia (1913) with the intention of convincing his audience to seek out and follow medical
professionals’ recommendations on marriage. In “Eugenesia,” Madrazo argued that reproduction should be limited
to healthy individuals (57) and that eugenics should be a part of general education for men and women (64).
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express her suffering under Enrique’s close medical watch, all of her desires are left unrealized
under her husband’s strict limitation of her activities. Aside from prohibiting her from reading
novels and newspapers, he forbids her from going to concerts and spectacles. Gelcha appears
understanding of her husband’s prohibitions: she asks for his forgiveness when her desires have
gone against his prescribed prenatal care, kisses her husband passionately, and gazes at him
adoringly. However, despite Gelcha’s pleasantness, their relationship foregrounds the right of
individuals as a criticism of eugenics — an anxiety evidenced by a 1910 issue of Nuevo Mundo
proclaiming that, carried out to its full extent, eugenics would represent “la más monstruosa de
las tiranías… el sacrificio más absoluto de los derechos del individuo ante la especie” (the most
monstrous of tyrannies… the most absolute sacrifice of individuals before the species; Andrenio
1).
Although Gelcha does not refer to Enrique’s oppressive behavior as tyrannical, as she
herself indicates, it would be impossible for others to know if she were suffering. When Enrique
asks her whether she is upset that he heavily censors the newspaper before she reads it, she
affectionately responds, “No, porque también está prohibido enfadarme” (No, because it is also
forbidden for me to get upset; 205). In his attempt to prevent suffering, Enrique causes suffering
that cannot be expressed. Even though the narrator does not use Gelcha as a focalizer and does
not depict any expression of pain or distress on her part, their relationship illustrates beyond a
doubt that Enrique’s medical project sacrifices the health and social life of the mother for the life
of an idealized future child. Enrique’s behavior aligns with the later writings of Spain’s first
eugenicist, Enrique Madrazo, who claimed that “la matriz ordena y todo lo restante del
organismo se desvive por ella...no es la madre quien manda, es el embrión” (the womb makes the
orders and the rest of the organism goes out of its way for it… it is not the mother who is in
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command, but the embryo; 86) and went on to explain that women’s activities should be
restricted for this reason (98). While arguments that warned against eugenics’ potential to
threaten the rights of individual did not consider the role of women, Casanova’s depiction of
Enrique’s relationship with Gelcha not only illustrates the way in which eugenics could sacrifice
the individual to the species, but that the threat of this tyranny would be primarily suffered by
women.
The novel also goes on to explore the ways in which Enrique’s eugenic medical approach
threatens the rights of individuals in the lower classes. From the beginning of his medical career,
Enrique had hoped to cure and educate the Russian ethnic minorities of the lower classes (106).
By the time he is married to Gelcha six years later, he has established a hospital, but has had
trouble drawing in patients, which he attributes to the Russians’ fear of hospitals and the Tartar’s
Muslim superstitions. As with his eugenic treatment of Gelcha, Enrique’s medical approach to
the lower classes combines medical treatment with education. However, while Enrique envisions
the excursion as a philanthropic one, in which he must teach Muslims and impoverished
Russians to value their own lives and that of their children, Iwan derides it as a civilizing effort
(211) and a hunt (219). Iwan interrogates his friend’s perceived responsibility of medical
intervention, asking “Y con qué derechos quieres violentar a esas pobre criaturas que viven como
pueden? … Con qué derecho quieres imponer la salud en quien no la desea?” (And what gives
you the right to torture those poor creatures who are living in whatever way they can?... What
gives you the right to impose health on those who do not desire it?; 219). The concern that
eugenics could overstep the rights of individuals was often met with the suggestion that an
education would empower individuals to make the eugenic choices without the need for legal
intervention. Absent from these discussions is the perspective, which Casanova presents through
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Iwan, that the ideological inculcation of eugenic values may in itself be an imposition on
individual rights. Enrique and Iwan’s opposing positions on the rights and responsibilities within
medical intervention are inseparable from the former’s curative time and the latter’s anti-future
stance: whereas Enrique conceives of human rights as the rights of future generations, Iwan is
invested in the rights of existing persons to refuse medical treatment and education.
The tension between Enrique, as a member of the middle-class, and Iwan, as a member of
the working class, reveals the way in which eugenic discourses were intertwined with concerns
about productivity and political dissent. When Enrique learns that Iwan’s six-year exile in
Siberia for running a revolutionary underground press has resulted in an unnamed chronic
illness, he entreats Iwan to apply his medical knowledge and be useful to his fellow man (214),
adding “basta de aventuras políticas; vas a curarte” (stop your political adventures; you will be
cured; 214). Enrique’s definition of health through labor and abstention from working class
politics is consistent with contemporary medical perspectives,23 and signals that one of the
desired results of eugenics was to increase economic productivity. As the journalist Fernando
Araujo explained in the prestigious journal La España Moderna, eugenics would create
“individuos sanos y robustos, aptos para todo linaje de trabajos” (healthy and robust individuals,
apt for all forms of labor). The political nature of Enrique’s offer to cure Iwan emphasizes the
aspects of medical intervention that conceive of normalizing values as inherent to the idea of a
cure.
Through Enrique’s medicalization of Mara, Gelcha, and Iwan’s behaviors and conditions,
El doctor Wolski reveals the ways in which curative time, and specifically eugenics,
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Most notably, Spanish doctor and politician Ángel Pulido’s El cáncer comunista: Degeneración del socialismo y
sindicalismo (1921) lambasted the degeneration, illness, and criminality that accompanied working class revolution.
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conceptualized health in increasingly narrowing terms by attempting to anticipate the probability
of future conditions and by imagining any experience of physical suffering as indicative of a life
not worth living. The final three chapters of the novel close off Enrique, Iwan, and Mara’s
stories. While the failure of Enrique’s project demonstrates that illness and suffering will
continue within even the best-laid eugenic plans, the penultimate chapter, focalized through
Iwan, connects the novel’s theme of preventing suffering to another form of preventable
suffering— that caused by a repressive government. Conversely, Mara provides the internal
focus for the final chapter, which provides a surprising happy ending in which she has lived
longer than expected and found value and pleasure in her life with tuberculosis. Through this
triptych conclusion, the novel ultimately illustrates that whether a life is worth living depends on
the conditions of social life, rather than exclusively on health status.
Enrique’s project is marked as a complete failure when birth complications leave Gelcha
sterile, his son dies, and his hospital burns down, signaling the limits of the scientific certainty in
eugenic measures. Hooper convincingly argues that Enrique’s hygienic practices are to blame for
Gelcha’s sudden decline in health and, by extension, their son’s death (A Stranger 41). While I
do not discount this interpretation, the sudden and unexplained death of the child blatantly resists
speculation about its cause. Neither Enrique, who had obsessively attempted to make sense of
Mara’s diagnosis, nor any of the other characters offer any conjecture. The possibility of an
unexplainable and unforeseeable event, untethered from causality, shores up the limits of
Enrique’s eugenic project. The tragedy foregrounds that accidents and natural disasters are
beyond the control not only of individuals and institutions but also of medical science and
mathematical studies of probability. This interpretation ties Enrique’s tragedy into discussions
surrounding medical certainty and eugenics, which ranged from questions about probability
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mentioned earlier in the chapter to the belief that “estamos todavía muy lejos de conocer las
leyes de la herencia” as Xalabarder claimed in 1917 (we are still very far from knowing the laws
of inheritance; cited in Campos et al. 183). At the conclusion of the scene, the news that
Enrique’s hospital has suddenly caught fire —with no explanation or suggestion of a cause—
symbolically reinforces the notion that his son’s death is a tragedy that defies scientific
expectation.
Iwan’s concluding chapter provides the novel’s only glimpse into his social world.
Despite Enrique’s insistence that Iwan has no interest in improving his situation and has not
made himself useful to his fellow man (83; 214), the novel informs us that Iwan is an educator
and produces illegal, political newspapers in the hopes of inciting a revolution. In the novel’s
penultimate chapter, however, his conversation with a fellow revolutionary reveals that he has
lost hope that a subversive newspaper could encourage a popular uprising. Their debate centers
on police brutality, the criminalization of the press, and the unjust incarceration of thousands of
Russians. These issues, previously unmentioned in the novel, give a brief insight into Iwan’s
political motivations, and the differences between his project and Enrique’s. Whereas Enrique,
comfortably middle-class, locates the cause of suffering in individual patient’s bodies (following
the medical model of disability), Iwan’s exposure to non-medical forms of suffering caused by
state oppression has led him to conceive of systems (rather than individuals) as the obstacle that
makes any future happiness impossible. Iwan reaffirms his anti-future stance by taking the
position that the revolutionary, pacifist newspaper will never lead to progress, but when the
police raid the press, Iwan protects his fellow revolutionaries (and potentially the future of the
press) by burning incriminating documents. Caught by the police, he takes one of their guns and
commits suicide rather than returning to exile in Siberia.
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Iwan’s suicide returns the narrative to the question of what lives are worth living, an issue
primarily explored through Mara’s wish that she had never been born and through Enrique’s
meticulous biocertification of Gelcha’s family history. Although Iwan suffered from organ
failure that he believed would kill him, the constant pain does not make life unlivable. His
suicide demonstrates that the conditions of exile—that is, systemic oppression—makes life
unlivable, not his health problems. It is impossible to read the conclusion of Iwan’s story as a
success but, given the novel’s political revelations, I disagree with the assessment that Iwan’s
suicide demonstrates that “Iwan’s project fail[s] as definitively as Enrique’s” (Hooper, A
Stranger 38). Even at the most simplistic level, Iwan’s climax, unlike Enrique’s, does not result
in the death of the people he was trying to help. More importantly, however, it is difficult to
define Iwan’s project. If we take the underground press to be his project, there is no reason to
believe it will not continue after his death. Conversely, in his discussion in the press room, he
claims that if he believed in the possibility of progress, it would be through anarchic terrorism,
but (he reiterates) he does not believe in progress. If anything, based on his conversations with
Enrique, his “project” is characterized by the last bit of advice he gives his friend: accept
suffering and continue living, until you no longer can. Moreover, Iwan’s last chapter documents
the violence of Russian police and military to enforce censorship, which outraged Casanova
(Alayeto 26). Despite Iwan’s cruelty and cynicism, his anti-future stance is portrayed as more
empathetic and socially-informed than Enrique’s eugenic program.
The novel’s last chapter reveals how Mara, like Iwan, has accepted suffering as a part of
life, with the difference that Mara does not necessarily believe, as Iwan does, that national
progress or the advancement of humanity is an impossibility. Mara’s unstated “project” extends
Iwan’s by committing herself to accept suffering and find pleasure in continued life, specifically
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by running a schoolhouse in Lithuania and performing acts of charity. Her life illustrates a
different relationship with the future—one marked by her acceptance of the unknowability of her
life expectancy and her efforts to build a better society. It is, of course, impossible to ignore that
Mara has participated in Enrique’s eugenic project by deciding to leave him, but the surprise of
returning to a character that had presumably died years before nevertheless reaffirms the limited
speculation of Enrique’s eugenic vision. After all, she has outlived Iwan, as well as Enrique’s
hope for his eugenic marriage.
With regards to Mara’s utopic Lithuanian life, Hooper has argued that despite the final
chapter’s “claims to inclusion” the idealization of Mara’s conclusion remains “[based] on the
middle-class, ethnically Polish women of whom Mara is the principal representative—[and] is, in
its way, equally limited” (A Stranger 50). In relation to the novel’s broader questions about
reproduction, we can identify further limitations. The final chapter not only upholds the novel’s
investment in national and racial regeneration, but specifically in the regenerational role of
children. As scholars have noted, the role of the female teacher in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century was associated with women’s social duties to raise the nation’s citizens (San
Román Gago 112; Palacios 21-22) thereby casting women teachers in the role of “madresmaestras” (mother-teachers; Palacio 22). Mara may not be able to or choose to reproduce, but the
novel affirms her traditionally feminine qualities by positioning her as a maternal figure to many
children. Even though Casanova appears to advocate for women’s education through Mara’s
university-level studies and Gelcha’s attempts to learn about the world, within this framework,
the exclusive function of women’s education is to raise children for the nation.
In this sense, Casanova’s views diverge from that of Spanish women writers in the fin-desiècle who were more progressive (at least in terms of gender issues). Since 1868, Spanish
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Krausists had argued for women’s education on the basis of their role as mothers to the nation’s
future citizens but an 1892 conference on women in Madrid marked a turning point on the debate
of women’s education (Johnson 15-17). At this conference, Emilia Pardo Bazán became “la
primera en defender una enseñanza dirigida a beneficiar a la mujer y no pensada en la función de
la misión de ésta en una sociedad patriarcal” (the first to defend [women’s] education directed
toward benefitting women and not imagined in terms of the function of women in a patriarchal
society; Jagoe 131). Casanova, on the other hand, appeared to hold a more conservative view
than Pardo Bazán, as she publicly criticized feminist movements and instead “praise[d] the
efforts of emancipated Polish women who worked outside of the home and helped build the
Polish nation, but remained excellent wives and mothers and did not lose sight of their feminine
responsibilities” (Alayeto 161).
Furthermore, in concordance with her normative femininity, which one scholar has
described as “pallid, submissive, almost masochistic” (Alayeto 161), Mara also reifies the
normativity of being a “good patient.” In his discussion on what constituted a “good patient” of
an incurable illness in the nineteenth-century, Jason Szabo notes that “women were singled out
as exemplary incurables because they tended to respond constructively to suffering… many
made a stirring display of self-abnegation and devotion to others” (160). Mara’s charity and her
education of children satisfy the devotion he describes. Despite the happiness that Mara appears
to find in her charity work, her persisting love for Enrique functions as a kind of “compulsory
nostalgia” (Kafer 42) for her life before tuberculosis, implying that even the best existence with
an incurable illness remains incomplete and that it is incomplete because of thwarted
heterosexual desires. The depiction of her nostalgia is all the more a normalizing gesture (and
further proof that she is a “good patient”) in that it reminds us that Mara’s decision to end her
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relationship with Enrique may be read as an enactment of eugenics in itself. The fact that she
chose not to reproduce or to advocate for the possibility of a relationship without reproduction—
and that she never expressed any resistance toward his ideas before her illness—may suggest that
she also held eugenic values.
Despite these significant affirmations of what it means to be a good woman patient,
Mara’s trajectory remains triumphantly subversive in the face of curative time by flouting the
expectations that living with tuberculosis constituted a kind of death, an existence without a
future or a valuable present. Johnson has demonstrated that women’s modernist literature
challenged the idea of “biology as destiny” (185) and explored new domestic dynamics (12),
which I would argue that El doctor Wolski does in surprising ways. Johnson’s examination of
this topic centers entirely on examples of biological sex as pre-determining a heteronormative
way of life. Although Mara in many ways reinforces normative femininity, she challenges the
idea that life is determined exclusively by biological qualities. Her life in Lithuania stands in
stark contrast to the living death with which Enrique associated tuberculosis at the beginning of
the novel and has subverted her own expectations of her prognosis. Her letter to Enrique had
expressed fears that she would alienate those closest to her as her health deteriorated.
Preemptively mourning the loss of her social life, she wrote, “necesitaré ser cuidada … [y] mis
amigos se apartarán de mí, porque mi mal es contagioso…” (I will need to be cared for… and
my friends will leave me because my illness is contagious; 147). Instead, the maternal care that
Mara provides for children and for victims of domestic abuse undermines the prognosis of
passivity and solitude, as well as the expectation that being a caregiver and care receiver are
mutually exclusive identities.
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Moreover, Mara’s life in Lithuania functions as one of the new domestic arrangements
that women’s modernist literature often depicted according to Johnson. Women novelists,
Johnson contends, depicted characters who pushed against the denial of work identity to women.
The argument that Mara is rewarded because she renounces her un-feminine ambitions (Hooper,
“El Doctor Wolski en su contexto” 46) is rooted in Mara’s interest in Enrique’s medical career
and in her university studies. While her career ambitions take a more modest, feminine route that
situate her in a maternal role, her position as a paid educator at a time when women’s career
opportunities were limited and criticized is nevertheless noteworthy. Given Mara’s continued
reliance on María, their domestic dynamic represented in the Lithuania is only made possible by
Mara’s class status, but nevertheless offers a positive alternative to married life. Her identity as
an educator, caregiver, and unmarried, financially independent woman is both added to her
identity as a woman with tuberculosis and facilitated by that identity.
Most importantly for the purposes of considering Mara’s relationship to crip time,
Casanova’s use of the conventions of romantic literature cast Mara’s life as a potentially
desirable form of existence. Mara’s “sonrisa valerosa de un sufrimiento hondo y callado…
hermosura inmaterial y sublime que proyecta el alma sobre la materia próxima a caer en la
tumba…” (brave smile of a deep and silent suffering… immaterial and sublime beauty that the
soul projects over the matter that will soon fall into the tomb…; 285) exemplifies the Romanticera idealization of tuberculosis as a “spiritualization of the being” (Dubos 65). By grafting the
idealization of tuberculosis from the Romantic tradition into a debate about eugenics, the novel
creates a space to consider the potential for social and personal value in the experience of illness.
This vision of tuberculosis is aestheticized and based on Mara’s class status, but it nevertheless
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proposes that in a successful model of national regeneration, disability does not preclude social
engagement or contribution.
The final sentence in the novel depicts Mara enjoying the sunset while listening to the
Angelus, a daily Catholic prayer. Beyond the divine sanction of Mara’s ethics that this closing
scene provides, it also offers a return to the different relationships to futurity between Enrique
and Mara. It is difficult not to draw parallels between the birth of Enrique’s son at dawn three
chapters earlier. While Enrique’s joy, rooted in a push toward progress, would be short-lived,
Mara’s sunset offers an alternative approach to progress. Her enjoyment of the prayer that “en la
diáfana serenidad de la tarde vibró pausado” (in the diaphanous serenity of the evening vibrated,
paused; 286) illustrates a slower experience of time than Enrique’s. While the setting sun signals
her acceptance of death, the reference to the Angelus situates her relationship to futurity as
focused in day-by-day existence and in a faith-based view of eternity, rather than in the
measuring of progress over time. As Hooper has argued, Mara’s life in Lithuania depicts a
sentimental association between women and cyclical time that could reverse the damaging
effects of modernity, and yet, her social interactions signal specific, socially modern initiatives,
such as providing a space for victims of domestic abuse and making education universally
available (A Stranger 49). At once cyclical and modern, Mara’s life is also a form of crip time
marked, occasionally, through the smaller intervals of continued life, as in the inhale and exhale
of “su respirar anheloso” (her gasping breath; 286). Her extensive social work and community
building, as well as the continued uncertainty about her longevity, indicate that the utopia
presented in Lithuania is a different kind of imagined future than the domestic daily ritual
usually sentimentalized as feminine.
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Through Mara, Gelcha, Enrique, and Iwan, El doctor Wolski represents distinct
negotiation of scientific interventions in the social landscape, and in doing so exposes two
important aspects of early eugenics. The first is that scientific representations of health through
fin-de-siècle biocertification, through the actuarial tracing of heredity and inheritable disease,
narrowed the definition of health. This was disabling, as we can see in the cases of Mara and
Gelcha. When Mara is diagnosed with hereditary tuberculosis, her inability to produce a healthy
Polish heir forecloses any attempt by her or Enrique to imagine the possibility of sustaining or
managing her health through the illness, which she is able to do in Lithuania. Gelcha, who
suffers the brunt of Enrique’s eugenic plan, is simultaneously healthy enough to have his child
and always potentially diseased or disabled — first, by the possibility of carrying a latent
predisposition to an illness, and later, by the possibility of introducing undesirable environmental
factors into the unborn child’s life. Enrique’s treatment of Gelcha exposes the gendered nature of
disease and disability in eugenics, and specifically in soft eugenics’ focus on motherhood as a
crucial site of social improvement. Indeed, his behavior towards her illustrates eugenicist and
pediatrician Huerta’s proclamation that “todas las miserias sociales se forjan en el útero de la
mujer” (35). By employing scientific rhetoric, Casanova exhibits how actual medical discourse
neglected the health of incurable subjects and negated the health of future mothers.
The second is that, if scientific representations of illness create increasingly narrow
understanding of health, representations of crip time can find fissures to re-open and expand the
category of what counts as a life that is worth living. Hooper has noted that Mara presents an
inclusive vision of the future (“Fin de siècle” 186), to which I would add that her vision is only
reached by virtue of being cast out of a eugenic program. Her painful casting out opens the
possibility for her own social project. Neither submitting to the past by limiting herself to her
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plans before the diagnosis, nor sacrificing herself to the expectations of her prognosis, Mara
finds happiness in the day-to-day practices of caring for her community. The community
imagined in the final scene of El doctor Wolski returns us to an earlier phrase that indicated Mara
would find “otro mundo donde los tristes serán consolados” (another world, where sad persons
will be consoled; 150). While the introduction of this phrase during Mara’s preparations for her
final years in Lithuania appeared to allude to her death, her continued life plays a role in
constructing this other world within an existing society. This other world is one in which there is
a future for disability. It can be glimpsed through feminized (sentimental, mystical) and not-yetimagined avenues, and, Casanova suggests, it can be created within existing societies.
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Conclusion

At the fin-de-siècle, depictions of crip time in Spanish literature spoke to cultural
anxieties about social and national progress—not only how progress would be achieved, but the
risks that could accompany it. The Spanish Restoration witnessed the crystallization of
institutions of social control aimed at facilitating economic development in Spain and the
concomitant rise of medical interventions with the objective of curing social ills. Western
European discourses on degeneration—focusing on race, crime, productivity, and reproduction—
were crucial to the configuration of disability and gave rise to the idea that disabled subjects
were a threat to the future. The novels we have examined reveal that prominent and popular finde-siècle authors sought ways to understand how disability was culturally constituted in society
and to explore the ethical implications of eliminating disability in the name of progress. Within
this context, depictions of crip time questioned scientific authority by subverting medical
expectations and, at times surprisingly, challenged discourses that devalued disabled and
otherwise marginal subjects.
An examination of crip time in literature is crucial to nuancing the complex and
contradictory views in the cultural imaginary regarding progress in turn-of-the-century Spain. It
is, on the one hand, not surprising that these anxieties would find expression in representations of
the medical gaze and the disabled body— and that they would anticipate the more sustained
eugenics projects of the twentieth century. On the other hand, it may be unexpected to see that
valuing subjects diagnosed as degenerate or disabled produces ruptures across other norms
(constructions of gender, race, and class) within the literary text. If we take this to suggest that,
as disability theorist Lennard Davis implies, the disabled body lurks behind every image of
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transgression and deviance, then valuing disabled subjects is key to re-writing dominant cultural
paradigms.
Literary fiction gives expression to marginal subjectivities alongside cultural anxieties. It
considers competing narrative futures, varying desires for what a positive outcome entails—and
in doing so, fiction opens the space to imagine a possibility that dominant cultural ideals deny:
disability can still exist in a desirable future. In Feminist, Queer, Crip, Alison Kafer writes “I,
we, need to imagine crip futures because disabled people are continually being written out of the
future, rendered as the sign of the future that no one wants” (46). The erasure of disabled
subjects from the future is not a metaphor, Kafer insists, pointing to ongoing practices of
institutionalization that deny people with disabilities a future and “it is my loss, our loss, not to
take care of, embrace, and desire all of us” (46). In the nineteenth century Spanish novel,
disabled characters express their desire for a future in which they are admired (Telmo in La
piedra angular), loved (Rafael in Torquemada and Almudena in Misericordia), and given the
opportunity to contribute to a community (Mara in El doctor Wolski). The articulation of this
desire encourages us to imagine a world in which that is possible.
These works do not elide the ways in which disabled characters might uphold dominant
ideals that dehumanize others in an attempt to preserve or acquire what little power they can
within existing structures. In the chapters analyzed here, these power dynamics are evident in
disabled characters’ militaristic pride (La piedra angular), racism (Misericordia), classism (Los
Pazos de Ulloa, “Leliña,” and “La esteril”), and an attachment to gender norms (El doctor
Wolski), with overlap among these categories. Nevertheless, the bonds they forge with others
compel a recognition of interdependence. The acknowledgement that all subjects are dependent
on others has the capacity to render the dependency of disabled subjects more acceptable and
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encourage the valorization of caregiving. Positive interdependence and caring labor, these works
suggest, are the methods by which to value otherwise undervalued lives, even at a time of
economic, racial, and imperial redefinition.
These issues—the problem of reifying dominant ideals in an attempt to affirm the agency
of a disabled subject and the possibility of interdependence and caregiving as radical frameworks
for social change—remain relevant in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. My analysis, I
hope, has signaled fruitful ground for the examination of constructions of crip time in the fullfledged eugenics debates and modernist literature that followed under the dictatorship of Miguel
Primo de Rivera and under the Second Spanish Republic. In the first third of the twentieth
century, eugenic discussions in Spain increasingly included socialist and anarcho-feminist
perspectives that sought a new social and sexual order. While these have not yet been studied
from a disability theory approach, the intersections between feminist and socialist eugenics and
questions of interdependence are promising. Likewise, an analysis of literature written under
Francoist censorship might provide important insights into the redefinition of “abnormal” from a
medical classification of disability in the nineteenth century to an explicitly political category
that designated ideological enemies, suggestive of the way in which disability was constructed
within the program of Spain’s “racial hygiene” (Camos 144).
With regard to the problem of reifying oppressive practices or ideals, Benjamin Fraser
raises the question of how minoritized groups’ use of rights-based discourses and appeals to
economic inclusion may risk reaffirming patterns of disempowerment in the twenty-first century
Spanish context (8-9). While both he and Robert McRuer see the need for disability rights groups
to demand recognition by normative institutions and through normative practices as
indispensable “in the short term” (Fraser 9), both scholars’ celebration of the importance of
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interdependence in art and activism in Spain points to a long-term course for cultural change.
Benjamin Fraser’s scholarship, which includes among its objects of study texts authored or
partially-authored by people with cognitive disabilities showcases “the need to consistently
recognize the potential of collaboration” (23). In his critique of global austerity politics, Robert
McRuer examines the connections between disability and the 15-M movement, which included
disability activists and incited a cultural flashpoint for the theorization of precarity and
community support.
Studies of crip time can unearth practices of resistance against eugenics, austerity, and
other forms of violence. The question of how the futures we imagine can devalue living subjects
gives way to critiques of institutional and personal practices, including the unintentional ways in
which efforts for the empowerment of marginal subjects can reproduce cultural values that
disempower others. Even through these critiques, however, literary and cultural representations
of crip time can foment the desire for a more livable society and explore the means by which to
create it.
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